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The book, pamphlet, and newsletter were taken
up with urgency by Muslims in the nineteenth
century in order to counter the threat posed to
the Islamic world by European imperialism. The
culama were initially at the forefront of this revo-
lution, using a newly expanded and more widely
distributed literature base to create a much
broader constituency for their teachings. An
inevitable side-effect of this phenomenon, how-
ever, was the demise of their stranglehold over
the production and dissemination of religious
knowledge. Muslims found it increasingly easy
to bypass formally-trained religious scholars in
the search for authentic Islam and for new ways
of thinking about their religion. The texts were in
principle now available to anyone who could
read them; and to read is, of course, to interpret.
These media opened up new spaces of religious
contestation where traditional sources of
authority could be challenged by the wider pub-
lic. As literacy rates began to climb almost expo-
nentially in the twentieth century, this effect was
amplified even further. The move to print tech-
nology hence meant not only a new method for
transmitting texts, but also a new idiom of
selecting, writing and presenting works to cater
to a new kind of reader.1
Contemporary Muslims have been speculat-
ing about the utility of electronic information
technology in the organization of religious
knowledge for some time now. Abdul Kadir
Barkatulla, director of London’s Islamic Comput-
ing Centre, explains that he first became attract-
ed to computer-mediated data storage in his
capacity as a scholar of hadith, a field which
involves the archiving and retrieval of thousands
upon thousands of textual references. The CD-
ROM has provided an invaluable medium for his
work. The entire Qur'an (including both text and
recitation) along with several collections of
hadith, tafsir, and fiqh can easily fit on a single
disc. Barkatulla sees this development as having
the greatest relevance for those Muslims who
live in circumstances where access to religious
scholars is limited, such as in the West. For him,
such CD-ROM selections offer a useful alterna-
tive. ‘IT doesn’t change the individual’s relation-
ship with his religion’, he says, ‘but rather it pro-
vides knowledge supplements and clarifies the
sources of information such that Muslims can
verify the things they hear for themselves’.
Barkatulla sees IT as a useful tool for systematiz-
ing religious knowledge, but – crucially – only
pre-existing juridical opinions. In his terms, IT is
only for working with knowledge that has
already been ‘cooked’, and not for generating
new judgements. There are, however, those who
disagree with him. Sacad al-Faqih, for example,
leader of the London-based ‘Movement for
Islamic Reform in Arabia’ and another keen
advocate of information technology, believes
that the average Muslim can now revolutionize
Islam with just a basic understanding of Islamic
methodology and a CD-ROM. In his view, the
technology goes a long way to bridging the
‘knowledge gap’ between an calim and a lay
Muslim by placing all of the relevant texts at the
fingertips of the latter. ’I am not an calim’, he
says, ‘but with these tools I can put together
something very close to what they would pro-
duce when asked for a fatwa’.
That is certainly not to say, however, that the
culama have been entirely marginalized. In fact,
some religious scholars have become quite
enthusiastic about computer technology them-
selves. ‘Traditional centres of Islamic learning
(such as al-Azhar in Cairo and Qom in Iran) did
not respond to the opportunities offered by IT
for about ten years’, Barkatulla observes, ‘but
now they are forced to’. He alludes to something
like a ‘race to digitize Islam’ among leading cen-
tres of religious learning around the world.
Because the modern religious universities have
developed comprehensive information systems,
the more conservative, traditional institutions
are now forced to respond in kind in order to
keep up with the times. At the Centre for Islamic
Jurisprudence in Qom, Iran, several thousand
texts, both Sunni and Shici, have been converted
to electronic form. While Sunni institutions tend
to ignore Shici texts, the Shica centres are digitiz-
ing large numbers of Sunni texts in order to pro-
duce databases which appeal to the Muslim
mainstream, and hence capture a larger share of
the market for digital Islam.
Neither has the rise of electronic ‘print Islam’
eradicated the saliency of the oral tradition. Elec-
tronic media are as adept with sound as they are
with the written word. Certainly we have heard
much about the role of audio cassettes in Iran’s
Islamic revolution, where recordings of Khomei-
ni’s sermons were smuggled over from his
Neauphle-le-Chateau headquarters near Paris
and, much to the Shah’s dismay, widely distrib-
uted in Iran. The Friday sermon, or khutba, is
today recorded at many mosques throughout
the Muslim world and the distribution of these
recordings along with addresses by prominent
ideologues consciously emulating the rhetoric
of influential modern Muslim thinkers such as
Sayyid Qutb, Ali Shariati, and Abu'l Ali Mawdudi,
serves to politicize Islam before an audience of
unprecedented proportions. Recordings of ser-
mons by dissident Saudi culama, such as Safar al-
Hawali and Salman al-cAwda, also circulate wide-
ly both inside and outside the Kingdom, and this
marks the first time that material openly critical
of the Saudi regime has been heard by relatively
large sections of that country’s population. The
website of a London-based Saudi opposition
group has also made Salman al-cAwda’s sermons
available over the Internet using the latest audio
streaming technology.2 ‘Now that media tech-
nology is increasingly able to deal with other
symbolic modes’, notes the anthropologist Ulf
Hannerz, ‘we may wonder whether imagined
communities are increasingly moving beyond
words’.3
It is perhaps on the Internet, however, that
some of the most interesting things are happen-
ing. Can we meaningfully speak today about the
emergence of new forms of Islamic virtual com-
munity? To begin with, we need to make sure
that we have a more nuanced understanding of
those Muslim identities which use the Internet.
We cannot start talking about new forms of dias-
poric Muslim community simply because many
users of the Internet happen to be Muslims. Not-
ing that in many instances Muslim uses of the
Internet seem to represent little more than the
migration of existing messages and ideas into a
new context, Jon Anderson rightfully warns that
‘new talk has to be distinguished from new peo-
ple talking about old topics in new settings’.4 Yet
we also have to acknowledge the possibility that
the hybrid discursive spaces of the Muslim Inter-
net can give rise, even inadvertently, to new for-
mulations and critical perspectives on Islam and
the status of religious knowledge. As regards
notions of political community in Islam, there is
also the Internet’s impact on ‘centre-periphery’
relations in the Muslim world to be examined. A
country such as Malaysia, usually considered to
be on the margins of Islam both in terms of
geography and religious influence, has invested
heavily in information and networking technolo-
gies. As a result, when searching on the Internet
for descriptions of programmes which offer for-
mal religious training, one is far more likely to
encounter the comprehensive course outlines
provided by the International Islamic University
of Malaysia than to stumble across the venerable
institutions of Cairo, Medina, or Mashhad.
P E T E R  M A N D AV I L L E
The phenomenal popularization and transnational prop-
agation of communications and information technolo-
gies (hereafter referred to as IT) in recent years has gen-
erated a wide range of important questions in the con-
text of Islam’s sociology of knowledge. How have these
technologies transformed Muslim concepts of what
Islam is and who possesses the authority to speak on its
behalf? Moreover, how are they changing the ways in
which Muslims imagine the boundaries of the u m m a?
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Digital Islam:
Changing the Boundaries of
Religious Knowledge?
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The inaugural issue of the ISIM Newsletter has received favourable
response. We tried to reach a large audience and reactions to the
first mailing, indeed, came from all over the globe. These positive
reactions demonstrate the existence of a demand for information
on the multifaceted field of the study of modern Islam and Muslim
communities – or ‘communities of Muslims’ as Filali-Ansary puts it
( p . 6) – as well as for an exchange of ideas and findings generated
by research. In this second issue, we try to continue along this line.
In comparison to the inaugural Newsletter, the geographical
spread of the contributions to this issue is ex-
panded, bringing us to the geographical margins
of the world of Islam: Vietnam, The Philippines,
Australia, South Africa, Trinidad and the Czech
Republic. More than anything else, this global
expanse shows that the world of Islam – through migration and
conversion – is interwoven with other worlds, both old and new.
This interwovenness, however, does not mean that the mutual
(and self) images and conceptions which Muslims and non-Muslims
have necessarily imply social or religious affinities. In several con-
tributions, the rapport – but also the lack thereof – is dealt with
directly or indirectly, both within the range of academic and ideo-
logical discourse (e.g. secularism in Muslim and Christian experi-
ences) and of societal and political practice (e.g. political represen-
tation and radicalization). The growing interest in non-political
Islam, too, is evident in this issue; the religious debates within Islam
receive increased attention, in particular the more ‘liberal’ trends,
as do the more mystical currents. Mass culture and the new media
have recently stimulated fresh research into the swiftly expanding
worlds of broadcasted and – even – digital Islam. Issues of gender
and of other social and cultural categories, like age (youth) and eth-
nic background, feature in a number of articles, varying from
reflection on methodologies to performing arts and song. Most,
but not all, contributions deal directly with Islamic or Muslim cate-
gories. Some deal with aspects of societies which are predominant-
ly Muslim in composition, but which have no, or no direct, bearing
on religious thought or practice, but then no society of Muslims can
be solely understood from religious angles. Fur-
thermore, Muslim societies are also to be under-
stood from the perspective of their historical
experiences. More articles in this issue reflect this
perspective than in the first.
The ISIM Newsletter has the ambition of covering activities concern-
ing the study of Islam and Muslim societies. This information, along
with news on vacancies, grants, and fellowships, is presented in the
ISIM  ‘Info Pages’. In order to offer updated information, the ISIM
relies on its readers. You are invited to send us (by e-mail, fax, etc.)
comments on the contents of specific articles or the Newsletter as a
whole, and information on activities you think relevant to our audi-
ence (also by digital forms on our website). When processed, the
information will be made available also on the ISIM website. ♦
D I C K  D O UW E S
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The ISIM Newsletter is a tri-annual publication of
the International Institute for the Study of Islam
i n the Modern World (ISIM). Responsibility for the
facts and opinions expressed in this publication
rests solely with the authors. Their views do not
necessarily reflect those of the Institute or its
supporters. The ISIM Newsletter is free of charge.
E d i t o r i a l
ISIM Academic Committee
The following scholars have become
members of the ISIM Academic
Committee, which is still in formation.
Prof. Dr Mamadou Diouf
Prof. Diouf is affiliated with the
Université Cheikh Anta Diop Dakar-
Fann and the Council for the Develop-
ment of Social Science Research in
Africa (CODESRIA) in Dakar, Senegal.
H e is an anthropologist and historian.
He is the author of, amongst others,
L e Kajoor au XIX siècle: pouvoir ceddo
e t conquête coloniale, Paris, 1990.
Prof. Dr Jean-François Leguil-Bayart
Prof. Leguil-Bayart is director of
t h e Centre d’Études et de Recherches
Internationales (CERI) in Paris. His
interests include political sciences,
historicity of the state and foreign
politics. His geographical interests are
Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey and Iran.
Most recently he has published
l ’ I l l u s i o nI d e n t i t a i r e, 1996. 
Prof. Dr Gudrun Krämer
Prof. Krämer holds the chair of
I s l a m i c Studies at the Free University of
Berlin since 1996. Her fields of interest
are: modern Middle Eastern history and
current Arab affairs, contemporary
Islamic political thought, and
m i n o r i t i e s in the Muslim Arab world.
Her main geographical interest is Egypt.
To appear soon is Der Gottesstaat als
R e p u b l i k.
Sami Zubaida
Sami Zubaida is reader in Sociology,
Birkbeck College, University of London,
and chairman of the Department of
Politics and Sociology since 1997. His
interests are wide and include religion,
ethnicity, and nationalism, and food
and culture. His geographical interests
comprise Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Turkey.
H e is the author of Islam, the People
a n d the State, London, 1993.
ISIM Professorial Fellowhip
The first Professorial Fellowship
o f ISIM has been granted to Prof. Dr
Muhammad Khalid Masud. A graduate
of McGill University, Montreal, Professor
Masud became affiliated with the Islam-
ic Research Institute, International Islam-
ic University, Islamabad, Pakistan
( S e e also ISIM Newsletter 1 page 43 for
details on this institute). His interests are
wide but he is in particular known for his
work on Islamic law and legal philoso-
phy. His geographical interest comprises
most parts of the Muslim world, in par-
ticular South Asia. Professor Masud is a
prolific author and has published books
and articles in many scholarly magazines
and journals. He is the author of I q b a l ’ s
Reconstruction of Ijtihad, IRI & Iqbal
Academy. Among his most well-known
editing works is Islamic Legal Interpreta-
tion: the Muftis and their Fatwas, co-
edited with Brinkley Messick and
David Powers, Cambridge, USA, 1996.
Dr S.J. Noorda:
P r e s i d e n t of the U n i v e r s i t y
of Amsterdam
On 1 January 1999, Dr S.J. (Sijbelt)
Noorda was appointed President of the
University of Amsterdam (UvA). He had
been acting President after the untimely
death of his predecessor, Dr J.K.M. Gev-
ers. Dr Noorda had been vice-president
of the University of Amsterdam since
1991. The UvA is one of the founding
universities of ISIM. Dr Noorda is Chair-
man of the Board of ISIM. He studied
Theology at the Vrije Universiteit Ams-
terdam and at the Union Theological
Seminary/Colombia University in New
York and defended his PhD thesis at
Utrecht University. 
Before embarking on his career as
university board member, he worked as
a scholarly member of the Bible Transla-
tion and Hermeneutics section of Vrije
Universiteit Amsterdam. He is currently
Chairman of the project board of the
new translation of the Bible into Dutch.
Letters to the Editor
The ISIM solicits your response to
t h e ISIM Newsletter. We intend to allow
space for reactions to, and comments
o r opinions on, articles contained in this
publication. If you wish to contribute to
this section, please do so via one of the
following addresses. Be sure to indicate
‘Letter to the Editor’. 






R e t r a c t i o n
The ISIM Newsletter editors would
like to apologize for a misprint in the
inaugural issue. On page 42, the
director’s name and address of the CIE
(Centre for Islam in Europe) figured
o n the bottom of the page under the
information for the NIAASC
(Netherlands Institute for Archaeology
and Arabic Studies in Cairo). 
T h ec o r r e c t addresses are as follows:
Centre for Islam in Europe
Director: Professor Herman de Ley
Address: Blandijnberg 2
B-9000 Gent, Belgium
Tel: +32 9 264 40 251
Fax: +32 9 264 6441 
Nederlands-Vlaams Instituut in Cairo
( N V I C )
Former Netherlands Institute for
Archaeology and Arabic Studies in
Cairo (NIAASC)
D i r e c t o r :
Professor Johannes den Heijer
Address: 1, Mahmud Azmi Street
Zamalek, Cairo Egypt
Tel: +20 2 3400076
Fax: +20 2 3404376
N e t h e r l a n d s - F l e m i s h
Institute in Cairo
Nederlands-Vlaams Instituut
i n Cairo (NVIC)
On February 10, 1999 the
Netherlands Institute for Archaeology
and Arabic Studies in Cairo (NIAASC)
changed its name. The NIAASC is now
called the Nederlands-Vlaams
Instituut in Cairo (NVIC) in Cairo
( a l-M achad al-Hulandi al-Falamanki bi
l-Qahira in Arabic). The name change
was witnessed by representatives of
the Dutch and Belgian governments,
the presidents of the General Board
and the Scientific Council, and by
representatives of participating
institutions. Representatives of
various Egyptian scholarly and
cultural institutions as well as foreign
institutions based in Cairo were also
p r e s e n t .
At the occasion, the role of the
N V I C (NIAASC) in Arab Studies in
t h e Netherlands was highlighted by
P r o f .D r R. Kruk of Leiden University,
Chairperson of the Scientific Board
o f the NVIC. Prof. Dr U. Vermeulen
o ft h e Catholic University Leuven,
member of the Scientific Council of
the NVIC, spoke about the role of
NVIC in Arab Studies in Flanders.
M I S C E L L A N E O U S
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I S I M
D I C K  D O U W E S ISIM Opening Day
The Guest
The coming of Faezeh Hashemi attracted
much attention, although few were to have
the opportunity to actually see her. In the week
before the opening, news of her participation
spread quickly. She had been invited on the
basis of her special position in Iran, where she
gives voice to certain opposition currents and
strives to increase the participation of women
in public life. Aimed at softening the restrictive
character of the present Islamic regime, Hashe-
mi’s activities arouse the suspicion of the more
conservative guardians of the Islamic Revolu-
tion. Inside Iran, she has gained popularity by
her attempts to alter the Islamic regime from
within, although she often has to ‘walk a thin
line’. The fact that she is the daughter of for-
mer president Ali Akbar Rafsanjani helps to
explain her remarkable performance in the tur-
bulent political environment of present-day
Iran. She operates, not without risk, in particu-
lar when it comes to the views expressed in the
periodical Z a n, which sometimes are perceived
as ‘anti-state’ by conservative forces, as reflect-
ed in the recent trials.
Her presence at the opening was met with
curiosity by some, anxiety by others. The Dutch
academia and media were curious about this
unexpected female guest from a country nor-
mally perceived as being hostile to most of our
values. During the last year, in particular after
the election of Khatami as president of Iran, it
had become apparent to many that the `situa-
tion in Iran was more complex. The invitation
and her acceptance reflected a growing open-
ness in mutual policies. Others were far less
welcoming, particularly the community of
Iranian refugees in the Netherlands (about
30,000). Word of her participation was received
with astonishment and anger. Certain groups
strongly opposed to her presence at the open-
ing requested and gained permission of the
local police to demonstrate against her and
the Islamic Republic. In their eyes, being a
Member of Parliament meant that she repre-
sented the Iranian regime and, moreover,
being the daughter of former president Raf-
sanjani, some held her accountable for their
sufferings during his presidency.
The Demonstration
The morning of the opening, scores of demon-
strators assembled at the entrance of the Con-
cert Hall in the main street of the inner city. The
supporters of the Mujahidin-i Khalq were clearly
the most vocal group. Their slogans were sup-
ported by beating drums. They waved banners
containing the picture of their leader Rajavi. The
other demonstrators belonged to various leftist
groups who carefully kept some distance from
the Mujahidin. The demonstrations were not
limited to the exterior of the building; a number
of opponents of the Iranian regime entered the
Concert Hall – the opening day was indeed a
public affair – and some supporters of the
Mujahidin succeeded in approaching Faezeh
Hashemi just after she had arrived. In the com-
motion, Mrs Hashemi decided to leave.
This decision proved to be a wise one, for
later, when Dr Martin van Bruinessen attempt-
ed to read out the text of Hashemi’s speech,
many demonstrators in the audience prevent-
ed him from doing so, mostly by shouting slo-
gans – including ‘Death to Rafsanjani’ and
‘Death to Khatami’. Some male demonstrators
jumped on the stage in an attempt to capture
the microphone. The demonstrators could not
be quieted down. During lunchtime the orga-
nization – with the great help of some Iranians
living in the Netherlands – succeeded in con-
vincing the demonstrators that Mrs Hashemi
had left. The demonstration was disbanded,
allowing the programme to continue as
s c h e d u l e d .
The Opening
The programme started as scheduled with a
short word of welcome by the ISIM director-in-
charge, Prof. W.A.L. Stokhof, on behalf of the
ISIM Board. The Netherlands’ State Secretary of
Justice, Mr. J. Cohen, then addressed the audi-
ence on behalf of the Dutch government. In
both speeches, the autonomy of the new
research institute was emphasized, as was the
importance of national and international
cooperation. In the words of Stokhof, ‘… the
ISIM is independent even from the govern-
ment that made its existence possible. By this
autonomy, however, the ISIM depends on the
networking of scholars to guide its plans and
activities, lighting our way into the future.’
Cohen agreed: ‘ … let me reiterate that the
ISIM is an autonomous institution and is to
determine its own programmes and activities,
but not without the participation of other aca-
demic institutions both here in the Nether-
lands and abroad.’
Stokhof stressed that modern Islam and
Muslim societies should be understood within
an historical context and that more classical
approaches in the field of Islamic Studies are
by no means incompatible to the needs of
research on modern phenomena. He added
that the activities of ISIM are embedded in the
duplex ordo, dividing science and religion. This
does not imply that the activities of ISIM will be
left to isolation within the academic communi-
ty. On the contrary, ISIM should prove its rele-
vance to society at large by rendering the aca-
demic research accessible to a broader audi-
ence. Cohen situated the founding of ISIM
within the Netherlands’ government policy to
support initiatives aimed at increasing knowl-
edge and research on societies and cultures
that are important to the Netherlands and
Europe. ‘This includes, of course, and increas-
ingly so, the Muslim world – a world which is
more and more part of our own. Today, mil-
lions of Muslims live in Western Europe,
800,000 of which live here in the Netherlands.
In order for the Netherlands to develop a truly
coherent multi-cultural society, knowledge of
its contributing cultures and societies is essen-
t i a l . ’
In contrast to the eventful morning session,
the afternoon programme ran smoothly. The
Moroccan singer Amina Alaoui and her
acoustic ensemble performed four Arabo-
Andalusian songs. 
Opening Lecture
The opening lecture, ‘Islam in the Global
Public Sphere’, was delivered by Prof. Dr Dale
Eickelman, Professor of Anthropology and
Human Relations, Dartmouth College (USA).
The text in the sidebar is taken from the con-
clusion of his speech. (The lecture will be pub-
lished by ISIM shortly.)
F o r u m
The Opening Day was concluded by a forum
discussion on the plans and policies of the
ISIM. The forum included the following mem-
bers: 
Prof. Dr Nasr Abu Zayd (Visiting Professor of
Islamic Studies, Leiden University), Prof. Dr
Dale F. Eickelman (see above), Prof. Dr Nilüfer
Göle (Professor of Sociology, Bosphorus Uni-
versity), Prof. Dr P.S. van Koningsveld (Profes-
sor of Religious History of Islam in Western
Europe, Leiden University), Prof. Dr Peter van
der Veer (Professor of Comparative Religion
and Dean of the Amsterdam School for Social
Science Research, University of Amsterdam).
Dr N.H. Biegman, author of Egypt: Moulids,
Saints and Sufis (London 1990) and currently
Permanent Representative of the Netherlands
to NATO and WEU, chaired the forum. The pre-
sentations given by the members of the forum
in general, wholeheartedly welcomed the ISIM
as an important initiative in the field of the
study of modern Islam and Muslim societies.
Prof. Nilüfer Göle highlighted the complex
aspects of modernity in the study of Islam,
whereas Prof. van der Veer pointed at the pos-
sible danger of perceiving and describing
developments in the Muslim world as being
tantamount to Islam. As representatives of the
theological and philological traditions, Prof.
Nasr Abu Zayd and Prof. P.S. van Koningsveld
stressed the importance of the integration of
these traditions into the Institute, in particular
the inclusion of scholarly reference to the nor-
mative and other texts of the Islamic tradition.
Prof. Dale Eickelman agreed to the latter
remarks, pointing to the growing number of
projects in which scholars of various discipli-
nary traditions cooperate, thus combining
their specializations. ♦
The Emerging Public Sphere
‘Without fanfare, the notion of Islam as dia-
logue and civil debate is gaining ground. Like
the ‘‘Copernican revolution”, the current break
in religious authority in the Muslim world is
likely to be seen as significant only in retro-
spect. A new sense of public is emerging
throughout Muslim-majority states and Mus-
lim communities elsewhere. It is shaped by
increasingly open contests over the use of the
symbolic language of Islam. Increasingly, dis-
cussions in newspapers, on the Internet, on
smuggled cassettes, and on television cross-
cut and overlap, contributing to a common
public space. 
New and accessible modes of communica-
tion have made these contests increasingly
global, so that even local issues take on
transnational dimensions. Muslims, of course,
act not just as Muslims but according to class
interests, out of a sense of nationalism, on
behalf of tribal or family networks, and from all
the diverse motives which characterize human
endeavour. Increasingly, however, large num-
bers of Muslims explain their goals in terms of
the normative language of Islam. Muslim iden-
tity issues are not unitary or identical, but such
issues have become a significant force in both
Muslim-majority states and those in which
Muslims form only a minority of the popula-
tion. It is in this sense that one can speak of an
emerging Muslim public sphere.
This distinctly public sphere exists at the
intersections of religious, political, and social
life and contributes to the creation of civil soci-
ety. With access to contemporary forms of
communication that range from the press and
broadcast media to fax machines, audio and
video cassettes, from the telephone to the
Internet, Muslims, like Christians, Hindus, Jews,
Sikhs, and protagonists of Asian and African
values, have more rapid and flexible ways of
building and sustaining contact with con-
stituencies than was available in earlier
decades. The asymmetries of the earlier mass
media revolution are being reversed by new
media in new hands. This combination of new
media and new contributors to religious and
political debates fosters an awareness on the
part of all actors of the diverse ways in which
Islam and Islamic values can be created. It
feeds into new senses of a public space that is
discursive, performative, and participative, and
not confined to formal institutions recognized
by state authorities. 
Just as there is general scholarly recognition
that there are multiple paths to modernity,1
there is a practical awareness of multiple
claims to the task of staging virtue,2 i n c l u d i n g
a public engagement in the name of religion. 
Publicly shared ideas of community, identity,
and leadership take new shapes in such
engagements, even as many communities and
authorities claim an unchanged continuity
with the past. Mass education, so important in
the development of nationalism in an earlier
e r a ,3 and a proliferation of media and means of
communication have multiplied the possibili-
ties for creating communities and networks
among them, dissolving prior barriers of space
and distance and opening new grounds for
interaction and mutual recognition.’
N o t e s
1 . S.N. Eisenstadt (1996), Japanese Civilization:
A Comparative View. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, pp. 396-426.
2 . Armando Salvatore (1998), ‘Staging Virtue:
T h e Disembodiment of Self-Correctness and
the Making of Islam as a Public Norm’, Y e a r-
book of the Sociology of Islam 1, pp. 87-119.
3 . Ernest Gellner (1983), Nations and
N a t i o n a l i s m. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
pp. 28-9.
On Tuesday, 20 October 1998, the International Insti-
tute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM)
celebrated its official opening day. Well over 300 people
attended the gathering in the renovated Concert Hall of
Leiden. It was to become a memorable day, attracting
extensive media coverage following protests by Iranian
asylum seekers. The morning programme consisted in
the more official aspects of the day, featuring an open-
ing speech by State Secretary of Justice and – what
sparked off an angry response of the demonstrators –
an address by Faezeh Hashemi, member of Parliament
of Iran and editor-owner of the oppositional Z a n p e r i o d-
ical. The address did not take place. After a short musi-
cal intermezzo, the afternoon programme had a more
academic tone: a lecture by anthropologist Professor
Dale Eickelman and a forum discussion on the format
and plans of the ISIM.
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The official opening of the ISIM was
enlivened by a brief musical concert of
t h e Moroccan-born singer, Amina
Alaoui, with her repertoire of the
Alcantara. Trained in Arabo-Andalusian
music and classical piano, Alaoui has
specialized in the style of Arabo-
Andalusian gharnati singing of
Morocco. Settled in Granada, Amina
Alaoui for the first time forged
t h e musical ‘Alcantara’ (phonetic for
t h e Arabic al-Qantara), bridging via
t h e medium of music, a new style
between her native town Fes and her
adoptive city of Granada. Alaoui’s
understanding and interpretation of
the ‘Alcantara’ is a musical
interpretation of a future which is m a r k e d
b y a universal and tolerant humanism. Her
presentation of this, as at the ISIM Opening
Day, was characterized by her refined vocal
range and her passion for Andalusia. 
A solo performance on the zarb by Bijane
Chemirani following the four songs by Amina
Alaoui made up the musical intermezzo.
O n eo f her songs best indicative of the spirit
o f universal love and tolerance which she tries
to impart through every musical performance
is perhaps ‘Amours ou trop tard me suis pris’,
Alaoui’s rich, soulful voice reminded everyone
present that the only enduring joy is that which
comes from a love which seeks only to serve
and give love unto others.
ISIM Advanced
D e g r e e P r o g r a m m e
In November 1999, the ISIM will begin its Advanced Degree
Programme in cooperation with participating research schools.
T h e Advanced Degree prepares students (holders of a Master’s
d e g r e e or its equivalent) for PhD research. It is open to graduates
i n the humanities, social sciences, religious studies and theology.
T h e applicants must specialize in a field specifically related to Islam
o r to a Muslim society and must demonstrate outstanding academic
qualities. The Advanced Degree programme lasts for one academic
year and includes, amongst others, courses in languages (advanced
level), research methods (including data organization), and social
science and cultural-historical approaches. The emphasis in the
selection of Advanced Degree students is clearly placed on proven
academic capacity. The programme combines course work and
individual supervision. Most students will be stationed in Leiden,
however, some may be placed at one of the ISIM participating
universities (elsewhere in the Netherlands). Although the Advanced
Degree training is a preparatory programme for PhD research, this
does not guarantee entry into an ISIM PhD programme. 
The tuition fee is 10,000 guilders (currently approximately 5,000 USD).
However, (partial) waivers may be obtained in certain cases.
F o r t h e academic year 1999-2000, a limited number of full grants
(including tuition and living costs) will be offered. For information
a n d application forms, please contact the ISIM secretariat or consult
t h e ISIM website. 
The closing date for applications is: 15 April 1999.
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The Nether l a nds
N I C O L A N D M A N
In February 1988, the Dutch government published
a policy document on imams and their training.1 In pre-
vious years, it had strongly advocated such training.
The policy document was the preliminary conclusion of
a – sometimes heated – debate: Who is in control of
future imams? Will the Dutch borders be closed to
imams from Turkey and Morocco?
Imams in
t h e N e t h e r l a n d s
Home-made Better
than Import?
The Netherlands counts approximately
700,000 persons of Islamic background. Most
belong to immigrant communities from Turkey
and Morocco, which settled in the Netherlands
in the ’60s and ’70s. Between 200 and 250
imams are employed (with a salary) in the 380
mosques in the Netherlands; in the smaller
houses of prayer the religious leaders are usu-
ally unpaid. The majority of professional
imams are recruited in the country of origin:
Turkey or Morocco. The majority of the Turkish
imams have been dispatched by the Direc-
torate for Religious Affairs for a period of four
years, at the end of which they return to
Turkey. Other imams have been educated in
the country of origin, but have settled in the
Netherlands permanently.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the exter-
nal recruitment of imams has been criticized as
being an unwelcome foreign influence on the
Muslim communities in the Netherlands and as
being a hindrance to their integration in soci-
ety. The Dutch government has ordered sever-
al investigations since 1994 and in 1998, pro-
duced the above-mentioned policy document
concerning imams. The document contains
the following aims: 1. Stimulation of a theolog-
ical institution for the training of imams within
the Dutch educational system; 2. Refresher
courses for imams who have been educated
elsewhere; and 3. Restriction on entry for new
imams from abroad if candidates in the
Netherlands are available.
On the one hand, Muslim organizations have
reacted with criticism to this government policy
by pointing to the division between Church and
State. On the other hand, they have devised
educational structures that may be eligible for
recognition and funding of the government.
Motives of Those in Favour
The Dutch government regards this matter
from the point of view of integration of ethnic
minorities. With this, the government means
their participation as full citizens in every
aspect of society. With disturbing issues such as
increasing juvenile unemployment and juve-
nile delinquency among certain ethnic minori-
ties, the government intends to develop a
social-cultural policy in which religion and ‘liv-
ing principles’ are included. The role played by
religious leaders, in casu the imams, can be pos-
itive as well as negative. They can convey
norms and values that may frustrate the inte-
gration of Islamic migrant communities in
Dutch society. In concreto this means imams
who call on their audience to limit, in as much
as possible, contact with the unbelieving infi-
dels; or those who discourage young Muslim
women from studying or pursuing a career,
based on traditional views on the position of
women. It is implicitly assumed that imams
who have been trained abroad will propagate
such conservative ideas. Apart from that, vari-
ous government bodies – among them the
Dutch Internal Intelligence Service – have
voiced their concern that imams could act as
instruments by means of which foreign author-
ities or organizations can control Muslim com-
munities in the Netherlands. 
On the other hand, one hopes that imams
who have a more positive attitude about the
society around them can break the isolation of
some Muslim groups, or at least decrease it. The
government assumes that imams trained in the
Netherlands will be well integrated into society.
The need for a new type of religious leader
who is better equipped to work in non-Islamic
environments and who is completely indepen-
dent of foreign governments is also sometimes
expressed by Muslims in the Netherlands who
are critical towards existing Muslim organiza-
tions. They blame the present generation of
imams for preaching an Islamic message which
too much assumes the self-evidence of the truth
of Islam and offers too little possibilities to enter
into discourse with the non-Muslim environ-
ment. It is especially those Muslims who con-
structively work together with non-Muslims on
a daily basis that oppose the isolationist atti-
tude of some imams. Although not doubting
the universal truth of the Islamic teaching, they
stress that it is essential to further define and
accentuate it in the social and cultural context.
The plea for Dutch imam training is further
substantiated by the consideration that Islamic
theologians should not only function within the
confinements of the mosque but also in other
social structures, such as hospitals and correc-
tional facilities. These institutions have a tradi-
tion of spiritual care for their clients, which is
given from either a Christian, Jewish or human-
ist perspective. The increased number of Mus-
lims in Dutch hospitals, and also in correctional
facilities, justifies the appointment of imams
next to the great number of ministers and
humanist counsellors. This forms part of the
greater structure (hospitals, jails, etc.) and pre-
supposes that the imam works together in a
team of people who hold different views. The
demands of professionalism placed on Christian
or humanist spiritual counsellors have not yet
been clearly formulated for ‘hospital imams’.
However, it is clear that theological training in
Turkey or Morocco will not be sufficient for this.
Therefore, the pursuit of specialized imams in
institutions forms an argument for imam train-
ing in the Netherlands.
The last argument for training imams in the
Netherlands is simply the need for imams who
can speak Dutch and who can preach, lecture
and give religious advice in that language.
Knowledge of the language of their countries of
origin strongly decreases amongst Muslims
who grow up in the Netherlands. It is evident
that an imam with insufficient knowledge of
Dutch is severely handicapped in his communi-
cation with people of the second and third gen-
erations. Concern about the Islamic training of
the future generations is the main impetus for
most Muslim organizations that want to train
their imams locally.
While the motives for imam training in the
Netherlands greatly differ with the various
actors, and while also the ideological ‘colour’ of
the training they desire varies widely, the need
for local training facilities for imams is shared by
m a n y .
Objections of Those Against
Despite the arguments in favour of local imam
training, proposals to come to bring this to
fruition are strongly objected to by existing Mus-
lim organizations. Apart from that, there is doubt
about the feasibility of the proposed training
structures. 
The opposition is mainly triggered by fear of
assimilation in the surrounding environment. As
Muslims grow increasingly more opposed to the
norms and values of secular society, their mis-
trust of politicians who promote an Islam adapt-
ed to Europe increases as well. Some Muslim
organizations fear that a theological training
supported by the government will have to make
unacceptable concessions to the dominant cul-
ture. This fear is vented amongst others through
the rejection of a ‘West European Islam’. Even
though no one would deny that the West Euro-
pean context poses specific challenges for Mus-
lims, the universal, unique and revealed charac-
ter of the Islamic message, which is not open to
concessions, is stressed.
In opposing the government policy in favour
of local imam training, antagonists refer to the
division of Church and State. Through its imam
policy, the government would involve itself in
the internal affairs of a religious organization.
Even though the division of Church and State in
the Netherlands is more an ideological image
than it is descriptive of the actual situation, it has
almost gained the status of a dogma. That is why
the government, in its policy document, stresses
that it does not want to violate that division in its
proposals. It claims only to facilitate the condi-
tions under which the Muslims themselves can
create their imam training. Notwithstanding, the
government does try to influence the Muslim
communities in the Netherlands via the imam
policy. A paradox in the discussion about the
involvement of the government with the train-
ing of imams is the fact that in the present situa-
tion a number of imams are under the control of
a foreign government, namely Turkish. If the
Dutch government interferes in that situation,
for instance by severely limiting entrance of
these imams, it is to be questioned whether, by
doing so it is supporting the autonomy of local
Muslim organizations or limiting it.
Those critical of imam training in the Nether-
lands are also opposed to the negative and over-
generalized view of the present generation of
imams. They point to the training that current
imams have had for years on end, which begins
at early age. They doubt if the same level of reli-
gious knowledge can be obtained by means of
training conform to the Dutch educational sys-
tem. They are annoyed by the pejorative atti-
tudes towards the intellectual traditions of
madrasahs (religious schools) in the Muslim
world.
A final question about the proposed imam
training concerns its feasibility. If it is assumed –
as it is by the Dutch government – that Muslim
organizations themselves will have to bear the
responsibility, is there enough organizational
strength among these internally-divided orga-
nizations? And, is there sufficient (paid) employ-
ment for students who would finish the train-
i n g ?
Recent Developments
In the policy document mentioned above,
concrete measures are announced for ‘import’
imams: In the future they will have to follow a
foundational course during which they have to
learn the Dutch language and acquire relevant
knowledge about Dutch society necessary for
their job. The government is awaiting initia-
tives from Muslim organizations and universi-
ties concerning a new imam training in higher
education and limits itself to indicating the
legal possibilities and conditions for applica-
tions in this field. It does not give any financial
commitment. Without embarking on juridical
details, it can be stated that the legal barriers
for the founding and funding of new institu-
tions for higher education would be difficult. It
would be a different matter if an already-exist-
ing university would develop Islamic theologi-
cal training: in that case conditions can be met
relatively easily. From the policy document, it
can be gathered that the Dutch government
would like to see the imam training it desires
realized in this way.
At present, the initiatives of Muslim organi-
zations are headed in a different direction. On
the one hand, there are organizations such as
Suleymanlis, which transplant training struc-
tures they have in their country of origin in the
Netherlands, without demonstrating any need
for recognition or funding by the Dutch gov-
ernment. On the other hand, there are two
organizations that do aspire to public recogni-
tion and funding, but in doing so, opt for hav-
ing their own university: the Islamitische Uni-
versiteit Rotterdam (Islamic University Rotter-
dam) which began in 1998 with a very limited
budget; and the Stiching voor Islamitisch Hoger
O n d e r w i j s (Foundation for Islamic Higher Edu-
cation) in Utrecht, which has developed plans
for a (an autonomous) Theological University,
in cooperation with Utrecht University. The
government seems to be getting what it had
asked for all these years, namely Islamic theo-
logical training at an academic level, but in a
form it does not prefer: independent institu-
tions. ♦
Nico Landman is a university lecturer in Islamic
Languages and Cultures, Utrecht University,
t h e Netherlands. In 1996, he conducted research
o nt h e possibility for imam training in
t h eD u t c h educational system, upon request
o ft h eN e t h e r l a n d s ’ State Secretary.
E-m a i l :l a n d m a n @ d e n i c s e r . l e t . u u . n l
N o t e
– The integration policy concerning ethnic
minorities in relation to their spiritual ministers.
Report of the Minister of Internal Affairs and State
Secretary Netelenbos of Education, Culture and
S c i e n c e s, Netelenbos, The Hague, 1998.
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S e c u l a r i s m
AB DO U  F I L A L I - AN S A R Y
The ‘Islam and secularism’ debate began a century ago
and does not seem to have progressed. Prevailing atti-
tudes, both ‘pro’ and ‘con’, are apparently locked in a
stalemate and an endless ‘war of positions’. Why are the
actors of different trends restating more or less the
same formulations on this issue? Is it possible to find a
likely interpretation for such a phenomenon?
The Debate on
Secularism in
C o n t e m p o r a r y
Societies of
M u s l i m s 1
The Misunderstanding
a b o u t S e c u l a r i s m
The issue of secularism is addressed in dif-
ferent ways, depending on whether the con-
text is Muslim or Christian. In the latter case, it
is treated as a process, i.e. a set of historical
changes supposed to have affected the regu-
lation of the social and political order, and to
have permeated the prevailing conceptions
(or worldviews) within society. When the con-
text is ‘Islamic’, a clear opposition is posited at
the very beginning between ‘Secularism’ and
‘Islam’, taken as broad and substantive cate-
gories, which are supposed to refer to two
separate and irreducible realms of meaning.
The question asked in the first case seems to
concern ‘how secularization happened in some
European societies at some time, and how it
influenced their functioning, and the domi-
nant attitudes of their members’. In the other
case, however, the question is most often: ‘Is
Islam compatible with secularism?’ The dis-
cussion is therefore drawn to conceptual, the-
oretical aspects: from the outset it adopts an
approach based on the manipulation of broad
concepts and discoveries, at one stage or
another. It is led to, and often locked in, a kind
of a p o r i a. Very few studies address the histori-
cal aspects of secularization within societies of
M u s l i m s ,2 i.e. ask how it affected the life and
views of Muslims, or attempt to describe what
a c t u a l l y happened since the category was dis-
covered and the changes were experienced by
Muslims. Therefore, an ideological bias seems
to dominate the debate in this field.
The few studies which concentrated on the
historical changes within societies of Muslims
since the 18th century point to the fact that,
although secularization as an ideology (i.e.
what the French call l a ï c i s m e) was received
from outside, a real, observable ‘secularizing’
process began much earlier. This process was
indeed a reaction to the perceived European
advance and menace. The need for deep
reform, and the actions taken in order to set a
new organization of state and society based
on rational criteria rather than religious tradi-
tions, stemmed from the perceived weakness
of Muslim polities and from internal drive to
overcome this situation. The irruption of the
European-originating ideology of secularism,
and its imposition on societies of Muslims
through the erection of modern nation-states,
interrupted the evolution of the initial,
‘endogenous’ secularizing process.
Whichever credit is given to these concep-
tions, and assuming that secularization (the
‘real’ and durable phenomenon) was brought
into societies of Muslims from outside, i.e.
from an alien culture, it has stirred waves of
changes and numerous reactions which
deeply influenced the regulation of the social
and political order and gave birth to an
intense and continuous debate within these
societies. On one hand it is remarkable that,
since the distinction between the ‘secular’ and
the ‘regular’ had no equivalent in Arabic, the
word chosen initially for secularism was
d a h r i y i n, a Qur'anic term for atheists.3 A l-
though it was replaced later by l a d i n i y y i n, the
semantic choices which were made convey a
strong assimilation between secularism and
atheism, or at least an opposition to, and reac-
tion against, religion. Even the term ci l m a n i
(this-worldly) which was introduced at a later
stage and which prevails to this day, conveys
the impression of rejection of the fundamen-
tal base of religion, i.e. the idea of transcen-
dence. In all cases, secularism was understood
as an alternative to religion, not as an alterna-
tive way of ordering society and of conceiving
the world. The majority of Muslims thought
that secularization imposed abandoning alto-
gether their religious faith, their traditions,
their values, etc. Secularization was equated
to a complete negation of the self, to a total
rejection of all the views, wisdom and prac-
tices inherited from the ancestors, and, above
all, it was perceived as an alien phenomenon,
introduced into societies of Muslims by those
who were the ‘historical enemies’, crusaders of
yesterday and colonizers of the day. Then, as
still now, it was perceived in the fullest sense
of the word, as a l i e n a t i o n. Hence, the turn
taken by the debate in the public arena, with
the small exception of some academic circles.4
Secularists found themselves, except during
some short intervals, (as, for example, when
nationalism dominated) on the defensive.
Their enthusiastic and vibrant apologies of
rationalism, progress, development, freedom,
democracy, etc., as by-products of secularism,
were often successfully faced by accusations
from their opponents of unbelief, disrespect
for the ‘authentic’ values of society and some-
times, implicitly, if not openly, of treason.
Secularism vs. Secularization
The consequence of this evolution may be
described as boldly paradoxical in a double
sense. On one hand, one cannot avoid deep
surprise at the fact that Islam, which potential-
ly has less to oppose secularist worldviews and
ideals, would come to be seen as the most
resistant to secularism. As E. Gellner says: ‘The
high culture of Islam is endowed with a num-
ber of features – unitarianism, a rule-ethic,
individualism, scripturalism, puritanism, an
egalitarian aversion to mediation and hierar-
chy, a fairly small load of magic – that are con-
gruent, presumably, with requirements of
modernity or modernisation.’ 5
Of course, one cannot push aside the wide-
spread argumentation linking the success of
secularization within European societies to
specific features of Christianity, i. e. the rela-
tionship it establishes between the sacred and
the profane, between God and Caesar. Howev-
er, when one considers the long and painful
process through which the changes were
achieved and the secular order implemented,
one can only question the accuracy of this for-
mulation and wonder whether it is rather a
late justification rather than a real under-
s t a n d i n g .
On the other hand, it is easy to observe that
secularization has found its way to Muslim
societies, and has deeply and irreversibly p e r-
meated their ordering and the prevailing con-
ceptions within them. In almost all countries
belonging to the ‘Muslim world’, positive law
and state regulations have replaced traditions
and rules drawn from religion or linked to its
tenets, with the exception of personal status
and family law, which remains the last resort
for conservation, or maintenance, of the ‘Islam-
ic’ identity. At the same time, the prevailing
worldviews are strongly permeated by con-
ceptions and attitudes linked to modern sci-
ence and ideologies. A real ‘disenchantment o f
the world’ has made its way to the most dis-
seminated conceptions, even if authors as
famous as E. Gellner interpret the change as a
mere replacement of ‘low’ or ‘popular’ by
‘high’ Islam.6 In fact, ideas of determinism,
modern expectations, and belief in continuous
progress have by and large replaced the tradi-
tional attitudes based on resignation and
belief in static or cyclical time and in mysteri-
ous forces.
The resulting situation is therefore marked
by strong contradictions: although s e c u l a r i z a-
t i o n has, in a way, happened (or at least
achieved many of its effects), secularism i s
seemingly rejected by the majority of the pop-
ulation. The call for implementation of the
s h a ri ca, which constitutes the main slogan of
fundamentalist movements, shows how con-
servatives feel the disruption of the traditional
order and its drifting from what they consider
to be the religious norms.
It was Ali Abderraziq (1888-1966) who, in the
mid-twenties, proposed what may be the best
approach to bring to a match the prevailing
conceptions and the actual situation within
societies of Muslims. His main idea, which he
exposed in his famous essay, Al-Islam wa Usul
al-Hukm (Islam and the Foundations of Political
P o w e r. Cairo, 1925), was to introduce a clear
distinction between Islam as a complex of
beliefs, moral norms and rituals, which can be
traced to sacred texts (first ‘meaning’), and
Islam as the history of a community who
attempted to live up to its beliefs and to imple-
ment the morality and perform the rituals
which stem from them (second ‘meaning’). The
community has chosen, for particular historical
reasons, to live its faith in a particular way, i.e.
through the creation of a polity designed to
prolong the sacred community of the Prophet.
However, this is not the only way to live the
faith and to implement its ethical principles.
The real, and most important turn in the histo-
ry of Muslims is not, as is widely believed, the
end of the ‘rightly-guided caliphate’ (A l - K h i l a f a
a r - R a c h i d a), but rather the death of the
Prophet, which signalled the end of a sacred
community and the creation of a ‘caliphate’
intended to continue his action. The caliphate,
even in its early phases, is Islamic only by
name. No such political system could legiti-
mately prevail, since nothing in the sacred cor-
pus (i. e. Islam in the first meaning) allows a
claim of this sort.
The reasons for an Impasse
The ideas of Ali Abderraziq were strongly
opposed. He was finally silenced, as were other
creative thinkers before and after him. In his
case, this did not happen as a consequence of
popular unrest or of pressure from massive
social movements. The ‘masses’ seemed to be
rather sympathetic to his ideas, as they were
perceived at that time as an open rebuke of
despotism. However, although he had a num-
ber of followers in the subsequent years, espe-
cially in the academia, the direction he
explored remained neglected.
Thus one may nowadays wonder whether
the impasse of societies of Muslims is due to
the continuous presence of small groups of
determined activists who, in the absence of
centralized religious authorities, exert a
strong censorship on public discourses and
blackmail political authorities. The recent
events in Iran offer a strong case for this inter-
pretation: although the majority of the popu-
lation has shown a clear option for liberal atti-
tudes (through the election of Mohamed
Khatami), a small group succeeds in blocking
the way to any real and durable progress in
this direction. ♦
Abdou Filali-Ansary is director of publication,
Prologues: revue maghrébine du livre,
C a s a b l a n c a ,M o r o c c o .
N o t e s
1. We opt for this expression instead of ‘Muslim
societies’ for its greater accuracy.
2. To the exception of few authors, like A. Al-Azmeh,
A. Charfi and D. Eickelman. See for example:
Abdelmajid Charfi: Al-Islam wa al-Hadathah
( I s l a m and Modernity). Tunis: 1990, Aziz Al-Azmeh:
A l-cIlmaniya min Mandhur Mukhtalif ( S e c u l a r i s m
from a Different Point of View). Beyrouth, 1992
and Dale Eickelman, ‘Inside the Islamic
Reformation’, in The Wilson Quarterly 22, No 1
(Winter 1998).
3. This choice was made by Jamal-Eddin Al-Afghani
in the essay he wrote in reaction to attacks on
Islam by Ernest Renan.
4. Even in academic circles, most approaches address
the question from the framework of the
contrasting terms of Islam and X (X being
modernity, democracy, human rights,
secularism…) strengthening the reduction of
complex issues to mere oppositions between
categories. In this, a large number of scholars
seem to be driven in their work by media-defined
issues and approaches. They contribute to the
consolidation and legitimation of artificial or
prejudice-born ways of asking, and therefore of
answering, questions.
5. Ernest Gellner, ‘Up from Imperialism’, in:
The New Republic, 22 May 1989, pp. 35-6.
6. Ernest Gellner (1992), Postmodernism, Reason
a n dR e l i g i o n. London.
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R a d i c a l i s m
O L I V I E R  R O Y
The recent burst of violence linked with the Saudi-born
Islamic militant, Usama Bin Laden, sheds some light on a
recent evolution of Islamic radicalism. In the eighties,
most of the violence was linked either to an internal
confrontation between a state and its Islamist opposi-
tion (Syria, Egypt, Afghanistan, and later Algeria) or to a
state-sponsored terrorism with strategic goals: for
instance, the attacks against US and French barracks in
Lebanon in 1983-4 and the hostage-takings of 1985
were aimed at ending the Western support for Iraq in
the war with Iran. In the nineties, the internal violence
either decreased or is no longer threatening the state
apparatus. It is rather being directed at ‘side-targets’
(like tourists in Egypt, former fellow-Islamists, or the
civilian population in Algeria). 
The Radicalization of 
Sunni Conservative
F u n d a m e n t a l i s m
Most of the main-stream Islamist move-
ments endeavoured, more or less successfully,
to enter the legal political scene (Turkey, Jor-
dan, Yemen, Kuwait, Egypt) and largely gave
up their supra-national agenda in favour of a
national posture (Refah, FIS), if not nationalist
(Palestinian Hamas, but also … Islamic Iran).
But this normalization of the Islamist move-
ments left aside a new kind of radical fringe.
The bombing of the World Trade Centre in
New York (1993) was probably the harbinger
of new patterns of radical Islamist violence.
The targets are symbolic Western (and more
precisely American) buildings or people. There
is no longer any strategic goal; more precisely,
there is a huge discrepancy between the
avowed goals (the departures of Western
forces from the Gulf) and the real threat they
represent for the Western interests. The in-
volved networks are made of transnational
militants, who often have multiple citizenship
(or no citizenship at all, like Bin Laden), and do
not link their fight with a precise state or
nation. Even if they come from some main-
stream Islamist movements (like the Muslim
Brothers) they do not identify themselves with
the present strategy of these movements.
They appeal to uprooted transnational mili-
tants who travel from one jihad to the other,
and identify themselves with a sort of imagi-
nary u m m a h.
Almost all of these militants shared a com-
mon point: they spent some time in Afghanis-
tan, in Mujahidin training camps, and they are
based between Lahore (Pakistan) and Kanda-
har (Afghanistan). This Afghan connection
dates back to the early eighties. In response to
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a joint ven-
ture of Pakistani military services (ISI) and
Saudi Intelligence (under Prince Turki Bin
Faysal), with the support of the CIA, endeav-
oured to send to Afghanistan a kind of ‘Islamic
legion’ to help the Afghan Mujahidin. The
sponsors had different agendas. The Saudis
and the Americans wanted to ‘bleed the Sovi-
ets’ and to defuse the growing anti-Western
Islamic radicalism by diverting it against com-
munism (especially after the 1983-4 events in
Lebanon). The Saudis were also trying to
enforce their Islamic credentials against the
Iranian brand of Islamism, by fostering a strict
Sunni militant Islam. The Pakistanis had a
more long-term strategic agenda. They were
the only ones who thought in terms of a post-
Soviet era. They wanted to establish a kind of
protectorate on Afghanistan through funda-
mentalist and ethnically Pashtun movements
(this dual ethnic and religious connection has
been a permanent feature of the Pakistani pol-
icy, even when they shifted their support from
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to the Taliban in 1994).
The purveyors of these networks were main-
ly Arab Muslim brothers, like Abdallah Azzam.
A Palestinian holding a Jordanian passport, he
headed the Peshawar office of the ‘Mektab ul
Khedamat’, which worked as the dispatcher of
the volunteers flocking from the Muslim
world. (Azzam was assassinated in September
1989.) Many militants from repressed radical
movements found their way to Afghanistan,
among them many Egyptian leaders: Shawki
Islambuli, the brother of Sadat’s killer; Sheikh
Omar Abdurrahman; Talacat Fuad Qassim;
Mustafa Hamza; Abou Hamza of the Gamaca t ;
Al Zawahiri of the Jihad (who co-signed most
of Bin Laden’s communiqués in early 1998);
and others. The fact that Sheikh Abdurrahman
easily obtained a US visa from the American
consulate in Khartoum, followed by a green
card in 1992, is certainly a legacy of this peri-
o d .
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
(1989), followed by the collapse of the USSR
(1991), changed the picture. The USA lost
interest in these militant networks, but for dif-
ferent reasons the Saudis and Pakistanis still
supported them. A turning point was the Gulf
War of 1991: suddenly the ‘Afghans’, as they
were called, founded a new jihad, this time
against the West.
Many militants, back in their country of ori-
gin, founded or joined radical groups, some of
them being splinter groups from the main-
stream Islamist movements. The GIA in Algeria
was founded by ‘Afghans’ (Tayyeb el Afghani,
Jaffar al Afghani, and Sharif al Gusmi), while
the pro-GIA journal in London, al Ansar w a s
headed by Abu Hamza, an Egyptian who was
severely wounded in Afghanistan. The Kash-
miri radical movement Harakat al Ansar was
also founded by former ‘Afghans’, as was the
Yemenite Jihad, founded by Sheikh Tariq al
Fadil, involved in a bloody hostage-taking of
Western tourists in December 1998. By the
same token, the head of the group held
responsible for the attack on a group of
tourists in Luxor (November 1997), Mehat
Mohammed Abdel Rahman, has also travelled
to Afghanistan. In the Philippines, Abu Baker
Jenjalani, head of the Abu Sayyaf group (killed
in 1998), also has an Afghan background
(although he is one of the few to have been
supported by Libya).
But other militants did not come back to
their own country. They used to travel from
one place to the other, fighting a nomadic
jihad against the West. A group headed by
Sheikh Omar Abdurrahman and Yussuf Ramzi
tried to blow up the World Trade Centre in
New York in 1993; both were in Afghanistan
and the latter fled to Pakistan after the action.
The last operation was the bombing of two US
embassies in Eastern Africa. The main suspect,
Mohammed Saddiq Odeh, is a Palestinian who
was trained also in Afghanistan.
All these militants and networks have kept
their ‘Afghan’ connections: Usama Bin Laden
is living in Afghanistan under the protection
of the Taliban. They are also supported in Pak-
istan by a cluster of political and religious
organizations, loosely coordinated in the
framework of the Dawat ul Irshad, established
near Lahore. One finds the Islamist Jamaca t - i
Islami, the more conservative Jamiat-Ulama
Islami, which controlled the networks of
madrasas from which the Taliban movement
originated, and more radical splinter groups
like the Sepah-i Saheban, whose main goal is
to fight Shicism. Some high-level former Pak-
istani officials, like the general Hamid Gul, for-
mer Head of the ISI at the end of the Afghan
War, are also supporting the movement (Gul
protested against the extradition of Ramzi to
the USA and the bombings by the US forces of
the Mujahidin training camps in August 1998).
These groups, which were all involved in sup-
porting the Afghan Mujahidin, have openly
turned anti-Western, in phase with a huge part
of the Pakistani intelligentsia. If the Pakistani
government takes its distance from Bin Laden,
it openly supports the Taliban movement.
How can one assess the importance of this
radical movement? It is not solely a rear-guard
fighting waged by ‘lost soldiers’. On one hand,
it is one of the consequences of the policy of
conservative re-Islamization waged by states
like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (but also Egypt),
and is in phase with the entry into the labour
market of thousands of madrasa students. It is
also a consequence of the integration of the
mainstream Islamist movements into the
domestic political scene, which left out mili-
tants with no state or nation. It is not a coinci-
dence if many of these militants are uprooted
Palestinian refugees, or come from the periph-
ery of the Middle East (with the notable excep-
tion of Egypt). They are not involved in the
main Middle Eastern conflict, like Palestine,
because the struggle is waged by a well-root-
ed ‘Islamo-nationalist’ movement like the
Hamas. All the militant actors strongly advo-
cate supra-nationalism and practise it. The Tal-
iban even downgraded the ‘Islamic State of
Afghanistan’ to a ‘mere’ ‘Emirate’. In Usama
Bin Laden’s networks (the Al Qaida Move-
ment) there are Egyptians, Pakistanis,
Sudanese, and Palestinians. Many of the mili-
tants, by the way, are really uprooted. They
once fought in ‘peripheral’ jihads, like Bosnia,
Kashmir, or Afghanistan, where their relations
with the local population remain uneasy. Abu
Hamza is an Egyptian, acting for the Algerian
GIA in London, whose son-in-law (who has a
British passport) was arrested in Yemen
(December 1998). Yussuf Ramzi, born in
Kuwait to Palestinian and Pakistani parents,
went to the Philippines and to the USA. In fact,
the militants are a pure product of globaliza-
tion and the New World Order – using dollars,
English, cellular phones, the internet, and liv-
ing in camps or hotels.
Their second characteristic is that their ide-
ology links a very conservative traditional
Islam (shariat and only the shariat) with vio-
lence and terrorism. In particular, they are very
a n t i - S h icite. Although their anti-shicism is well
rooted in traditional Sunni fundamentalism, it
has been catapulted by the Wahhabi influ-
e n c e .1 These neo-fundamentalist radicals are
rather different from the mainstream Islamist
movements, not only in terms of politics but
also of ideology. The Islamists, although advo-
cating the implementation of the shariat, have
a social and economic programme, coupled
with a political agenda; they claim also to
bypass the shica-sunni divide, to promote
women in an Islamic society, and to not con-
fuse Christianism and Western imperialism
(Hassan al Banna was eager to establish a rela-
tionship with the Copts; Lebanese Hezbullah
and the Iranian Islamist governments have
also been eager to keep some connections
with Christian groups). The conservative back-
ground of the neo-fundamentalists is by con-
trast clearly expressed by their insistence on
the mere implementation of the shariat in
order to create an Islamic society, on the con-
finement of women, and on hostility against
the Shicites (branded heresy),2 the Jews and
the Christians. This hostility is heralded in the
name of Bin Laden’s movement ‘World Islamic
Front for the struggle against Christians and
J e w s ’ .
Nevertheless, the main weakness of these
movements is precisely their lack of con-
stituency among the large Muslim countries
(except Pakistan). ♦
Dr Olivier Roy is Senior Researcher at the CNRS,
A i x-en-Province, France.
E-m a i l :o r o y @ c o m p u s e r v e . c o m
N o t e s
1. Interestingly enough, the Wahhabi influence had
less impact on an other ‘heresy’: sufism. If Sufi
practices have decreased, many of these
fundamentalists, like the Taliban do acknowledge
their Sufi background and did not indulge in
destroying tombs of the ‘Saints’.
2. This anti-Shicas bias is well expressed in a book
written by Maulana Nomani, a Pakistani deobandi,
Khomeyni, Iranian revolution and the Shica faith,
with an introduction by the Indian Muslim salafi
Sayyed Nadwi, denouncing the Iranian Revolution.
Dharb-ul Mu'min, a journal close to the Taliban and
published in Karachi, has published some khotbas
of Sheikh Hudaybi, imam of the Masjid-e Nabavi,
who severely criticizes Christians, Jews and Shica s ,
called k u f f a r (unbelievers), r a f a w i z (heretics) and
m o n a f i q i n (hypocrites). (August 2 1998, on the
Website Taliban.com).
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Human R i ghts
J OE  S TO R K
Human Rights Watch (HRW), an independent non-gov-
ernmental organization based in New York, investigates
and reports on human rights abuses in some seventy
countries, including the United States. HRW’s purpose is
to hold governments accountable for violations of
internationally recognized human rights and humani-
tarian law, and to generate pressure from other govern-
ments, international organizations, and civil societies to
end such abuses. We address the practices of govern-
ments without regard to ideological or geopolitical ori-
entation, and of all ethnic and religious persuasions.
The organization also responds to abuses committed by
armed insurgent groups. Among the major concerns of
the organization are freedom of thought and expres-
sion, due process and equal protection of the law, tor-
ture, arbitrary imprisonment, and disappearances. HRW
recognizes the indivisibility of human rights, including
economic, social, and cultural rights, although its main
work focuses on civil and political rights, including the
right of workers to exercise freedom of association and
to engage in collective bargaining.
Human Rights
W a t c h
and the Muslim World
The organization began modestly in 1978 as
Helsinki Watch, with the purpose of monitor-
ing compliance by the participating states in
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe with the human rights provisions of the
Final Act of the conference, known as the
Helsinki Agreement. An Americas Watch divi-
sion emerged in the early 1980s to monitor
human rights developments in Central and
Latin America and US human rights policy
there. Today HRW also includes divisions that
monitor developments in Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East and North Africa. Three thematic
divisions focus on Women’s Rights, Children’s
Rights, and Arms (the role of arms transfers to
abusive forces and particular weapons systems
that are inherently cruel or indiscriminate,
such as landmines). A current theme of Human
Rights Watch is international justice, which
includes support for the special international
criminal tribunals in former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, the campaign to establish an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, and, following on Spain’s
request to extradite former Chilean dictator
Augusto Pinochet, efforts to encourage
national judicial systems to prosecute crimes
of recognized international jurisdiction such as
war crimes, genocide and crimes against
h u m a n i t y .
HRW premises its efforts on the universality
of the core rights specified in the 1948 Univer-
sal Declaration and subsequently codified as
treaty law in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). From this perspective
HRW applies the same criteria when it moni-
tors the practices of governments claiming to
be Islamic as when it examines states that dis-
criminate against or persecute Muslims. We
have been outspokenly critical of Sudan, for
instance, where the Islamist government has
invoked religious grounds for its scorched-
earth war policy that has targeted civilians in
the largely non-Muslim south of the country
and generally employed tactics that cannot be
justified by the tenets of any religion. HRW has
been a main source of documentation of mass
killings and other atrocities in former Yugosla-
via, notably in Bosnia and now Kosovo, where
Muslims comprise the majority of victims. In
Indonesia, HRW’s Asia division has been moni-
toring abuses growing out of, and contributing
to, communal tensions following the resigna-
tion of President Suharto. The violence there
has sometimes been directed at, and at other
times perpetrated by, Muslims. HRW recently
urged the Jakarta embassies of Egypt and Jor-
dan to help form a diplomatic delegation to
investigate attacks by security forces in the
largely Muslim region of Aceh and to help
defuse mounting tensions there. HRW’s reports
and public advocacy in such circumstances
Joe Stork is the Advocacy Director of the Middle East
and North Africa Division of Human Rights Watch,
Washington DC, USA.
make a point of addressing the economic,
political, and social factors underlying conflicts
that are expressed primarily in terms of reli-
gious identity.
Most situations we investigate do not turn
on questions of religious belief. HRW has
looked with equivalent scrutiny at the abusive
interrogation and detention practices of the
governments of Syria, Bahrain, Israel, Iran and
Egypt, for example. In some instances these
abuses arise out of political or armed conflict
involving demands for civil rights and eco-
nomic justice by communities claiming to suf-
fer from discrimination and exclusion based on
religious belief. In cases such as Algeria and
Egypt, where armed opposition groups calling
themselves Islamic justify atrocities against
civilians in those terms, HRW has condemned
the violations of humanitarian law unequivo-
cally, but also insisted that the governments
counter the violence without recourse to out-
lawed practices such as torture and arbitrary
arrests. Furthermore, HRW insists that govern-
ments not abridge the rights to free associa-
tion and expression of Islamists attempting to
promote their political views by peaceful
m e a n s .
Governments in the newly independent
states of Central Asia have reacted warily to
growing interest in Islam, preferring to main-
tain control by appointing clerics and requir-
ing registration of congregations. HRW has
decried the repression of independent Muslim
activists in Uzbekistan, where the government
has arrested hundreds of believers on fabricat-
ed drug charges. We have also documented
discrimination against pious Muslims in educa-
tion, such as the dismissal of young men and
women from schools and universities for wear-
ing beards and h i j a b.
One area of HRW’s work that confronts most
directly the claimed Islamic character of cer-
tain human rights abuses involves issues of
freedom of belief and of religion. HRW pub-
lished a 1997 report detailing extensive human
rights violations by the Islamic Republic of Iran
against religious (and ethnic) minorities,
notably Baha'is, evangelical Christians, and
Sunni Muslims. The organization has similarly
criticized Saudi Arabia’s official and wide-
spread discrimination against its Shica Muslim
minority, and its intolerance of non-Wahabi
beliefs and practices generally, including non-
Wahabi Sunni Muslims. In other cases, HRW
has protested a government’s failure to pro-
tect the rights of citizens threatened by groups
attempting to impose their interpretation of
Islam. Human Rights Watch has been critical of
recent steps by the Egyptian authorities con-
ferring semi-official powers of censorship on
the Islamic Research Academy of al-Azhar, for
example. We also intervened in the case of
Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, a professor of Islamic
Studies and Linguistics at Cairo University,
who felt compelled to leave Egypt following
threats against his life after a group of Islamist
lawyers had secured civil court judgements
declaring Abu Zayd an apostate on the basis of
his scholarly writings and ordering him to be
divorced from his wife against their will. HRW
initiated a joint letter of protest to President
Mubarak signed by twenty-one human rights,
women’s rights, Arab-American and Muslim
American organizations, urging the authorities
to support publicly Professor Abu Zayd’s right
to exercise free expression without harass-
ment and threats of physical harm, to provide
him and his wife with adequate security should
they return to live in Egypt, and to submit new
legislation that would strengthen guarantees
and protection of freedom of expression and
academic research.
Another area where governments and
movements have attempted to impose their
understanding of Islamic values is women’s
rights. In Algeria, HRW has called attention to
the actions of armed groups claiming to be
Islamic who have raped, mutilated and mur-
dered women, in some cases for defying their
rules of dress and work outside the home. The
organization has condemned the extreme
steps of the Taliban government in Afghan-
istan stripping women of their rights to work,
travel and attend school. HRW has document-
ed the discriminatory impact of civil and crimi-
nal codes in Iran, Pakistan, Morocco, Egypt,
and elsewhere that, in the name of promoting
Islamic values, subordinate women’s social sta-
tus and restrict their personal freedoms. The
organization also works on the problem of
domestic violence around the world, including
countries with Muslim majorities or large
minorities, in an effort to persuade govern-
ments to fulfil their responsibility to protect
women’s lives and physical security.
In all these areas, Human Rights Watch works
closely with local human rights defenders and
organizations. While local human rights move-
ments are numerous and active in several Mus-
lim countries, such as Pakistan and Egypt, gen-
erally speaking the Middle East and North
Africa probably have the youngest and least-
developed movement. In many countries the
groups lack legal status. In Egypt, where the
human rights community has become quite
diverse, they operate very much at the uncer-
tain sufferance of the government. More typi-
cally, in Syria and Bahrain for instance, no local
activity is permitted and international organi-
zations are generally not allowed to conduct
fact-finding missions. Tunisia is somewhat
unique: few governments in the world devote
as much time to promoting their human rights
image while systematically silencing their citi-
zens who attempt to present a more accurate
picture. The challenges to local human rights
defenders, and to international organizations
like HRW, go beyond government harassment
and repression, however. The overall political
environment is generally not hospitable to
human rights concerns, which are frequently
attacked as self-serving Western constructs
not only by the government but also by politi-
cal opposition groups and media. At the same
time, many political activists and commenta-
tors, including Islamists, have incorporated
human rights into the discourse of their politi-
cal programmes and objectives. Human Rights
Watch sets a high priority on working in con-
sultation with local groups where they exist
and in pressing the governments to permit
such activity where they presently do not.
The issue of religious persecution has be-
come a contentious one in US legislative poli-
tics recently, driven largely by persons who
contend that Christian minorities have increas-
ingly become targets of discrimination and
abuse in Communist countries like China and
Vietnam and in several Muslim countries like
Sudan and Egypt. In some cases the govern-
ment is the source of the abuse; in other cases
it is more an issue of the government failing to
protect residents against vigilante attacks.
Human Rights Watch has consistently includ-
ed, in its monitoring and advocacy, freedom of
religion and the right to practice (or not to
practice) one’s religious beliefs as among the
core universal human rights. We have argued
that denial of freedom of belief is almost
always part of a more general pattern of
repression and denial. In terms of US policy,
the problem is not insufficient attention to reli-
gious persecution, but rather the overall failure
to implement existing human rights legislation
to sanction a whole range of grievous abuses,
including this one. ♦
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Mi ddl e Ea st
J U A N  R . I .  C O L E
Middle Eastern religion is seldom mentioned in the
same breath with modernism, at least in the West. How-
ever, the Baha'i faith, which originated in nineteenth-
century Iran, poses key conundrums to our understand-
ing of the relationship between modernity and religion
in the global South.
The Genesis
of the Baha'i Faith
i n Middle Eastern
M o d e r n i t y
Modernity was conceived in binary opposi-
tions, between superstition and reason, abso-
lutism and liberty, nation and Other, civilized
and barbarian, and male and female. Propo-
nents of modernity, as Edward Said demon-
strated in his masterful O r i e n t a l i s m,1 m a n a g e d
to range a number of such oppositions togeth-
er, coding reason, liberty, nation, civilization
and maleness as European, whereas both
Europe’s medieval (‘immature’) past and
Europe’s Oriental Others, especially Islam, were
painted as possessing the opposite and inferior
characteristics. European modernity tended to
hide from itself its own darker traits, including
chauvinist hatreds, industrialized warfare,
racism, colonialism and male chauvinism, and
the degree to which the modern form of these
phenomena was inextricably intertwined with
the entire modernist project.
From a postmodern point of view, modernity
has lacked a sense of ambiguity and irony, and
suffers from limiting its typologies to mere
binary oppositions, when in fact social phe-
nomena come in three’s, four’s, and even high-
er ordinals, not just in two’s. North Atlantic
modernists have also privileged the European
experience of modernity in ways that seem
peculiar to anyone who knows something
about world history. Anthony Giddens in T h e
Consequences of Modernity (Stanford, 1990),
argues that modernity is not a static matter of
binary oppositions, but is rather dialectical.
Movements against absolutism give rise not
only to parliamentary regimes, but also to
national security states that appear to many
citizens to deprive them of liberties instead of
bestowing them, thus generating oppositional
grassroots movements campaigning for
democracy (as opposed to elitist Liberalism)
and for workers’ rights. That is, he challenges
modernists’ insistence that the contenders in
political battles can be neatly divided into
‘reactionaries’ and ‘progressives’. Giddens
gives the name ‘utopian realist’ to the move-
ments, such as those of workers, women,
peace groups and others, that challenge the
industrial, militant nation-states of bourgeois
m o d e r n i t y .
Islam’s encounter with nineteenth-century
modernity produced not only reactionary,
revivalist, millenarian, liberal and fundamen-
talist responses, as some have argued, but in
the form of the Baha'i faith it produced a mix-
ture of millenarianism, liberalism and utopian
realism that later turned sharply toward a sort
of fundamentalism. The latter turn has tended
to obscure the original emphases of the reli-
gion’s founder, which can only be recovered
through reading his voluminous letters in their
nineteenth-century political and cultural con-
t e x t .
The Baha'i faith developed out of the esoteric,
kabbalistic Shaykhi movement of Shicite Islam,
founded by Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa'i (1753-
1826), and out of the apocalyptic and messianic
Babi movement, founded by cAli Muhammad
Shirazi, the ‘Bab’ or door to the divine, in 1844,
which racked Iran with religious ferment and
turmoil, leading to the Bab’s execution in 1850
and a retaliatory attempt on the life of Nasiru'd-
Din Shah by radical Babis in 1852, and thence to
a nation-wide pogrom against the new reli-
g i o n .2 Out of this maelstrom emerged an entire-
ly different sort of messianic movement, the
Baha'i faith, founded in Baghdad in 1863 by
Mirza Husayn cAli Nuri, Baha'u'llah (1817-1892).
Baha'u'llah, a high notable born in Tehran
whose father had been a provincial governor
married into the royal family, had emerged
after the Bab’s execution as a prominent Babi
leader, though his more radical younger half-
brother, Mirza Yahya Subh-i Azal, was more
widely recognized as the vicar of the Bab in the
1850s and early 1860s. Baha'u'llah was exiled
first to Ottoman Baghdad (1853), then to Istan-
bul (1863), Edirne (1863-1868) and finally in
1868 to Akka on the coast of Ottoman Syria,
where he lived until his death. In 1867 he had
broken decisively with Azal, proclaiming him-
self the messianic successor of the Bab and
founding a new religion, the Baha'i faith. Partly
due to his exiles to the Ottoman Empire, which
was more directly imbricated in European
modernity than Qajar Iran, Baha'u'llah turned
Babism from a millenarian protest movement
into one that mixed modernist and utopian
realist themes. He expressed approval of some
aspects of modernity, whereby he critiqued
the absolutist Ottoman and Qajar states,
including a call for parliamentary democracy,
some separation of religion and state, a guar-
antee of freedom of conscience and expres-
sion, greater rights for women, and an end to
arbitrary decrees, which should be replaced by
tribunals. At the same time, however, he cri-
tiqued nineteenth-century modernity itself,
condemning chauvinist nationalism (whether
religious, linguistic or ethnic in character),
European colonialism, industrialized warfare
paid for by high taxes on the poor, the anarchy
of international relations based upon the
absolute sovereignty of nation-states (which
he wished to curb through international peace
conferences), and what he thought of as over-
developed civilization, by which he appears to
have meant materialism, pollution and mas-
sively destructive weaponry.
Baha'u'llah’s mixture of rationalization (e.g.
parliamentary institutions and due process),
appeal to human rights, and yet his communi-
tarian emphasis on the creation of a new,
revealed missionary religion, prefigured some
of the convergences between the old Right
and Left that French sociologist Alain Touraine
perceives as characteristic of the turn of the
twentieth century. In a fascinating about-face,
the later Baha'i faith’s leaders turned increas-
ingly to the Right, condemning multi-party
democracy as factious and plutocratic, advo-
cating theocracy, and curbing individual free-
dom of conscience and expression within the
community. This right wing shell has preserved
the utopian realist core of Baha'u'llah’s own
emphases, however, creating a unique sectari-
an community that has remained tiny in the lit-
erate world, in part because of its strict con-
trols on discourse, but which has had some
success missionizing in India and elsewhere in
the global South. The Babi-Bahai movements
underwent an odyssey from militancy in the
1840s to pacifist, liberal globalism under
Baha'u'llah and thence in the twentieth centu-
ry to two contending emphases: a liberal
stream that maintains a universalist and toler-
ant outlook and a conservative one that
dreams of theocratic domination and insis-
tence on scriptural literalism. The movement
thus defies any easy teleology of modernity,
and in many ways parallels the major reformist
intellectual currents of modern Iran’s Shici t e
majority. ♦
Juan R. I. Cole is Professor of Middle Eastern and
South Asian History at the University of Michigan,
USA. He is author of Modernity and the Millennium:
T h e Genesis of the Baha'i Faith in the N i n e t e e n t h
Century Middle East. New York: Columbia University
P r e s s .
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N o t e s
1. New York: Vintage, 1978.
2. Abbas Amanat (1989), Resurrection and Renewal:
The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran,
1 8 4 4-1 8 5 0. Cornell: Cornell University Press.
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A u s t r a l i a
K A T Y  N E B H AN
Images of the Sydney Harbour Bridge, Opera House,
Centrepoint Tower, and Darling Harbour flank the
mosques of Mecca and Medina on this greeting card
designed and printed in Australia. This card reflects on
the theological and cultural struggles experienced by
Australian Muslims since their period of mass migration
to Australia in the 1970s, particularly among the most
influential of Australia’s Muslims: the migrants and the
Australian born and bred generation. The experiences
of both these groups may be understood through a
remark made in a recent article published in S a l a m, the
official magazine of the Federation of Australian Muslim
Students and Youth (FAMSY): ‘It is our destiny that we
found ourselves here (Australia). However, the rest is a
t e s t .’ 1 Destiny is a fundamental pillar of the Islamic faith.
However, as with the practice of Islam, the ways in which
destiny is perceived differs between particular places,
periods, cultures and peoples. How have members of the
Australian Muslim population conceptualized their des-
tiny? Where will it lead them?
A u s t r a l i a n
M u s l i m
D e s t i n i e s
The new interest in Australian Muslims in the
last two decades – inspired by the mass migra-
tion of the 1970s – has produced numerous
studies, literature and audio-visual material
within the Australian context. Whilst taking into
account the differences which exist among
these, both in terms of medium and content, the
majority have taken a largely empirical approach
centred around the Muslim migrant experience.
Both religious and ethnic identifications are
central to understanding the ways in which Aus-
tralian Muslim migrants have constructed a
place for themselves in Australian society. Whilst
religious identification may be important to
many of these immigrants, it is clear from the
designated names of the majority of associa-
tions and mosques, that religion, though impor-
tant, has not generally acted as the socially or
organizationally cohesive category. Numerous
mosques including the Albanian Mosque in Vic-
toria, the Lakemba Mosque built by the
Lebanese Muslim Association in Sydney, and the
various organizations including the Bosnian
Islamic Society and the Islamic Egyptian Society,
point to significant ethnic divisions among Aus-
tralian Muslims. This is not surprising since the
Australian Muslim population represents 64 dis-
tinct ethnic groups who speak over 55 lan-
guages. Do these ethnic Muslim groups stand
detached under the umbrella of the Australian
Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC)? Where do
‘other’ Muslims fit into their conceptions of their
destinies? Is there a sense of a shared Australian
Muslim identity?
The tendency to form ethno-religious associa-
tions is characteristic of the majority of immi-
grants to Australia. For many migrants, the
establishment of ethnic associations, clubs,
places of worship and shopping centres are a
means of securing the cultural, linguistic and
religious heritage in their new home. Muslim
immigrants were no exception. As the majority
had poor English language skills, resulting from
the conditions and requirements of work which
made it difficult to attend English language
classes, communication amongst members of
the linguistically diverse Australian Muslim pop -
ulation was extremely difficult. A remarkable
amount of ethnic newspapers were, and contin-
ue to be, published by various ethno-Muslim
groups in languages other than English. In many
mosques today, the Friday sermons continue to
be given in the native languages of the majority
of those attending. The highest authoritative fig-
ure in Australia and the Pacific, the mufti, does
not speak English. At present, it appears unlikely
that the ethnic basis of many of these already
established associations and mosques will dis-
solve. Further, few of the founding members are
willing to give up the security and social net-
works which these associations provide.
The incorporation of ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ in
the titles of many of these ‘ethnic’ institutions
was in some cases informed by the desire to
distinguish them from others which shared a
common ethnic background but not the faith.
In a recent interview I conducted with one of
the founders of the Lebanese Muslim Associa-
tion (est. 1959), the sense of rivalry between
Lebanese Christians and Muslims was still
given as the reason for which ‘Lebanese Mus-
lim’ was chosen as the definitive title. He point-
ed out that just as Lebanese Christians had
established themselves in Australia, they too
wanted to be identified as a distinct ethnic
group albeit with a Muslim identity. 
The active display of this Muslim identity and
its influence on relations between many of
these ethno-religious institutions has not been
great. The only significant exception has been
the references to the Afghan ‘Muslim’ contri-
bution to Australia in many of the histories
written, with varying degrees of sophistication,
by members of these institutions. The modest
mosques built by the Afghan cameleers who
came to provide much-needed transport in the
outback between 1867 and 1910, are regarded
by many Muslims as marking the foundation of
their destiny in Australia. Though this has not
necessarily led to the concept of a single des-
tiny with a dominant Islamic orientation, it has
provided a sense of a collective consciousness. 
The sense of struggle which marked the
experiences of the Afghan cameleers and the
later Muslim migrants appears to have brought
about identification with this collective con-
sciousness. The White Australia policy which
denied Afghans the opportunity to bring
spouses and family from their homeland, and
the replacement of camel driving by the motor
truck in the 1920s, saw the small Afghan popu-
lation of Australia fade away. Though only a
few of their mosques remained in Adelaide,
Perth and Broken Hill, for the significant num-
ber of working class Muslim immigrants who
came to satisfy the labour needs of Australia
after 1945, these overseas-born pioneers who
worked with a predominantly Anglo-Aus-
tralian population provided a potent symbol.
‘Muslims: helping Australia get off its feet’ 2 –
these words represent the popular sentiments
of most Australian Muslims. These ‘tough, suc-
cessful men, held by many Australians in great
respect’ provided Muslim working-class immi-
grants with the semblance of hope they need-
ed at a time when securing good jobs and
social mobility was difficult.3
It was through this shared experience of
struggle and hope that middle and working
class Muslim immigrants harmonized the
Afghan experience with their own. AFIC – the
peak Muslim organizational body in the country
– was particularly influential in upholding the
memory of the Afghan contribution through its
numerous publications, most notably the A u s-
tralian Muslim Times. The Afghan experience
was codified and used as a positive foundation
around which subsequent Australian Muslims
could base their historical origins in Australia.
However, for the children of these migrants
who now make up the second and third genera-
tion of Australian Muslims, the largely migrant
character and ethnic orientation of this collec-
tive consciousness has proved to be a hin-
drance. As well as keeping them culturally and
socially isolated from the diverse mainstream
Australian society, it has also kept them apart
from Australian Muslims who may also come
from different cultural, linguistic and ethnic
backgrounds. Their reaction to these ethno-reli-
gious divisions on the one hand, and the use of
the past as a prologue for the construction of a
collective consciousness on the other, have
seen the emergence of a radical movement
which aims to promote the unity of an Aus-
tralian Muslim identity through stronger reli-
gious identification.
Some of the earliest institutions to promote
the centrality of an ‘Australian Muslim’ identity
over an identity based largely on ethnicity,
include FAMSY (est. 1967), the Muslim
Women’s National Network of Australia (est.
1980s), and more recently the Muslim Commu-
nity Cooperative Australia (est. 1989). In the last
decade, there has also been a marked increase
in non-ethnic based suburban associations like
the Illawara Islamic Association, and the Islamic
Society of Manly Warringah. In 1996, the pri-
vately owned Australian Muslim Times w a s
replaced by the Australian Muslim News, w h i c h
is owned by AFIC. This saw a major change in
the national and widely read paper. Space pre-
viously allotted to non-English languages was
replaced by a wider variety of local and global
news as well as advertising in English.
The importance of language as an agent of
change can also be seen through the increase
in the number of overseas scholars and acade-
mics invited to conferences and seminars held
by AFIC, FAMSY and the various state organiza-
tions. Whilst many continue to be invited from
the Middle East by the various ethno-religious
organizations, these scholars and academics
are increasingly coming from North America,
Canada and the United Kingdom. As the largest
group of Muslims in Australia are Australian
born, it is not surprising that these English-
speaking guests continue to draw large audi-
ences from both the youth and the educated
middle class.4 As well as crossing the linguistic
barriers of the members of their audience, their
message of tolerance and unity is often more
relevant to the second and third generation of
Australian Muslims who play an active role in
organizing these events. However, it must be
pointed out that as with the Australian Muslim
N e w s, the majority of these events cater to a
largely English-speaking Australian Muslim
population. Although they acknowledge the
benefits of a diverse ethnic, cultural and lin-
guistic Australian Muslim community, their
struggle to smooth the disunity which this
diversity creates has left a gap in their struggle
for tolerance and unity which has yet to be
bridged. That is not to say that attempts have
not been made.
An example is the annual Australian Multicul-
tural Eid Festival and Fair (MEFF) held at the
end of Ramadan in Sydney. MEFF’s attempt to
create such a bridge is evident in the strategy
they developed ‘in recognition of the fact that
there is a lack of tolerance and acceptance
among people of different ethnic, cultural and
linguistic backgrounds within the Australian
Muslim community.’ 5 Creating an exhibitive
and socially-relaxed atmosphere with partici-
pants from state and regional ethno-religious
institutions and non-ethnic based others, gov-
ernment representatives, and visitors from a
diverse range of backgrounds including a small
number of non-Muslims, MEFF attempts to
help Australian Muslims ‘adopt and thrive’ not
only as a unified Muslim community but also as
an Australian one. The relative success of their
initiative may be seen in the increase in partici-
pants from 800 in 1987 to over 30,000 in 1998.
However, with the rapid changes taking place
among the Australian Muslim population today,
it is difficult to predict what destiny has in store.
Ethno-religious institutions continue to yield
some influence among migrants, although they
are being eclipsed by ethnically and linguistical -
ly diverse institutions. The growing number of
Australian-born youth continues to set new
trends centred around a more religious-based
identity through the English language. Although
approached in different ways, attempts at toler-
ance and unity continue to hold the imagina-
tions of the Australian Muslim population. While
they have gained some ground in the last two
decades, as one article in Salam magazine put it,
‘It’s a long road, mate…’ ♦
Katy Nebhan, Department of History,
University of Sydney, Australia.
E-mail: katy.nebhan@history.usyd.edu.au 
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The Phi li p pi nes
T H O M AS  M.  M C K E N N A
From 1972 to 1980, a ferocious war raged throughout
the southern Philippines between Muslim separatist
rebels and the Philippine military. An estimated
120,000 people died in the fighting, which also created
one million internal refugees and caused more than
100,000 Philippine Muslims to flee to Malaysia. That
war ended in a stalemate and for the next 18 years an
uneasy and fragile cease-fire existed – one periodically
broken by armed clashes between the military and sep-
aratist fighters who remain under arms in remote
camps. A 1996 peace agreement between the Philip-
pine government and the main rebel faction represents
the first real progress towards a genuine settlement of
the conflict and substantial political autonomy for
Philippine Muslims. This article traces the remote and
proximate causes of the Philippine Muslim (or






The Muslim territories of the Philippines mark
the periphery of the Eurasian Islamic world.
Indeed, with the exception of a few Muslim
groups in easternmost Indonesia, no indigenous
population of Muslims in the world lives at a far-
ther distance from the Islamic heartland than do
the Muslims of the Philippines. There are
approximately 3 million Muslims in the Philip-
pines, the only predominately Christian country
in Southeast Asia. Though they represent only
about 5 percent of the Philippine population,
Muslims are geographically concentrated in the
south of the country, and are distinguished from
Christian Filipinos not only by their profession of
Islam but also by their evasion of 300 years of
Spanish colonial domination. They thus com-
prise the largest un-hispanicized population in
the Philippines. At the same time, Philippine
Muslims have always been separated from one
another in this archipelagic nation by significant
linguistic and geographic distance. They are
divided into three major and ten minor ethno-
linguistic groups and dispersed across the
southern islands.
Philippine Muslims share their religious cul-
ture with the neighbouring majority Muslim
nations of Indonesia and Malaysia. They also
retain aspects of an indigenous pre-Islamic and
pre-colonial Philippine culture – expressed in
dress, music, political traditions and a rich array
of folk beliefs and practices – that are similar to
those found elsewhere in island Southeast Asia,
but are today almost entirely absent among
Christian Filipinos. Thus, while Philippine Chris-
tians and Muslims inhabit the same state and are
linked together by various attachments, a pro-
found cultural gulf created by historical circum-
stance separates them. 
That gulf is the outcome of two inter-linked
events: the conversion of some regions of the
Philippines to Islam, and the Spanish colonial
occupation of other regions shortly afterward.
Philippine Muslim tradition holds that Islam was
brought to the Philippines by a wandering
prince, the son of a Malay princess and an Arab
sharif, in the very early sixteenth century. Islam
may in fact have arrived somewhat earlier or
later but, whatever the date, it seems clear that
Islam was introduced to the Philippines as part
of the last phase of a conversion process that
swept across Southeast Asia from west to east
beginning in the late thirteenth century. It is also
well established that the Islamization process
was still under way when the Spaniards gained
their foothold in the northern Philippines in
1571, defeating the fledgling Sultanate of Mani-
la to do so. After consolidating control of the
northern tier of the Philippine islands, they
failed, despite repeated attempts, to subdue the
well-organized sultanates of the South.Little his-
torical evidence exists to support claims that the
southern sultanates mounted a sustained, uni-
fied Muslim resistance to Spanish aggression. As
elsewhere in Southeast Asia, sultanates just as
often fought with one another, sometimes forg-
ing temporary alliances with the Spaniards to do
Dr Thomas M. McKenna is Associate Professor of
Anthropology, Department of Anthropology,
University of Alabama at Birmingham, USA. 
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so. Nevertheless, the ability of southern sul-
tanates individually to withstand Spanish hege-
mony for more than 300 years is a testament to
their military and diplomatic prowess. 
With their Reconquista of Muslim Spain a
recent collective memory, the Spaniards
assigned to the unsubjugated Muslim peoples
of the southern sultanates the label previously
bestowed on their familiar Muslim enemies from
Mauritania: Moros (Moors). The term Moro was
applied categorically and pejoratively with scant
attention paid to linguistic or political distinc-
tions among various Moro societies. The Ameri-
can colonizers who succeeded the Spaniards
and eventually subdued Philippine Muslims in
the early twentieth century by means of over-
whelming force, continued the usage of the
term Moro even though it had become an epi-
thet used by Christian Filipinos to denote sav-
ages and pirates. In a bold piece of semantic
alchemy, Philippine Muslim nationalists during
the late 1960s appropriated the term Moro,
shook it free of its colonial and pejorative roots,
and transformed it into a positive symbol of col -
lective identity – one that denominated the citi-
zens of their newly-imagined nation. For Philip-
pine Muslim nationalists, Moro denotes the
descendants of those unsubjugated peoples
whom the Spaniards and their colonized sub-
jects feared and distrusted. The ‘Moro National
Liberation Front’ was formed to direct the strug-
gle for an independent political entity pro-
claimed to be the Bangsa Moro or Philippine
Muslim Nation.
The Rise of Muslim Nationalism
and the Armed Separatist
S t r u g g l e
The Bangsamoro rebellion developed out of a
political movement for Muslim separatism that
originated among a small set of Philippine Mus-
lim students and intellectuals in the late 1960s.
That movement had as its goal the establish-
ment of a single independent homeland for all
the Muslim peoples of the Philippines. The
remote causes of Muslim separatism in the mod-
ern Philippines may be traced to Western colo-
nizers. The Spaniards created two distinct popu-
lations in the archipelago – the colonized and
Christianized peoples of the North and the
unsubjugated and mostly Muslim peoples of the
South. American colonizers yoked those two
populations unevenly together in a colonial, and
then national, state. A more proximate cause
may be found in the policies and practices of the
postcolonial, Christian-dominated Philippine
State. Until the 1950s, Muslims formed the
majority population of almost every region of
the southern Philippines. In the early 1950s, the
Philippine government began to sponsor large-
scale migration from the poor and politically
troublesome regions of the north and central
parts of the country to the agricultural frontiers
of the sparsely populated southern islands. The
large, fertile, and under-populated island of Min-
danao became the primary destination for Chris-
tian migration to the southern Philippines and
by the late 1960s, Mindanao Muslims found
themselves a relatively impoverished minority in
their own homeland. 
Tensions brought about by massive Christian
migration to the Muslim South eventually led to
the eruption of sectarian violence in Mindanao
in 1970. That violence, which in many cases was
initiated or exacerbated by government soldiers,
was a primary justification used by President
Ferdinand Marcos to declare martial law in 1972.
One of the very first actions of the martial law
regime was an attempt to disarm Philippine
Muslims. In response, the underground Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) was activated
as an armed separatist movement. Muslim sepa-
ratist rebels, numbering as many as 30,000
armed insurgents, fought the Philippine Armed
Forces to a stalemate, obliging the Philippine
government to negotiate a cease-fire and peace
treaty in 1977. Muslim civilians overwhelmingly
supported the separatist insurgents and suf-
fered cruelly at the hands of the Philippine mili-
tary. The peace settlement, which called for the
establishment of a ‘Muslim Autonomous Region’
in the southern Philippines, was never genuinely
implemented by the Marcos administration. As a
consequence, fighting broke out once more
before the end of 1977, but did not again
approach the level of intensity experienced prior
to the cease-fire. The Muslim separatist move-
ment entered a period of disarray marked by fac-
tional infighting and a weakening of popular
support. By the early 1980s, it had refashioned
itself in Mindanao into a mass-based and self-
consciously Islamic movement guided by Islam-
ic clerics. With the fall of the Marcos regime in
1985, movement leaders (with the now-modi-
fied aim of genuine political autonomy for
Philippine Muslims) fully adopted the practices
of popular politics, organizing mass demonstra-
tions to petition the government for political
autonomy. Meanwhile, armed rebel fighters
remained in fortified camps in the hills.
Moro Autonomy and
t h e Aspirations of
O r d i n a r y Muslims 
In 1996, seeking an end to more than 25 years
of political instability in the southern provinces,
the Philippine government finally signed and
implemented a new peace treaty with Nur Mis-
uari, the founder of the MNLF. Misuari became
governor of the Autonomous Region for Muslim
Mindanao, consisting of the four provinces in
the southern Philippines that retain Muslim
majorities. He also heads the Southern Philip-
pines Council for Peace and Development, a
three-year experimental body designed to chan-
nel development funds to all of the southern
Philippines and, in doing so, to convince majori-
ty Christian provinces to join the autonomous
region. Though many political uncertainties
remain, the Muslim Philippines today is more
peaceful than it has been in three decades and
exhibits more potential for prosperity than any-
one might have hoped for just a few years ago.
By the standards of modern ethno-nationalist
movements, the Moro struggle for self-determi -
nation has achieved considerable success. Origi-
nating as a largely defensive rebellion to protect
communities and cultural practices, the move-
ment has produced not only a significant mea-
sure of autonomy for Muslim leaders but also
some substantial new benefits for ordinary Mus-
lims. The rebellion drew the attention of the
Muslim world and strengthened connections to
the Islamic heartland long attenuated by physi-
cal distance and disrupted by Western colonial-
ism. One result has been an unprecedented flow
of external resources for Islamic education. New
institutions established by the separatist leader-
ship allowed Philippine Muslims for the first time
to register births and marriages with a formal
governmental authority they felt they could
trust. However, the most pressing need of ordi-
nary Muslims remains mostly unmet. As a result
of decades of governmental neglect and the
economic toll taken by the rebellion, the Muslim
provinces of the Philippines remain the very
poorest in the country. Without improving the
economic well-being of the majority of its citi-
zens, the autonomous government for which
ordinary Muslims fought and suffered will not
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I n d o n e s i a
MA R G AR E T  K A R T O M I
Aceh, the northernmost province of Sumatra (known as
Serambi Mekah ‘The Verandah of Mecca’) has a wealth of
Muslim musical genres and body movement or dance
forms. It was one of the first provinces of the Malayo-
Indonesian archipelago to develop musical art forms
associated with Islam. Unlike in many other Muslim
societies, the Acehnese have a martial art tradition
which is integrated into performances and includes
female as well as male heroism.
S e u d a t i
In Sufi mysticism as practised in Aceh and
elsewhere, the ecstatic movements of the body
are recognized as the expression of sponta-
neous emotion caused by the experience of the
divine. Se u d a t i is the best-known Acehnese
expression of this. It is believed to have originat-
ed in the Pidi area of northeastern Aceh, but is
now found all over Aceh’s coastal areas and
even in parts of the interior. In coastal Aceh, s e u-
d a t i is usually performed by men, except in West
Aceh, where it is common amongst women as
well. The body percussion and dance or con-
certed body movement used in the perfor-
mance is a centuries-old Muslim tradition found
not only in Aceh but also in parts of North Africa
and West Asia. 
In Sumatra, males, not females, perform most
Muslim associated art forms. Even when a
dance by a mixed couple is portrayed, both
roles are played by men. This is because of the
Muslim preference not to have women per-
forming on stage in front of men. However, a
range of specifically female genres is per-
formed by groups of teenage girls in West Aceh
(and elsewhere). They range from laments at
the death of a child to seudati inong, the female
song and dance form based on the art of self-
defence. 
S e u d a t i is performed in open air, either by a
group of eight men, a soloist, and his assistant
(seudati agam), or by a group of eight women, a
soloist and her assistant (seudati inong) .
Whether male or female, the performers accom-
pany their movements with body percussion,
beating out interlocking or sharp, striking
rhythms with their hands on the ground, hand
clapping and chest slapping. The dancers sing
poetry in p a n t o n (Malay) or s y a é ( A c e h n e s e )
form with verses either telling of Aceh’s past
glory or presenting religious themes, topical
events, or political ideas. Se u d a t i and s e u d a t i
i n o n g are nowadays generally performed at
wedding ceremonies or other joyful occasions.
In former times, performances often lasted all
night for several successive nights. Shorter ver-
sions have been devised for present-day use,
such as when troupes are invited to perform at a
government or corporate function.
In the female se u d a t i, led by a s y é k ( f e m a l e
commander and song leader) and her assistant,
the performers present a series of song-dance
sections in varying tempi. A major feature of the
music is tempo change, from relatively slow,
through to medium-fast and fast. Another fea-
ture is the variety of timbres and rhythmic pat-
terns provided by the girls’ body per-
cussion, including finger clicking and
hand and thigh clapping (instead of
chest beating as in male s e u d a t i)
while they sing.
Three seudati
p e r f o r m a n c e s
In a sequence of three s e u d a t i
i n o n g performances, which we re-
corded in Meulaboh in 1983, a group
of teenage girls performed the
dance-songs based on the art of self-
defence. Eight of the ten girls on
stage were singer-dancers and two
were solo singers who played the role of com-
mander and assistant respectively. Apart from
the s y é k and assistant, who sat separately, the
whole group kneeled closely together in a row.
Following customary practice, the singers
began with the standard greeting to request
the forgiveness of their audience for any mis-
takes in the performance, after which they
sang a local version of the Arabic phrase
assalaam mulaikum, and gave thanks to Allah
for all His gifts. They moved together in a
wave-like fashion – back and forth, or from side
to side, sometimes with every second per-
former moving diagonally backwards while
her immediate neighbours moved diagonally
forwards. They clapped their hands together or
beat their shoulders and other body parts to
produce interlocking rhythmic sections or sharp
rhythmic statements.
The First Performance
The s y é k opened the first performance by
singing a four-tone melody to a text, which
offered greetings to the parents of a boy to be
circumcised, as well as to the guests present.
After a while, the members of the chorus
clicked their fingers in a cyclic rhythm. The
chorus then echoed the soloist’s line, continu-
ing into a section of rhythmic finger clicking
which alternated with a section of rhythmic
clapping. Subsequent verses referred to the
Prophet, sometimes alternating between sec-
tions of soft or loud singing and body percus-
sion sections without singing. To the accompa-
niment of the finger-clicked and hand-clapped
rhythms by the members of the u r e u e n g, the
soloist moved into a medium-fast metre,
singing a three-tone melody. Soloists and cho-
rus each sang very short phrases in alternation
to their own clapped and finger-clicked rhyth-
mic accompaniment. The last section, in fast
tempo, continued to alternate between the
soloist’s melodic line accompanied by the per-
formers’ singing and interlocking body percus-
sion segments.
In this case, the text refers to startling events,
including earthquakes and the fasting of hero-
ine Putroe Cut Barén, who possesses mystical
powers. The text contains both Muslim and
pre-Muslim references (e.g. betel nut offer-
i n g s ) .
The Second Performance
In the second performance the s y é k s t a r t e d
by singing the customary greeting to Allah and
the Prophet as well as the guests. She sang in
slow metre to a five-tone palette, after which
the chorus repeated the s y é k’s melodic line
and text. The slow, unmetered singing by both
soloist and chorus without body percussion in
some sections contrasted with the metered
singing accompanied by body percussion in
others. The dancer-singers described their
dance movements in their song texts as well as
dancing them, dwelling on the fact that they
all came from the same school, and alluding to
themselves in verse as small yellow birds.
The Third Performance
In the third performance, the two p a n t o n
(quatrain couplets) presented images of boats,
the sea, a river, flowers and a garden. They
alluded to the verse’s real meaning – that the
sad male singer is waiting for a girl (a flower) to
grow up so that he can marry her, and that he
is crying at the thought of such happiness.
Since there is a reference to the port of Singkil
in the southwest, we may assume that the p a n-
t o n verses probably originated or were popular
in southwest Aceh. However, the verse is
adapted slightly to the occasion of this perfor-
m a n c e .
The three items described above are in typi-
cal seudati inong style. The young female
dancer-singers produce a specifically female
musical sound and movement, but like the
extremely vigorous male s e u d a t i a g a m, both
reflect a specifically Acehnese Muslim piety,
fervour, and artistry infused with the Acehnese
martial spirit.
Music referred to in this article (with tran-
scribed texts and translations) may be heard
on the author’s compact disc entitled ‘Muslim
Music of Indonesia: Aceh’, which is part of a 16-
volume CD set entitled ‘The Music of Islam’
(Executive Producer Eckart Rahn), Celestial
Harmonies, 1998, available by e-mail at (celes-
tial@harmonies.com) and on internet at http:
//www.harmonies.com ♦
Prof. Margaret Kartomi is a ne t h n o m u s i c o l o g i s t
a n dP r o f e s s o r of Music, Monash U n i v e r s i t y ,
M e l b o u r n e ,A u s t r a l i a .
E-m a i l : margaret.kartomi@arts. monash.edu.au
Bismillah ratep meuseukat
Taloe peuet urat geupuphon sambong




Deungo lon kisah uroe kiamat
Malam Jumeu'at phon teuka geumpa
Geumpa keudua malam Aleuhat
Geumpa ka meuhat ‘oh watee isya
Nyawong geutanyoe di dalam badan
Barang pinjaman siat tuhan bri
Oh troh bak watee ka neucok pulang
Nyawong lam badan tuhan peuerebre
With Allah’s permission we sing this sad song
Four pieces of rope begin to be joined up (to bear the corpse)
Allah tonight
Allah we dance
Allah in the palace
Allah we dance
Hear the following story
On Friday night the earthquake began
The second earthquake was on Saturday night
The earthquake happened after Magreb prayers
Our souls are contained in our bodies
Our lives are borrowed for a short time
When the time comes (Allah) takes our lives back
From our bodies soon we shall be separated
Seulamat datang bapak ngon ibu
Keunoe neutuju u Aceh Barat
Ranup neupajoh di dalam puan
Mulia rakan mameh suara
Ha ellallah alah e han
Han neutem rila Putroe Baren
Han neutem rila
Ha ellallah Putroe Cut Baren
Duek ateueh meuligoe
Ka geuduek sidroe geutueng puasa
Welcome, men and women present
To this place in West Aceh
We prepare betel nut in the container
We pay our respects in sweet voices
Oh 
Putroe Baren does not want people to do certain things
Does not want them to do certain things
Oh Putroe Cut Baren
Sits on a raised throne
She sits alone and fasts
Seudati Inong
The Female Form of
t h e Martial Art Genre
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M a l a y s i a
C H A N D R A  MU ZA F F AR
When Anwar Ibrahim was sacked from the government
and the ruling party at the beginning of September
1998, the reason given by Prime Minister Dr Mahathir
Mohamad for his drastic action was Anwar’s ‘low
morals’. Anwar was allegedly guilty of sexual miscon-
duct, including sodomy. Mahathir and his lieutenants
were convinced that as soon as the former Deputy Prime
Minister and Deputy UMNO President was put on trial,
the truth would become obvious to everyone and his
massive support among the Malaysian people would
decline rapidly.
Power struggle
i n M a l a y s i a
The Anwar Crisis
Now, it appears that the court proceedings
are having the opposite effect: many
Malaysians are persuaded that the sex charges
against Anwar are utterly ludicrous. The con-
tradictory stances of prosecution witnesses;
the way in which preposterous bits of evidence
have been introduced into the trial; the strenu-
ous attempts by the prosecution to exclude
certain other pieces of evidence; and most of
all, the decision of the court to amend the
charges and to expunge a great deal of the evi-
dence at the close of the prosecution’s case,
have given the impression to the public that
the State is determined to convict Anwar at all
costs – however flimsy the evidence may be,
and however farcical the trial has become.
The decision to expunge all references to
sexual misconduct from the court records has
particularly incensed the people. They now
realize that the sex charges were introduced in
the first instance to humiliate Anwar via the
trial, even though the State knew all along that
it could not sustain those allegations. It is the
shaming of Anwar in such a crude and vulgar
manner which has brought Mahathir into
odium. It has eroded his support base and has
weakened his political position to such an
extent that he is now regarded in some quar-
ters as a liability to the ruling party in the com-
ing general election.
The government’s failure to identify the
police personnel who had assaulted Anwar
while he was in police custody and to take
action against the culprit or culprits, has creat-
ed serious doubts in the public mind about the
government’s integrity. Though an indepen-
dent Commission of Inquiry has now been
established – four months after Anwar’s black
eye became public knowledge – the damage
done to Mahathir’s reputation is irreparable.
Anwar’s trial and the harsh treatment meted
out to him in police custody have helped to
convince a substantial segment of Malaysian
society that there are ulterior political motives
behind his dismissal. Indeed, there are more
people today than at the outset of the crisis
who believe that Anwar is in fact a victim of a
high-level conspiracy to destroy his political
career. Anwar has argued all along that
Mahathir and some of his cohorts in politics
and business are determined to eliminate him
because he is an obstacle to their interests.
R e l a t i o n s h i p
It was Mahathir who brought Anwar into
government, in 1982. It was Mahathir who
groomed Anwar, accelerated his ascendancy
within UMNO, and exposed him to a variety of
governmental roles until he assumed the man-
tle of Deputy UMNO President and Deputy
Prime Minister. Anwar was indisputably
Mahathir’s heir apparent. Though the older
man was instrumental in the younger man’s
meteoric rise, Anwar himself was undoubtedly
an astute politician with a knack for mass
mobilization and for the intrigues of intra-
party manoeuvres. Besides, he was also a gift-
ed orator who enjoyed tremendous rapport
with his followers. 
Anwar reciprocated Mahathir’s patronage by
giving unstinted support to the latter whenev-
er he was confronted by a political crisis. This
relationship between the two men created
quite a bit of resentment within UMNO espe-
cially among party stalwarts who had joined
the organization long before Anwar was co-
opted into government. In fact, from 1982,
there were groups who sought to drive a
wedge between Mahathir and Anwar through
poison-pen letters and whispering campaigns. 
Then in May 1997, Mahathir sent the clearest
signal yet to UMNO, the government, and the
people that Anwar would be his successor. This
was by appointing him Acting UMNO President
and Acting Prime Minister when he went off on
two months’ leave. Anwar’s adversaries in the
party, some corporate figures who regarded his
ascendancy as a threat to their interests and a
few individuals in certain public institutions
viewed his appointment as a sign of danger. In
July 1997, they circulated a signed document
alleging that Anwar had an adulterous relation-
ship with the wife of his Confidential Secretary,
on the one hand, and a homosexual relation-
ship with his wife’s former driver, on the other.
The Prime Minister, according to the local
media, had the police investigate the allega-
tions and in late August 1997, he announced
publicly that investigations had revealed that
there was no basis to the allegations. 
Differences 
The sex allegations would have ended there,
except for a series of developments since
August 1997 which brought them into the
limelight again and which had an adverse
impact on the Mahathir-Anwar relationship. In
the wake of the East Asian financial crisis, with
the ringgit and the stock market declining,
businesses collapsing, and people losing their
jobs, the general public became more and
more critical of the leadership of Dr Mahathir.
Though the crisis was largely due to an exter-
nal factor – volatile equity capital suddenly
exiting East Asian markets – the popular per-
ception was that Dr Mahathir had not man-
aged the economy well. 
The foreign media, on the other hand, por-
trayed Anwar, who was also Finance Minister,
as a sober and sensible person who under-
stood global financial markets. Their praise for
him created the impression that he was ‘their
man’. Some of them even suggested that
Anwar and not Mahathir should be running the
country. In fact, in June 1998 a number of
regional and international newspapers and
magazines openly called for Mahathir’s resig-
nation. The media, in a sense, brought to the
surface certain differences in approach
between Mahathir and Anwar in their handling
of the economic crisis. Right from the outset,
Mahathir preferred a credit expansionary poli-
cy aimed at stimulating the economy and pre-
venting it from sinking into recession. Anwar
took the more conventional route and sought
to cut back on expenditure and impose a cred-
it squeeze. 
These differences which generated some
uneasiness in the market did not, however,
cause the split between the Prime Minister and
his Deputy-cum-Finance Minister. What exac-
erbated their relationship was Anwar’s initial
reluctance to endorse some of the rescue oper-
ations of big local corporations hit by the
financial crisis. One of these corporations
which had accumulated huge debts was Kon-
sortium Perkapalan – a shipping firm associat-
ed with Mirzan Mahathir, the Prime Minister’s
son. There were a couple of other bailouts too,
allegedly linked to corporate figures close to
the Prime Minister which Anwar was not
enthusiastic about. 
Demonstrations 
As the rift between Mahathir and Anwar
widened, yet another factor began to have an
impact on their relationship. This was the
explosive situation in Indonesia which came to
a head in May 1998. Suharto was becoming the
principal target of massive street demonstra-
tions that zeroed in upon his long tenure –
3 2 years in power – and the enormous wealth
that his family had accumulated during his rule.
In the end, popular fury over his ‘nepotism,
cronyism and collusion’ forced Suharto to quit.
Opposition political parties, NGOs, and youth
and student groups in Malaysia, already critical
of the growing involvement of Mahathir’s sons
in big business and somewhat unhappy about
the Prime Minister’s own long stay in power (18
years by July 1999), began to draw parallels
between Suharto and Mahathir. Some of them
felt that the time had come for Mahathir to
r e t i r e .1
The question of corruption was raised by
some UMNO Youth leaders close to Anwar at
the party’s annual assembly in June 1998.
Mahathir saw it as a blatant attack upon his
leadership. Though he managed to blunt the
attack by revealing that others, including
Anwar’s family and friends, had also benefited
from the allocation of shares and the govern-
ment’s privatization programme, the raising of
the ‘corruption’ issue at the assembly, wors-
ened the deteriorating ties between Mahathir
and his heir apparent. 
Mahathir was now convinced that the UMNO
Youth criticisms, seen against the backdrop of
attempts to draw parallels between him and
Suharto; Anwar’s lukewarm attitude towards
certain bailouts; differences in approach
towards the economic crisis between him and
Anwar; the foreign media’s antagonism toward
him in contrast to the accolades showered
upon Anwar; and the general erosion of sup-
port for his leadership, were clear indications
that there was an organized, systematic
endeavour to force him out of office. The man
behind this endeavour, Mahathir reasoned,
was Anwar Ibrahim. He therefore decided to
move against his protégé. 
A l l e g a t i o n s
It is revealing that it was around this time, in
June 1998, that the sex allegations that
Mahathir had dismissed in August 1997, resur-
faced through a thick book entitled 50 Reasons
why Anwar cannot become Prime Minister,
which included a whole host of other slander-
ous charges against him. The book, inter alia,
alleged that Anwar was not only a womanizer
and sodomist but also a murderer, who was
corrupt, had abused power and was, at the
same time, a CIA agent and a traitor to the
nation. At the UMNO General Assembly, the
book was distributed to party delegates. In
spite of a court injunction restraining the dis-
tributor from circulating the book or its con-
tents, 50 Reasons is easily available and has
appeared in different forms.
That this poison-pen book designed to
smear Anwar should appear almost simultane-
ously to Mahathir’s loss in confidence in him is
no coincidence. The book, it is obvious, was
written at the behest of Anwar’s adversaries in
order to character assassinate him. It appears
that Mahathir, who was angered and incensed
by what he regarded as his heir apparent’s
betrayal and disloyalty, was not averse to the
production and distribution of the book. He
knew it would serve his purpose of slandering
and shaming someone who had the audacity
to go against him. Thus, Anwar’s enemies suc-
ceeded finally in merging their goal with
Mahathir’s motive. 
Loyalty 
Mahathir’s insistence on loyalty is not in
itself an unusual feature of politics. In most
political systems, ancient or modern, a deputy
or the number-two man is expected to be loyal
to his chief. Within UMNO – given its feudal
history and culture – unquestioning loyalty to
the paramount leader is one of the most cher-
ished traits of membership. It is because
Mahathir was absolutely certain that Anwar
had betrayed him that he has marshalled all his
resources to annihilate him. The virulence of
the annihilation can perhaps be best explained
by the fact that Anwar was, all said and done,
Mahathir’s protégé. 
What made the protégé’s sin of disloyalty an
unpardonable crime was Anwar’s reluctance to
protect the business interests of Mahathir’s
family and friends. By questioning the bailout
for Mahathir’s son, Anwar was telling his boss
that he was not prepared to salvage the
Mahathir family. For an ageing leader who wit-
nessed what happened in South Korea and
what is now happening in Indonesia, Anwar’s
attitude was the antithesis of the ironclad
guarantee he was looking for in a post-
Mahathir era. 
At the root of the expulsion of Anwar from the
government and the party is the question of
power. Mahathir sensed an attempt to ease him
out of power. He responded to the perceived
challenge with vigour and without scruples.
Anwar felt that Mahathir’s power base was
weakening. He sought to send a message – and
was repulsed. Though Mahathir has been able
to ward off the Anwar challenge for the time
being, the question is whether he will be able to
perpetuate his power for much longer. ♦
Dr Chandra Muzaffar is the President of
t h e International Movement for a Just World.
H ei s also Professor-cum-Director of the Centre for
Civilisational Dialogue at the University of Malaya,
M a l a y s i a .
N o t e
1 . There are significant differences between the
Suharto and Mahathir leaderships and between
Indonesia and Malaysia which some of Mahathir’s
critics fail to appreciate. Unlike Suharto, Mahathir
is a popularly elected leader who derives his
mandate from a democratically constituted
electoral process. Unlike the Suharto family,
Mahathir’s children have not established
monopolies over entire sectors of the economy.
Neither corruption, nor poverty nor
authoritarianism in Malaysia today bears any
semblance to the situation in Indonesia under
Suharto. 
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V i e t n a m
J AY  W I L L O U G H B Y
Islam was brought to Hindu/Buddhist Champa (present-
day southern Vietnam) by Arab and Persian sailors and
merchants who plied the rich Asian trade routes during
the first Islamic century. As the region’s aloewood soon
became a profitable commodity, small commercial set-
tlements appeared. Islam made slow but steady
progress among the Cham aristocracy and educated
classes. At the time of Champa’s final military defeat
and territorial absorption by Vietnam in the 1490s, the
Cham were predominantly Muslim. After their loss of
political independence and during subsequent Viet-
namese dynastic struggles, in which the Cham fared
quite badly, many Cham fled to Cambodia. The Cham
royal court remained centred in Phan Rang until 1693,
after which it moved to Cambodia and continued to
function for over a century in a much diminished capac-
ity. The Cham who remained behind were isolated by
successive Vietnamese dynasties from the Islamized
Malay world, with which they shared a common religion
and culture and, to a lesser degree, language. With the
incorporation of Vietnam into the French colonial
empire during the nineteenth century, all official assim-
ilation policies stopped and were replaced by a policy of
benign neglect.
Under the French, the Cham found themselves in two
different colonies: Cochin China in the south, and
Annam in the centre. As a result, the communities grad-
ually became quite distinct from each other. This




The Cham of Cochin China
In Cochin China, the Cham were largely con-
centrated in 7 villages in the province of Chau
Doc. Their leaders’ authority was restricted to
village religious affairs. The leading official of
each village, the Saykol Islam (Shaykh al Islam),
was appointed by the French. Lesser officials of
the religious hierarchy, in order of importance,
were the h a k e m, who served as judge and vil-
lage head; the ong mam (imam), who was in
charge of the village mosque; and the a h l y,
who oversaw the small communal worship
halls (s u r a u) and religious activities in the
c o u n t r y s i d e .
A m a d r a s a was attached to each mosque.
Local education consisted in memorizing and
reciting the Qur'an, as well as explaining its
meaning to the children. The language of
instruction was J a w i (Malay written in a modi-
fied Arabic script). Because of its central impor-
tance in Cham communal life, Malay soon
became the language of the local Cham elite. In
the 1930s, the Cham started to write their own
language in a similar modified Arabic script, as
the traditional Sanskrit-derived script was no
longer in use. A romanized alphabet was also
used. Both scripts are still in use today.
The Cham of Annam
In the centre of Vietnam, the French set up
the protectorate of Annam, which they ruled
through a compliant court in Hue. The local
Cham divided themselves into two groups:
Cham Bani and Cham Kafir (or Cham Jahit).
Both groups, although very unorthodox, saw
themselves as true Muslims. Among the Cham
Bani, each family provided one person to be
trained in religious matters. Known as the o n g
c h a r, this person observed the cult of the ances-
tors and other religious duties in the village.
The ong mam prayed and fasted on behalf of
the community, while the villagers showed
their devotion by prostrating during the
prayers and bringing offerings to the temple.
The Cham Kafir followed the old ways. Their
worship centred around two Cham kings: Po
Klong Garai and Po Rome. Temples to these
two kings still stand in Thap Cham (Phan Rang)
and have become tourist sites. Each year, the
faithful would go to the temple to wash and
clothe the statues of the kings, and then
parade them outside in a time-honoured cere-
mony. During the rest of the year, the temple
was closed.
The Cham of Annam were concentrated
around Phan Rang: in the districts of Phan Ri,
Phan Thiet, Ah Phuoc, and Binh Thuan. Origi-
nally, the French were in charge of their affairs,
but during the 1930s and 1940s the French
appointed Cham officials to manage their dis-
tricts’ affairs. 
Education, as in Chau Doc, was confined
largely to Islam. The Cham ‘scholars’ taught
Kitab (the Qur'an) and Kitab al Hamd, and con-
tinued to use the traditional Cham script (a k a l
t a u k). As their society was closed, the language
stagnated and gradually incorporated many
Vietnamese words. Currently, approximately
two-thirds of the Cham dialect spoken in this
area consists of Vietnamese words. As many
Malay words have been incorporated into the
Cham dialect in the Chau Doc, communication
in Cham between the two areas is sometimes
p r o b l e m a t i c a l .
The Cham Today
Today, the Cham in Vietnam number less
than one percent of Vietnam’s approximately
70 million people. They are concentrated in
three areas: the region surrounding the former
Cham capital of Phan Rang, Ho Chi Minh City,
and the southern provinces of Tay Ninh and
Chau Doc. The province of Chau Doc hosts the
local ‘institute’ of higher Islamic studies. Teach-
ing is supplemented by village elders and oth-
ers who have some Islamic knowledge. Cham
communities remain isolated from the Viet-
namese by mutual suspicion. Most of their
members are poorly educated, as school is not
compulsory and parents need their children’s
labour in the fields and the home. Schooling is
available in the Cham language for approxi-
mately 3 years, after which the language of
instruction is Vietnamese. 
The Cham Jahit have retained pre-Islamic
religious elements. For example, I attended
t a r a w i h prayer services in a Cham Jahit
mosque in Phuoc Nhon in 1993. Many worship-
pers, dressed in white robes, performed the
Buddhist triple prostration while facing the
direction of prayer. Only the imam and his
assistants were fasting and praying their ver-
sion of the prescribed prayers. Their a d h a n
bore no resemblance to the traditional Muslim
a d h a n, nor did the prayer ceremonies which
were conducted by roughly 10 assistants recit-
ing and bowing before what appeared to be
very tall candles while the imam sat to one side
and talked with those sitting close to him. I was
shown their Qur'an, which was a thick book
containing Qur'anic verses in Arabic along with
an interlinear Cham explanation. However, as
very few of them could read Cham and none
could read Arabic, we were told that the book
was a mystery. When my travelling companion
read it in Arabic and explained it to them in
Cham, they were amazed.
The Vietnamese government’s attitude
toward the Cham is becoming more relaxed,
partly due to Hanoi’s good relations with
Indonesia and Malaysia. Permits to expand or
build mosques are granted, usually after
Jay Willoughby is a founding member of the Cham
Muslim foundation and works for TRW in Virginia,
U S A .
lengthy bureaucratic procedures, and the peo-
ple are allowed to raise money locally and
abroad. Islamic literature is allowed, but there
are some restrictions. For example, various
members of the Cham Muslim Foundation
have spent years translating the meaning of
the Qur'an into Vietnamese, as well as books
on basic Islamic beliefs, the life of the Prophet
Muhammad, and stories of his Companions.
When these books appear in Vietnam, they
may or may not be banned. Books also come in
through Malaysian and Indonesian diplomatic
channels. In the near future, one thousand
copies of the Vietnamese translation of the
meaning of the Qur'an are scheduled to be
printed in Vietnam. Cham students can leave
the country to study Islam or other subjects,
provided they are high school graduates and
academically qualified, and if they have
enough money. Almost no Cham can meet
these requirements, as their communities are
poor and the level of formal education is quite
low. In addition, I was told that at least one
Vietnamese government official has been sent
to Saudi Arabia to study Arabic and Islam so
that the government will have a better idea of
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I n d i a
T H E O D OR E  G AB R I E L
The enchanting coral archipelago known as Lakshad-
weep comprises ten inhabited and seventeen uninhab-
ited islands, which lie about 200 to 400 kilometres off
the Indian west coast in the Arabian Sea. The islands
span from north to south for approximately 350 kilome-
tres. The inhabitants of all the islands are ethnically
very similar and speak a dialect of Malayalam, the lan-
guage of the neighbouring Indian state of Kerala.1 T h e
population numbering 50,000 is almost entirely Mus-
lim, mainly Sunnites, apart from a smattering of Waha-






The islanders are devout Muslims and main-
ly orthodox in their orientation, but there is a
substratum of Sufism underlying their faith
and practice. The Sufi leaders, known as Tan-
gals, are extremely popular and highly regard-
ed, and their followers engage in a lot of heal-
ing, and performing of miracles. The Sufis of
Lakshadweep belong to two orders, namely
the Quadiriyya and the Riffai. The two orders
are identified with two different caste groups
in the islands. Caste-like stratification is
noticeable among Muslims in various parts of
India, though none of them can compare in
rigidity and chauvinism with the caste system
of the Lakshadweep Muslims. Many attribute
the caste systems among Muslims to the ves-
tiges of their Hindu ancestry.2 Modernity has
attenuated the discrimination and social sepa-
ratism of the caste system of the islands. How-
ever, the castes are still endogamous and
caste names are often used in conjunction
with Muslim names. The most prominent
castes among the islanders are the Koya, the
superior caste, traditionally land and sailing
ship owners, and the Melacceri, who are their
serfs and engaged by the Koyas in coconut
tree climbing, toddy making and menial
duties. The Quadiriyya and the Riffai Sufi
orders of the Lakshadweep islands are associ-
ated with the Koya and the Melacceri castes
r e s p e c t i v e l y .
The origin of the Quadiriyya t a r i q a in Lak-
shadweep is obscure. The Hindu inhabitants
of the islands are said to have been converted
to Islam by Ubaid Allah, a grandson of Caliph
Abu Bakr. Ubaid Allah was shipwrecked on
Amini Island in 41 AH, where legend has it that
he was attacked by the population, but mate-
rialized tigers and other wild animals hitherto
never seen in the islands. It is said that when
he stamped his foot on the western shore, the
island tilted towards the West, and this is
when the astounded population accepted
Islam wholesale. He performed similar mira-
cles in the other islands. These legends laid
the foundation for mysticism in the islands
and led to a more charismatic form of the
faith. Ubaid Allah’s m a q b a r a (tomb) is still
found at the Juma m a s j i d in Androth Island
and is the scene of a popular and grand festi-
val each year. 
Sheikh Mohammed Kasim Tangal (died AH
1140), whose tomb is found in Kavaratti Island,
near the picturesque Ujjra mosque that he
built, is said to have introduced the thau-
maturgical and self-mortificatory Riffai d h i k r
to the islands. The present leadership of the
Quadiriyya and the Riffai Tariqas in Lakshad-
weep are from the Aranikkat and Ekkarpally
families of Kavaratti Island, both of whom are
considered to be the descendants of Sheikh
Mohammed Kasim. 
The Mohideen mosques – after Mohideen
Sheikh, by which name Abdul Quadr al Gilani
is known – are the venues of the Koyas, the
upper caste group. The Quadiriyya d h i k r ( a
remembrance ritual) performed by them is a
sober affair when compared to the Melacceri
d h i k r which involves magical acts of self-mor-
tification (see below). It is interesting that the
land owning upper caste group is associated
with the more dignified Sufi ritual and the
lower castes with the more lively and charis-
matic d h i k r. This is in keeping with the ideolo-
gy of the Riffai order that was inclined to self-
mortification, a result of the belief in the abili-
ty of the spirit to overcome the flesh. Perhaps
this reflects the persecution suffered by the
Melacceris at the hands of the upper castes,
and their quest to overcome poverty, sorrow
and misery by the spiritual acts of the d h i k r,
that exemplified the transcendence of the
spiritual over the worldly and the material.
Caste-based discrimination is usually only
visible in social and economic affairs. The
Melacceris resented its extension to religious
matters when they were not allowed to partic-
ipate in Mohideen ceremonies. Some Melac-
ceri youths secretly learned their songs and in
1950 went to the Mohideen mosque at Amini
and forcibly participated in the d h i k r c e r e m o-
ny being performed there. The Koyas, highly
incensed by this intrusion into what they con-
sidered their prerogative, complained to the
Tangal, the head of the Quadiriyya order. The
Tangal, however, held that there was to be no
discrimination in matters of faith and would
not admonish the Melacceri devotees. The
Koyas, taken aback by the Tangal’ s unexpect-
ed response, established their own mosques
in each island and conducted their cere-
monies separately, a practice which continues
to this day. No caste discrimination is shown at
the Mowlid festivals, the annual commemora-
tion of the Sufi saints whose d a r g h a s a b o u n d
in the islands. Huge amounts of food are pre-
pared and distributed at these events where
all the population of each island takes part.
D h i k r
The Sufi rituals are termed r a t i b in Lakshad-
weep. The Quadiriyya r a t i b ritual has two rows
of singers, ten to sixteen in number, clad in
white, with white caps, and holding tam-
bourines in hand. They stand facing each
other and sing devotional songs to Allah, the
Prophet and Abdul Kadar al Gilani. The singers
bow as they sing and tap their tambourines,
very slowly at first, the tempo slowly increas-
ing until it reaches a crescendo of singing and
genuflecting, when the singing suddenly
stops. The euphoria of the singers is clearly
visible to the onlookers. The singers’ move-
ments and singing are well synchronized. The
Head of the order, the Aranikkat Tangal, if pre-
sent, stands at the head of the group. A copy
of the Qur'an is placed on a pillow at the end
of the two rows.
The Riffai ritual also includes singing praises
to God, Muhammad and the founder of the
order, Ahmad ar Riffai. The tambourine wield-
ing singers are also present. However, about
six or seven murids, clad only in loincloths also
take part in the ceremony. Some swords,
knives and awls lie piled up in front of the Tan-
gal, the head of the order, who hands them
out to the partially-clad dancers after blessing
the instruments. The singing and drumming
begin slowly and as it works up to a faster
pace, the dancers enter the arena moving
slowly at first and as the rhythm and singing
work up to a furious pitch, they begin swaying
from side to side as though intoxicated. They
begin to slash their bellies, pierce their cheeks
and throat and hit their heads with hammers,
etc. The wounded dancers approach the Tan-
gal who strokes the wound areas softly. It is
believed that the dancers are healed instanta-
neously and completely. Not a drop of blood is
shed during the entire ceremony in spite of all
the frenzied self-mortificatory acts. 
The dancers must perform w u d u before par-
ticipating in the rituals, otherwise it is believed
that they will suffer pain from their wounds.
The elders recount that in former times they
even used to gouge out their eyes and slice off
their tongues. The islanders also say that it is
impossible to photograph the ra t i b ritual and
that the pictures come out blank if someone
tries to photograph the d h i k r.
The Tangals
The Tangals of the Sufi orders are all
believed to be descendants of the Prophet
and are highly regarded, not only in Lakshad-
weep and in neighbouring Kerala but also in
Sri Lanka and even as far away as Malaysia,
where they are sought after for their miracu-
lous powers and their teachings. One Androth
islander is a teacher at the prestigious Al Azar
of Cairo. They are known for their powers and
charismatic personalities and many periodi-
cally undertake what the islanders call s a f a r,
journeys to distant lands returning with much
wealth from the gifts and donations of their
admirers from distant shores.
Some have taken to secular education and
secular professions. A member of the
Ekkarpally family of the Riffai order Secretary
for Planning in the Lakshadweep government.
The oldest members of the Aranikkat and
Ekkarpally families are of course the Khalifas of
the two orders. The descendants of Ubaidal-
lah, the first Muslim missionary of the islands,
are mostly to be found in Androth. They are as
respected as the Tangals, being charismatic
and miracle-performing individuals, though
they do not hold particular offices in the Sufi
orders. 
Legends of the wonder-working deeds of
former times abound. For instance, the Sheikh
Mohammed Kasim is said to have blessed the
ladies of the island with painless childbearing.
However, this sans trauma child-birth is a
blessing only for the native inhabitants of
Kavaratti and not for expatriate workers. Simi-
larly, the inhabitants of Chetlat Island were
blessed by a local saint with the ability to
climb coconut trees without the aid of ropes
or any of the usual apparatus, a fact I have
observed personally. 
The minority community of Wahabis in the
Lakshadweep islands is extremely critical of
the Sufi rituals. This is in tune with the general
Wahabi opposition to Sufism, which holds
that this latter abounds in allegedly heretical
concepts, such as polytheism in the venera-
tion of saints, idolatry in rituals such as circum-
ambulation and prayers performed at tombs
and shrines to saints, and syncretism such as
the adoption of concepts and rituals from
non-Muslim religions. The Wahabis in Lak-
shadweep are mostly Arabic teachers who
have been in contact with the dynamic
Wahabi community of Kerala. They were for-
merly students in the Arabic madrasas run by
Wahabis in Kerala in this neighbouring state.
However, unlike in Kerala, Wahabism has not
been able to make much headway in Lakshad-
weep. Moreover, Sufi rituals are seen to be as
popular as ever in the islands. The people of
Lakshadweep are devoted to Islam. Their faith
is strong, as is their adherence to Islamic prac-
tice and law. This includes the youth, a mainly
university-educated and professional genera-
tion. This commitment is in no small measure
due to the Sufi ideology and practice in the
islands which lend charisma to the practice of
the faith, stimulating and attracting the popu-
l a t i o n . ♦
Dr Theodore Gabriel is Senior Lecturer at the School
of Theology and Religious Studies, Cheltenham and
Gloucester College of Higher Education, UK.
E-m a i l :T g a b r i e l @ c h e l t . a c . u k
N o t e s
1. Except for Minicoy Island which is Maldivian. 
2. See, for instance, Ahmad, Imtiaz (1978),
Caste and Social Stratification among Muslims
i nI n d i a, New Delhi, Manohar.
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Ce ntra l  As i a
AD E E B  K H A L I D
Muslim modernism in Central Asia at the turn of the
twentieth century remains virtually unknown to schol-
ars of Muslim cultural history. What little we know
comes through a thick prism of nationalist or Soviet his-
toriography that loses the Islamic dimension of the
movement. Yet, approaching Jadidism, as this move-
ment is usually called, as a Muslim movement allows us
to broaden our understanding of the Muslim world’s
encounter with modernity, and to reconsider many of






Jadidism arose in Central Asia in the 1890s, a
generation after the Russian conquest. Its pro-
ponents, the Jadids, formulated a harsh cri-
tique of their society based on a fascination
with modernity. The distinct flavour of Central
Asian Jadidism is captured in the following
exhortation penned by Munawwar Qari in
1 9 0 6 :
O Co-religionists, o compatriots! Let’s be just
and compare our situation with that of other,
advanced nations. Let’s secure the future of our
coming generations and save them from becom-
ing slaves and servants of others. The Europeans,
taking advantage of our negligence and igno-
rance, took our government from our hands, and
are gradually taking over our crafts and trades. If
we do not quickly make an effort to reform our
affairs in order to safeguard ourselves, our
nation, and our children, our future will be
extremely difficult. Reform begins with a rapid
start in cultivating sciences conforming to our
times. Becoming acquainted with the sciences of
the present age depends upon the reform of our
schools and our methods of teaching.1
The sense of decline and impending doom
was widely shared by the Jadids. Reform was
necessary to avoid extinction. Its advocacy
rested on a harsh critique of the corrupt pre-
sent. Judged by the needs of the age, much, if
not all, in Central Asian society was deemed to
be in need of urgent change. The solution lay
in cultivating knowledge, which appeared as a
panacea to the Jadids for the ills they diag-
nosed in their society. The very name
‘Jadidism’ is connected with education. It
refers to the advocacy by the reformers of the
phonetic, or new, method (usul-i jadid) of
teaching the alphabet in the maktab. From the
new method, Jadid reform went to the advoca-
cy of the new-method school, a transformation
of the syllabus, and ultimately a new concep-
tion of knowledge. 
In common with other modernists of the
period, the Jadids ascribed the ‘decline’ and
‘degeneration’ of their community to its depar-
ture from the true path of Islam. When Muslims
followed true Islam, the Jadids argued, they
were leaders of the world in knowledge, and
Muslim empires were mighty. Corruption of
the faith led them to ignorance and political
and military weakness. The solution was a
return to ‘true Islam’. But ‘true Islam’ had come
to mean something quite new to the Jadids.
The idea of progress, a historical consciousness
defined by constant change, and a modern
conception of geography, all in different ways
transformed the way in which Central Asians
could imagine their world. New conceptions of
time and space allowed a far-reaching histori-
cization of the world that produced new, ratio-
nalist understandings of Islam and being Mus-
lim. True understanding of Islam required not
insertion in a chain of authoritative masters,
but the mastery of the textual sources of Islam,
now available in print. Knowledge alone could
lead Muslims to the true faith. 
Knowledge also explained the superiority of
the ‘more advanced’ societies (Russia and
Europe in general) over Muslims. Up until 1917,
the Jadids’ view of Russia and Europe was
quite positive: they were living examples of the
links between knowledge, wealth, and military
might that the Jadids constantly asserted.
Such positive images were not simply the
result of the Jadids’ europhilia. They all had a
didactic purpose: to exhort their own society
to acquire all the aspects of Europe that they
admired – knowledge, order, discipline, and
power. This fascination with Europe coexisted
with a fear that if Muslim societies did not
‘catch up’, their situation would become ‘even
more difficult’. The practically unchallenged
encroachment of European powers over the
rest of the planet sustained these fears. Ulti-
mately, the hope of the Jadids was for Muslims
to join the modern world as respected and
equal partners. They wanted the modernity of
Europe for themselves.
The first proponents of reform often had tra-
ditional Muslim education, but they had also
experienced the modern world through travel
and reading newspapers. The father of Mah-
mud Khoja Behbudi, the most respected figure
in Central Asia, was qazi in a village on the out-
skirts of Samarqand, and Behbudi was taught
the standard madrasa texts of the time at
home by his father and uncles. The family was
prosperous enough for Behbudi to travel
abroad. A trip in 1900 to Istanbul and Cairo, en
route to the hajj, was a turning point in Behbu-
di’s intellectual trajectory. First-hand experi-
ence of modernist reforms in those places con-
vinced him to propagate similar ideas in his
own land. Abdurrauf Fitrat, the leading Bukha-
ran Jadid, had studied at a madrasa before he
travelled to Istanbul for further education. By
about 1910, the Jadid profile begins to change:
the younger Jadids still came from traditionally
learned families, but their madrasa credentials
were scantier. 
What the Jadids had in common was a com-
mitment to change and a possession of what
Pierre Bourdieu has called ‘cultural capital’.
This disposed them to conceive of reform in
cultural terms, and the modicum of comfort
that most enjoyed in their lives allowed them
to devote their energies to it. In the end, the
Jadids were constituted as a group by their
own critical discourse. Their sense of cohesion
came from their shared vision of the future as
well as their participation in common activities
and enterprises. The basic institutions of Jadid
reform were the press and the new-method
s c h o o l .
The Jadids avidly read the Turkic-language
press of both the Russian and Ottoman
empires, as well as newspapers in Persian and
even Arabic, published in the Middle East,
India, and Europe. This made them part of a
transnational public of Muslim newspaper
readers, open to ideas developed far away. But
in a more fundamental sense, print made
Jadidism p o s s i b l e. Jadidism was articulated in a
print-based public space which disadvantaged
the traditional cultural elite to the benefit of
the Jadids. The authority of the ulama, for
instance, had been based on their cultural cap-
ital acquired in years of study in the madrasa.
Such cultural markers also served to limit the
field of debate over questions of culture and
religious authority. Entry into the new public
space, by contrast, required only functional lit-
eracy. Debates in this public space in turn
served to discredit the very assumptions on
which the authority of the ulama had rested.
Madrasas came to be criticized for not meeting
the needs of the age; for producing corrupted
versions of Islam; and even for being hotbeds
of laziness and docility. 
The new-method schools were the site of the
struggle for the hearts and minds of the next
generation. Through them the Jadids dissemi-
nated a cognitive style quite different from
that of the maktab and thus created a group in
society that was receptive to their ideas. These
schools were also crucially important in the
social reproduction of the movement. If the
first new-method schools had been founded
single-handedly by a few dedicated individu-
als, by 1917 new-method schools were often
staffed by their own graduates. The Jadids also
enthusiastically adopted such new forms of
sociability as benevolent societies. 
Adeeb Khalid is an Assistant Professor of History at
Carleton College, USA. He is author of The Politics of
Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia.
E-mail: akhalid@carleton.edu
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This very brief exposition of Jadidism allows
us to pose a few basic questions about the
relation of ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’. The paradigm
of ‘Westernization’ seeks to interpret change in
the non-Western world as simply a case of imi-
tation, or the transplantation of ideas or insti-
tutions fully developed in a monolithic and
homogeneous ‘West’. It also assumes clear
boundaries between ‘cultures’, so that influ-
ences from ‘outside’ may clearly be delineated
from ‘authentic’ developments taking place
‘inside’ a culture. But were the Jadids ‘insiders’
or ‘outsiders’? Does fascination with European
might (and wanting it for themselves) make
them ‘Westernizers’? What is the ‘West’ in this
case anyway, given that the relationship
between Russia (the colonizing power here)
and ‘the West’ remains a matter of debate, not
least for Russians themselves? Perhaps these
categories are not very useful. Rather, it is
much more fruitful to see Jadidism as an exam-
ple of the open-ended transformation of cul-
ture at a time of intense social and economic
change – a time when new groups in society
arise and bring new means of communication
and organization to bear on their struggles. A
more useful conceptualization would pose the
same questions to Muslim modernism that are
posed to the transformation of Europe in the
early modern period, questions that, instead of
emphasizing cultural absolutes, deal with the
impact of modern means of order and disci-
pline on society and culture. ♦
B e h b u d i ’ s
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Divorce Iranian Style is a documentary film directed by
Kim Longinotto and Ziba Mir-Hosseini. It is set in a small
courtroom in central Tehran, and follows a number of
women who come before a non-plussed judge and by
turn use whatever they can – reason, argument, charm,
outrage, pleas for sympathy, patience, and wit – to get
what they each need. There are four main characters:
Massy, who wants to divorce her inadequate husband;
Ziba, an outspoken 16-year-old who proudly stands up
to her 38-year-old husband and his family; Jamileh, who
brings her husband to court to teach him a lesson; and




The idea of making a film about the working
of Sharica law in a Tehran family court was born
in early 1996 when a friend introduced me to
Kim Longinotto, the documentary filmmaker. I
had seen and liked Kim’s film, Hidden Faces
(1991), on women in Egypt. Kim had for some
time wanted to make a film in Iran: she was
intrigued by the contrast between the images
produced by current-affairs television docu-
mentaries and those in the work of Iranian fic-
tion filmmakers. The former portrayed Iran as a
country of fanatics, the latter conveyed a much
gentler, more poetic sense of the culture and
people. As she put it, ‘you wouldn’t think the
documentaries and the fiction were about the
same place.’ We discussed my 1980s research in
Tehran family courts and I gave her a copy of my
book, Marriage on trial.2
The first step was to apply to British TV com-
missioning editors for funding and to Iranian
officials for access and permission to film. Kim
focused on the first and I on the second. As will
become clear, I had to negotiate not only with
the Iranian authorities for permission and
access, but also with myself. As a novice in film
making, I had to deal not only with theoretical
and methodological questions of representa-
tion and the production of anthropological nar-
ratives, but also with personal ethical and pro-
fessional dilemmas. The film’s subject-matter –
the operation of Islamic family law in Iran today
– inevitably entailed both exposing individuals’
private lives in a public domain, and tackling a
major issue which divides Islamists and femi-
nists: women’s position in Islamic law.
We wrote a proposal for a documentary film
to be shot in a court in Tehran, and in March
1996 an application for a permit to film was sub-
mitted to the Iranian Embassy in London. We
phrased the proposal carefully, knowing the
sensitivity of the theme. We stated that our aim
was to make a film that would reach a wide
audience and challenge prevailing stereotypes
about women and Islam. This we wanted to do
by addressing a universal theme cutting across
cultural and social barriers, which ordinary peo-
ple could relate to emotionally as well as intel-
lectually. Marriage, divorce and the fate of chil-
dren, we argued, provide a perfect theme for
such a film.
In October 1996, we learned that our applica-
tion was rejected, no reasons given. But Kim and
I were now committed to the project, so we con-
tinued to lobby the Iranian Embassy, attending
its functions to meet visiting dignitaries and
explain our project. In December, we heard that
one of our proposals for funding had come
through: Channel 4 TV was prepared to fund us
to make a feature-length film for its prestigious
True Stories documentary slot. We were enor-
mously encouraged.
So in mid-January 1997, we decided to go
Tehran to follow up our application – to argue
our case in person with the Ministry of Islamic
Guidance – and also to see whether we could
work together. I wanted Kim to see Iran for her-
self, to get a feel for the place and culture. We
talked about our project to people ranging from
independent filmmakers to officials in televi-
sion, the Ministry of Guidance, women’s organi-
zations, and so on. All of them wanted us to
change our theme, to do a film on an issue
which was ‘politically correct’ and that could
give a ‘positive image of Iran’, such as marriage
ceremonies, female members of parliament, or
mothers of martyrs. Clearly, what Kim and I saw
as enchanting, as positive, were often things
that could not be filmed. In our discussions, we
had to show how a film about marital disputes,
shot in the family courts, could present a ‘posi-
tive’ image. We had to distinguish what we (and
we hoped our target audiences) saw as ‘posi-
tive’, from what many people we talked to saw
as ‘negative’, with the potential of turning into
yet another sensationalized foreign film on Iran.
Images and words, we said, can evoke different
feelings in different cultures. For instance, a
mother talking of the loss of her children in war
as martyrdom for Islam, is more likely in Western
eyes to confirm stereotypes of religious zealotry
and fanaticism, rather than evoke the Shica idea
of sacrifice for justice and freedom. What they
saw as positive could be seen as negative in
Western eyes, and vice versa. One answer was
to present viewers with complex social reality
and allow them to make up their own minds.
Some might react favourably, and some might
not, but in the end it could give a much more
‘positive’ image of Iran than the usual films, if
we could show ordinary women, at home and in
court, holding their own ground, maintaining
the family from within. This would challenge
some hostile Western stereotypes. 
In the end, the Ministry of Guidance seemed
to be convinced: we were told to make a fresh
application through the Embassy in London,
and were promised a permit in a month. Mean-
while, with the help of the Islamic Human Rights
Commission, we sought Ministry of Justice
approval to film in the courts: this proved less
difficult, as the Public Relations Department of
the Ministry was then producing a series of
short educational films shot in Tehran family
courts for Iranian television. 
We returned to London, intending to come
back and make the film before the May presi-
dential elections while those who had approved
it were still in office. But the months passed and
the official permit never arrived. It took a new
government, and President Khatami’s installa-
tion in August 1997, for our project to get off
the ground. We submitted another application
and, in October, I went to Tehran to follow it up,
presenting our case again to the Ministry of
Guidance, now headed by a reformist personal-
ity. This time, Ministry officials were more open
to our ideas; they were not afraid of dealing crit-
ically with internal issues and were less fright-
ened of what the outside world thinks. More-
over, they were true to their word. Three weeks
later, visas were issued for Kim and sound-
recordist Christine Felce, enabling them to
bring the 16mm camera and sound equipment. 
After their arrival, with letters of introduction
from the Ministry of Guidance, and aided by the
Public Relations Section of the Ministry of Jus-
tice, we visited several Judicial Complexes. There
are sixteen of these scattered around Tehran.
Each contains a number of courts and deals with
disputes filed by local residents, which differ in
nature, given Tehran’s geographical division
along socio-economic lines – broadly, the mid-
dle classes in the North, the working classes in
the South. This posed a problem for us. Our Min-
istry guides wanted us to show the diversity of
the courts and the range of disputes heard; they
were keen for us to film in courts headed by both
civil and religious judges and to cover marital
disputes in different socio-economic strata – to
do a kind of sociological survey. But we wanted
to work in a single court, to capture something
of the life of the court itself. We knew that in
Tehran, with a population of over ten million, no
court could be representative, and we did not
want to make a ‘sociological survey on film’. We
wanted to focus on characters and develop sto-
rylines. We also knew that our project depended
much on the goodwill of the judge and the court
staff. It was thus important for us to work in a
court where we were welcome, where our pro-
ject was understood, and where staff members
were willing to take part.
This was difficult to explain to the officials, but
finally we settled on the Imam Khomeini Judicial
Complex, the largest one, located in central
Tehran near the Bazaar. It housed some Ministry
of Justice offices, including the Public Relations
Section, as well as thirty-three General Courts.
Two courts dealt with family disputes, both
headed by clerical judges: Judge Deldar, who sat
only in the morning, and Judge Mahdavi, who
sat only in the afternoon. We were introduced to
both judges; both said we could film in their
courts.
At first we filmed in both courts, but soon we
confined ourselves to that of Judge Deldar,
which we found more interesting. As Judge
Mahdavi dealt only with divorce by mutual con-
sent, that is, cases where both parties had
already worked out an agreement, there was lit-
tle room for negotiation: the dynamics of the
cases heard were rather uniform, and the cou-
ples rarely revealed the real reasons behind the
breakdown of marriage. Judge Deldar, on the
other hand, dealt with all kinds of marital dis-
putes, thus we found a much wider range of sto-
ries and a more spontaneous environment.
Besides, the court staff members were also fasci-
nating characters in their own right, especially
Mrs Maher, the court secretary, who had worked
in the same branch for over 20 years. She was an
extremely capable woman who understood our
project, and her daughter Paniz was a real gift.
Both soon became fundamental to the film.
After a week, we too became part of the court
life.
The presence of an all-woman crew changed
the gender balance in the courtroom and
undoubtedly gave several women courage. Like-
wise, the fact that the crew had both Iranian and
foreign members, I believe, helped transcend
the insider/outsider divide. The camera was also
a link in this respect, as well as between public
and private. We never filmed without people’s
consent. Before each new case, I approached the
two parties in the corridor, explained who we
were and what our film was about, and asked
whether they would agree to participate. I
explained that we wanted to make a film that
foreign audiences could relate to, to try and
bridge the gap in understanding, to show how
Iranian Muslim women, like women in other
parts of the world, do the best they can to make
sense of the world around them and to better
their lives. Some agreed, others refused. On the
whole, and perhaps not surprisingly, most
women welcomed the project and wanted to be
filmed. 
We filmed for four weeks in November-
December. Back in London, we started editing
our over 16 hours of footage. It was already clear
to us who the main characters were likely to be.
When we put together the rushes, we found we
had material on 17 cases, but only in the eventu-
al six cases (only four of them fully developed)
shown in the film could we make usable stories.
It was heart breaking to have to abandon some
very moving, but unresolved stories. In going
through the material, rather than focusing on
the exotic and the different, we tried to focus on
commonalities: how difficult marriage can be
and the pain involved in its breakdown. We also
tried to show what it is like inside a Tehran law
court, and to give glimpses into the lives of ordi-
nary people. Although clearly some ‘contextual
information’ was essential, we were anxious not
to overcrowd the film with facts and figures, not
to tell viewers what to think, but to allow them
to draw their own conclusions. Above all, we
wanted to let the women speak, to show how
they are strong individuals going through a diffi-
cult phase in their lives, and to communicate the
pain – and the humour – involved in the break-
down of marriage. ♦
Dr Ziba Mir-Hosseini is a Research Associate at
t h e Department of Social Anthropology, University of
Cambridge, and at the Centre of Near and Middle
Eastern Studies, SOAS, London, UK.
E-mail: ziba@dircon.co.uk
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’The Musafirkhana was beautiful. It gave you a feeling
for work. You were surrounded by nice woodwork, cal-
ligraphy and coloured glass windows. You were in the
centre of Cairo, but you didn’t hear any noise.’ Painter
Mohammed Abla is soft-spoken yet very angry. Stand-
ing in the courtyard of the burned Musafirkhana palace
in the heart of Islamic Cairo, Abla sighs and moans. For
21 years he had his studio in this late 18th-century
Ottoman palace. In the ’60s, the then Minister of Cul-
ture, Sarwat Okasha, had decided in a fit of wisdom to
provide studios for artists in the Musafirkhana. 
National Heritage
Cairo Style
Last October the building burned down and
Abla lost 90 per cent of his work. With real
estate speculation thriving in the neighbour-
hood, Abla thinks it was arson. ‘The govern-
ment people say the fire started by a burning
rubbish pile in the alley outside. They
promised an investigation. I do not believe
them. For them the Musafirkhana was just
number 20 out of many other numbers. They
don’t care. Corruption has no feeling.’
Whether arson or negligence, the loss of the
Musafirkhana is a case in point in the steady
decline of the old Fatimid city of Cairo. On a list
of 622 monuments drawn up in 1950, the
Musafirkhana was registered as number 20. At
the time the list included some 130 buildings
that did not exist anymore. They were listed
deliberately to meet the UNESCO criterion of
600 historic buildings to secure for the city of
Cairo the status of ‘world heritage’. Since 1950
another 20 to 30 buildings on the list have
been demolished. During the Nasser era,
preservation of Islamic architecture was a non-
issue. In those days the Egyptian Antiquities
Organization had an annual budget of LE600.
In the Gamaliyyah district of Islamic Cairo sev-
eral monuments were demolished to make
room for schools. In the ’70s and ’80s, the
notion of preservation finally dawned upon
the authorities. However, most attention was
given to Egypt’s pharaonic past. It was only
after the 1992 earthquake – which caused only
minor damage – that the government felt chal-
lenged by the Islamists, notably the Muslim
Brotherhood, to start paying attention to the
country’s Islamic architectural heritage. The
most manifest initiatives, however, were taken
by Ismailis from abroad who felt strongly
attracted to the old capital of the their
medieval Fatimid caliphate. Apart from the
Agha Khan Foundation, a group of Bohras from
Pakistan and India raised capital to refurnish
the Al Hakim Mosque – named after the dis-
puted Fatimid caliph – in an Indian sub-conti-
nental style, with outlandish white stone bat-
tlements. By 1998, the Antiquities Organiza-
tion – meanwhile renamed the Supreme Coun-
cil for Antiquities – had its budget for Fatimid
Cairo raised to LE247 million.
Still very little has been done to save the city
from total collapse. The problems are numer-
ous. Especially in Egypt there is no public
debate yet on what restoration should be.
Critique and self-critique are taboo. All
experts involved in the politically sensitive
preservation business, Egyptians and foreign-
ers alike, are only willing to talk on condition of
anonymity. 
The administration of Cairo’s Islamic monu-
ments is chaotic. Most buildings are owned by
the Ministry of Awqaf – religious endowments.
No rental is collected, apart from the odd two
piaster a month for workshops established in
some monuments. Quite a few buildings have
been turned into schools and are the property
of the Ministry of Education. Responsibility for
maintenance and restoration, however, rests
with the Supreme Council for Antiquities,
under the Ministry of Culture. Finally, there is
the Cairo Governorate, the Ministry of Hous-
ing, Utilities and Public Works, and the Ministry
of Interior (traffic). At a lower level are the vari-
ous departments of utilities, such as water sup-
ply and sewerage. All these services either
refuse to cooperate or engage in some form of
horse-trading. The result is stagnation and
d e c a y .
The physical situation of the old city is des-
perate. The streets are so packed with people
that they have to work in shifts. As one expert
observes: ‘You have somebody who is selling
f u u l in the morning, then he moves away and
in his place comes a man who sells sweets.
Every single square meter is used. The pressure
is so high that even if you remove these people
you’ll have other people very soon coming
back. In front of the Sabil Mohammed Ali, on
the main north-south thoroughfare of the old
Fatimid city, there are clothes stores on the
street. The shopkeepers hang their items from
makeshift scaffolding. It is like the interior of a
big shop and you cannot even pass. Right
behind them there is a big empty lot, which
can be a wonderful market area. The city has so
much unused space, obviously because there
is total mess in legal issues.’ 
Whereas city development and population
pressure take their toll, the actual cause for the
crumbling of monuments is rising groundwa-
ter levels. The process has been going on for
more than 30 years. Contrary to popular think-
ing, it has nothing to do with the Aswan High
Dam. In fact the groundwater is up to several
metres above the Nile. This is exclusively due
to the leaking of water pipes and sewers. Inci-
dentally, this explains why daily water usage
per capita in Cairo amounts to an estimated
400 litres, whereas, for instance, in the Nether-
lands it is 130 litres. 
Just off Bab Zuwayla, beyond the Fatimid
enclosure, is the 12th-century mosque of Salih
T a l aci. The mosque is surrounded by a two-
metre deep ‘moat’. The bottom of this ‘moat’ is
simply the original street level. Since the 10th
century, when Fatimid Cairo was laid out, the
city has been rising through the continuous
dumping of dirt on the streets. This thick layer
of urban fill sits like a sponge on top of the
original silt layer. Until last year when a sewer
was built from Bab Zuwayla to Bab Al Khalq,
the ‘moat’ of Salih Talaci was a stinking pool.
Unfortunately the US-funded Greater Cairo
Waste Water Project has still not been extend-
ed to Fatimid Cairo. 
Meanwhile water levels keep rising. One
expert predicts lakes on the streets of Cairo in
the near future. As all buildings are made of
limestone, the groundwater penetrates
through capillary reaction up to two to three
metres above street level. The water evapo-
rates, the salt stays, and starts to attract more
water. The salt crystallizes within the stone.
This means expansion. Stones turn into pow-
der. Buildings crumble away. In addition, there
is aggressive air pollution and the effects of
heavy traffic. The inner city has been left to rot.
However, on a recent visit to the old city,
President Hosni Mubarak made the on-the-spot
decision, ‘like all his wise decisions’, that the
preservation of Fatimid Cairo should be sped
up. Over the coming years, the inner city is to
be turned into an ‘open-air museum’. All gov-
ernmental, commercial and residential uses
that conflict with the requirements of preserv-
ing antiquities are to cease. As one long-time
observer of dying Cairo sneers: ‘This is their
concept of preservation; they want to turn
Cairo into an Islamo-Disneyland. Anything they
think of as historical value is to be locked up
and used as a display for Western tourists.’ It is
the same idea European archaeologists had
about pharaonic temples: Clear them from
inhabitants, remove everything that is not orig-
inal – that is, every element of subse-
quent use – and open it to the public
as a museum. This became the
accepted idea of what a monument
is. In the case of the pharaonic her-
itage it seems to make sense but now
the Egyptian authorities try to apply
it to the Islamic city as well. The
Antiquities Organization treats mon-
uments as isolated structures. They
are no longer dealing with some-
thing that is a part of the surround-
ing city. Even if you have 600 Islamic
monuments, there are still some
9000 buildings within the old city
and most of them are of some his-
toric value and not registered as
s u c h .
On the other hand, all experts call
for enforcing stringent building
codes, that is, controlled develop-
ment sympathetic to the old city fab-
ric. They are furious with the concept
of sterilizing the city by moving out
‘offensive’ sights such as the onion
and garlic market in front of Al Hakim
Mosque and to replace it with tourist
shops selling busts of Nefertiti.
Right in the heart of Islamic Cairo
stands Qasr Bashtak, a huge Mamluk
palace. The building was restored by
the Germans in the ’80s. It was sup-
posed to be a cultural centre for exhi-
bitions and concerts. It never
worked. Besides, how many cultural
centres, exhibition rooms, and muse-
ums can you have in Cairo? The only
chance for the city fabric to survive is
if the buildings remain part of the liv-
ing city, as they once were. This means servic-
ing with piped water, sewerage and electricity,
and that requires cooperation among govern-
ment agencies headed by jealous bureaucrats
unwilling to yield power.
And then there is traffic. In the ’80s a fly-over
was constructed over Al Azhar Street, right into
the heart of Islamic Cairo ‘to ease congestion’.
Of course traffic only got worse and now a tun-
nel is being drilled under the old city. The con-
tractor managed to start tunnelling exactly on
top of the old eastern city wall that had been
covered with urban refuse over the centuries.
When they hit a tower dating back to Salah
Eddin, the authorities immediately fenced off
the site, forbidding entry to archaeologists, not
even for one day. However, people of the Agha
Khan Foundation, who have their office nearby,
managed to videotape the demolition from
their rooftop.
Some experts wonder whether the govern-
ment will decide to tear down the fly-over once
the tunnel is finished. Others are more cynical:
‘They will never regulate traffic. All the talk
about pedestrian zones and electric delivery
cars is sheer fantasy.’ The verdict on the preser-
vation of Islamic Cairo can only be harsh. Coun-
tries like Turkey, Syria and Tunisia rank much
higher than Egypt in taking care of their her-
itage. And it is even more disturbing that no
one has any recipe to change the course of
m a t t e r s . ♦
Evert Schreur is a free-lance journalist living in Cairo,
E g y p t .
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VA L E R I E  J .  H OF F M A N
Belief in the existence and powers of ‘saints’ or ‘friend
of God’ (wali, pl. a w l i y a) is pervasive throughout the
Muslim world. Such individuals are often associated
with Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, though the notion of
human perfection probably developed first among the
S h ica .
Saints and Sheikhs
in Modern Egypt
According to some branches of the Shica, the
imams inherited from the Prophet a spark of
divine light granting them a perfection and
sinlessness denied to ordinary human beings.
The perfection of the saints in Sunni Islam is
also a divine grace, and is often also associated
with putative inheritance from the Prophet,
though it usually also derives from the arduous
disciplines of self-denial and devotion that are
peculiar to the Sufi way. A true Sufi sheikh, or
spiritual master, should be a friend of God, one
who by virtue of his closeness to God may see
by the light of God what no ordinary person
can see, and who is therefore qualified to give
each disciple the discipline and instruction
that befits him or her. Nonetheless, not all
those who are recognized as saints are follow-
ers of the Sufi path, and not all those who func-
tion as sheikhs are commonly recognized as
s a i n t s .
Since there is no body in Islam authorized to
canonize saints, as there is in Catholicism, the
process by which sainthood is recognized is
entirely informal and necessarily a matter of
contention. Typically, disciples regard their
masters not only as saints, but usually as the
greatest of all saints, the q u t b (axis) or g h a w t h
(help). Nonetheless, the problem of unquali-
fied individuals being granted a certificate to
function as Sufi sheikhs has been broadly rec-
ognized by Sufis themselves. So who is a saint,
and how is he or she recognized?
The qualities typically deemed mandatory
for saints include piety, observance of the
S h a r ica, knowledge of God, and the perfor-
mance of miracles – typically miracles of
knowledge, such as the ability to ‘read hearts’
and to communicate mind-to-mind with other
saints or one’s own disciples, breaking through
barriers of time and space, and providing spec-
tacular assistance to those in need. Yet this
inventory of attributes is deceiving, for the
experts on Muslim sainthood also tell us that
sainthood (w i l a y a) is by definition hidden
among God’s creatures, especially the saints of
the highest rank. So the person who is serving
tea to the guests may in fact be of a higher
spiritual rank than the sheikh who is revered by
his disciples. There is hierarchy among saints,
with a diversity of spiritual types, habits and
functions. The qu t b, or axis, is said to be hidden
and largely unrecognized. Even a child might
be a saint. In Cairo there is a tomb for a boy
who, after his death, identified himself as a
saint by means of a dream given to a person
who had never known him. Nonetheless, the
man built a shrine over the place where the
dead boy was buried, and his tomb is visited by
people seeking his b a r a k a.
Some saints ought not to be taken as sheikhs
at all. These include the people of j a d h b, the
m a j a d h i b, who are violently ‘attracted’ to God,
leaving their minds bewildered by the shock of
sudden mystical illumination and incapable of
carrying out legal obligations. Such people
indeed have a sound spiritual state with God,
but should not be followed or imitated. An
Egyptian sheikh, Ahmad Radwan (d. 1967),
warned his followers not to ask the m a j a d h i b
to pray for them, ‘because they will pray that
you have poverty and illness, since by these
God makes the Muslims enter paradise.’ 1
Nonetheless, a Sudanese sheikh living in Cairo
said that the m a j a d h i b serve as God’s police-
men; though they appear to engage in bizarre
and meaningless behaviour, they report any
misbehaviour among the Sufis to the heavenly
c o u r t .2 Often those with mental illness are per-
ceived as m a j a d h i b, and their presence is seen
as a blessing, a notion that has caused some
outsiders to ridicule the Sufis, but which allows
such individuals to be accepted into society,
rather than shunned as they are in the West.
Sufi writings on sainthood assure us that
saints exist in all countries and will continue to
exist as long as the world exists; indeed, they
are essential for the well-being of the world.
The Sufi disciple can derive benefit from noth-
ing more than sitting at the feet of a ‘knower’
(ca r i f, often translated as ‘gnostic’), one who
knows God and who knows what medicine will
successfully heal the disciple’s spirit. This ben-
efit is not limited to explicit teaching, for
Ahmad Radwan says that the gnostics ‘pour
out the bounty of God which He has bestowed
upon them onto those who sit with them in the
a s s e m b l y ’ .3 In modern and late medieval
Sufism, Sufis become saints at least partly by
inheriting the asrar – spritual essences or
‘secrets’ – of their masters. This occurs upon
the latter’s death. Appointment as sheikh in
theory ought to follow this inheritance, but
clearly this is not always the case. In Egypt, the
son of a sheikh inherits the position of his
father, which is not seen as a corrupt practice,
as often the physical heir is also the spiritual
heir. But daughters may inherit as well as sons,
though Egypt’s Supreme Council of Sufi Orders
does not recognize the membership of women
in the Orders, much less their leadership. There
is also no guarantee that the son of a sheikh
will follow his father’s inclinations or inherit
the full measure of his father’s gifts, which may
be distributed among a number of the latter’s
d i s c i p l e s .
Throughout the Muslim world, the presence
of saints has been a source of comfort to peo-
ple. The mere presence of a saint’s tomb in the
neighbourhood is thought to confer blessings,
protection and prosperity. This is a theme that
was touchingly interpreted in a novelette writ-
ten in 1944 by Yahya Haqqi, describing the
devotions of the Egyptians to the shrine of the
Prophet’s granddaughter, Sayyida Zeinab.4
The oil from a lamp in the saint’s shrine was
thought to have curative powers, especially for
eye diseases. The protagonist, Ismacil, is raised
near the shrine. His father sacrificially sends his
son to England for medical training, where he
becomes an ophthalmologist. When he returns
to Egypt he scorns what he now regards as the
ignorant superstition of his family and country-
men who venerate Sayyida Zeinab and employ
oil from the saint’s lamp to try to heal the eyes
of his cousin, Fatima. Ismacil tries in vain to heal
his cousin using modern Western techniques,
and in desperation turns again to the oil of the
saint’s lamp, which, combined with Western
techniques, successfully heals his cousin’s
affliction. The book beautifully evokes the rev-
erence of the Egyptians for the saint as well as
the need for Westernized youth to find their
roots in faith while learning the science of the
W e s t .
In Egypt, there are occasional newspaper
editorials condemning the ‘superstition’ of the
people that drives them to venerate the saints,
but visitors to the tombs include the well-edu-
cated and politically powerful. The saints are
deeply loved and celebrated in annual festivi-
ties, the m a w l i d s (locally called m o u l i d s), that
sometimes draw pilgrims from very distance
provinces. The m o u l i d s include songs, the per-
formance of d h i k r (rituals of ‘remembrance’ of
God) and hospitality as well as the compulsory
visits to the tombs of the honoured saint. Peo-
ple may be recognized as saints in their life-
times, and a few even had m o u l i d s c e l e b r a t e d
for them before their deaths. Parents bring
their children’s school books to living saints so
they will lay their hands on them and bless
them. Former President Gamal Abdul Nasser
constructed a railway station near the remote
retreat of Ahmad Radwan in Upper Egypt and
sought his advice on political matters. This
relationship was not without controversy for
both Nasserites and Sufis,5 but illustrates the
continuing relevance of such individuals to
public affairs. One of Radwan’s disciples,
Sheikh cIzz al-cArab al-Hawari, is proud to have
a letter from the current President, Husni
Mubarak, thanking him for his role in bringing
about reconciliation between Muslims and
Christians in the Imbaba district of Cairo after
fighting broke out between the two communi-
ties in 1991.6 Regardless of the efforts of
reformers of both fundamentalist and mod-
ernist persuasion to undermine Sufism and
faith in saints, belief in the powers and moral
authority of God’s friends remains deeply root-
ed among the people. ♦
Valerie J. Hoffman is Associate Professor of Religion,
University of Illinois, USA.
E-mail: vhoffman@uiuc.edu
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M a u r i t a n i a
R AH AL  B OU B R I K
Since the early 1980s, the ideological landscape of Mau-
ritania, dominated by an elite that originated from the
political struggle for independence, has fallen into
decline. In a time of economic, social, and political crisis,
neither the political elite nor the military was capable of
meeting the expectations of Mauritanian society. The
modernist projects, timidly undertaken since the inde-
pendence, only reinforced economic and cultural
dependency on the Western model. The failure of the
national elite was blatant, and new social frameworks
began to emerge in order to end the ‘state of grace’
enjoyed by the political power at the time. 
T r a d i t i o n a l
‘Men of Religion’
and Political Power
i n M a u r i t a n i a
From the beginning of the 1980s, and espe-
cially with the advent of political pluralism, reli-
gion became more than ever central to politi-
cal, social, cultural, and identity-related issues
in Mauritania. A ‘religion of contestation’ would
gain territory not only by criticizing the political
power-holders and the moral ‘drifting’ of soci-
ety, but also by opposing other traditional reli-
gious representations of Islam. This conjunc-
tion provoked the returning to force of tradi-
tional models, either because those involved in
these latter were looking to defend their sym-
bolic space of action, or because they were
reactivated by the political power to counteract
the emergence of a militant Islam, which
threatened the established order.1
In denouncing the use of religion in politics
under the pretext that the law forbade political
parties based on religion: ‘Islam can not be the
exclusive prerogative of a political party’,2
those in power did not abstain from using reli-
gious personalities to reinforce their political
legitimacy. The creation of an official institution
echoed this; on 16 February 1992, a decree was
promulgated concerning the organization and
functioning of the ‘Islamic High Council’ (HCI –
Haut Conseil Islamique), a body which had
already been announced in article 94 of the
1991 constitution. The five members of the
Council were appointed by the president, all
belonging to tradition milieus: f u q a h â ’ a n d
leaders of brotherhoods. The president was
Mohamed Salam Ould Addoud, descendant of
an influential and educated family from Trarza,
whose m a h d r a (traditional school) was one of
the best known in the country. Addoud situat-
ed his official role in the HCI within the conser-
vative sunni tradition, which had managed the
rapport between scholar and monarch: ‘Since
the end of the reign of the four rashidun Califs,
all the sovereigns lacked the necessary con-
duct. There were the just, but there were also
the shameless. There were always pious schol-
ars and guides at their side. All maintained,
with the regime in power, relations based on
integrity, devotion and the accomplishment of
duty. They occupied various positions: judges,
imams, guides, gatherers (…). They would give
no credit to the lies of a sovereign, just as they
would not validate his abuses. Nonetheless,
they would not seek to plot against him, nor
would they seek to incite disorder and anarchy
to influence the scene. They limited themselves
to enjoining people to do good and forbidding
them to commit reprehensible acts.’3
Pesident Ould Taya furthermore relied on
independent religious figures, such as Boud-
dah Ould Bousayri, imam of the principle
mosque of Nouakchott who had distinguished
himself since the eighties by his preaching,
which was then to be heard on the radio each
Friday. He was considered the unofficial advisor
to the president. It was he who advocated
peace at the time of the call to j i h â d , l a u n c h e d
by Islamist leader Ould Sidi Yahya on the eve of
the rejection of his party’s (Omma) legislation
(18 November 1991).4 Still in his role as media-
tor between civil society and the authorities, he
intervened in the arrests of Islamist youths in
1994 and asked the president, during a Friday
sermon, to be merciful towards them. The pres-
ident conceded. Moreover, according to certain
sources, it was Ould Taya who asked the imam’s
intervention to resolve the crisis.5 The political
power thus made pragmatic choices and relied
on traditional religious personalities without,
however, allowing them the opportunity to
develop a notoriety that could go beyond its
control. 
The second category of men of religion to
which the authorities would turn to were the
leaders of brotherhoods, who until then had
been kept at a distance. With the indepen-
dence, the State, while opting for Islam, careful-
ly referred to its scriptural aspect, other expres-
sions and models being excluded indirectly.
This concealed its will to limit the influence of
other traditional religious actors, notably the
brotherhood leaders. These latter were deni-
grated and denounced officially by the state
party at the time (Mauritanian People’s Party) at
its 1968 congress.6
The marginalized brotherhood leaders of the
post-colonial period were to return to the
national political scene with the regional politi-
cal crisis and the introduction of a multi-party
system. During the blood-shattering events of
1989 between Senegal and Mauritania, the
leaders were to play an important role in the
reconciliation between the two countries. In
fact, the ties of brotherhood between the two
banks of the Senegal River are century-old. The
descendants of the Moorish s h a y k h ( s ), who had
conquered a large population in Senegal at the
beginning of the century, had retained close
ties with their followers. Belonging to a broth-
erhood was more powerful and more concrete
than belonging to a nation. The annual pilgrim-
ages made by the faithful to the holy places of
their brotherhood leaders were the expression
of permanent spiritual connections. This
transnational and trans-ethnic spiritual estab-
lishment allowed the network of brotherhoods
to actively involve itself in the bloody conflict
between the black-African community and the
Moorish community. Following the 1989
events, and before the opening of the official
borders, the s h a y k h brotherhoods worked for
reconciliation, not only by official means, but
also from the base. Relations between the
shaykh(s) and their disciples from the two
banks remained intact despite ethnic tensions.
The transnational position of the brotherhood
leaders earned them such sobriquets as ‘the
man who traverses the two banks’, attributed
to Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Ould Talib Bouya Ould
Saad Bouh when the following question was
posed to Shaykh Mohamadou Ould Hamahul-
lâh – son of the founder of Hamallism: 7 ‘ O f
what nationality are you (Malian or Mauritan-
ian)?’; he responded: ‘My nationality is my
brotherhood (t a r i q a) and all my disciples are of
the same nationality as I am’ .8
In the past few years, the brotherhoods have
begun to conquer urban areas. They opened
z â w i y y a in the form of traditional educational
centres in the cities of Nouakchott and Nouadi-
bou. Although the brotherhood leaders are rel-
atively reticent towards politicians, they have
become involved during elections. They were
approached from all sides by parties and politi-
cal personalities to take advantage of the polit-
ical influence they had to offer. However, in
majority, they supported those (already) in
power. The son of Hamahullâh, Shaykh
Muhammadou declared: ‘Ahmed Ould Daddah
[president of the UFD: opposition party] came
to see me. Hamdi [Hamdi Ould Maknas presi-
dent of the PPD: opposition party] phoned me.
I have his written request for my support. I d e d-
icated prayers to him, as I did for Ahmed Ould
Daddah and Mouawiya Ould Sid'Ahmd Taya
(PRDS: Parti Republique Democratique et
Social]. We are above these political divides’. 9
This displayed neutrality is only superficial, as
indicated by the s h a y k h himself when he then
stated: ‘The people of this village asked me to
advise them in their choice amongst the newly
emerging parties. I suggested they go to the
PRDS for the following reasons: 1 – Its leader is
the leader of the State. He won the presidential
elections and is more experienced than the
others. 2 – He holds something in his hands, as
opposed to someone who is seeking’. 1 0 The vil-
lages under the direct influence of the Qâdirî
brotherhood leaders as well as the Tijânî vote
massively in favour of the party in power, PRDS.
The pluralism and opening of the – electoral –
political arena facilitated the emergence of tra-
ditional leaders as important actors on the local
and national political scene. The f u q a h â ’, the
brotherhood leaders and tribal leaders were
mobilized, above all, for electoral purposes.
These three principal actors coordinated their
work in certain domains, all the while remain-
ing in competition and rivalry in order to obtain
maximal advantages in return for their service.
For this reason, the alliances were often tempo-
rary and vague. It should be noted that the trib-
al factor was very decisive in these alliances,
especially during the elections.
The traditional religious body is not homoge-
nous, religious dignitaries grant their support
to one political party or another, depending on
their personal interests. They react in a social
tribal framework, and often play the role of
intermediary between political forces and their
own tribes, at times in coordination, at others in
competition, with tribal leaders. The support
that some amongst them granted to the state
party or to the opposition is situated more
within a traditional alliance between notables
than it is in an explicit political alliance. This
attitude is not unique to traditional followers of
religion; it is also the attitude of modernist
political personalities and the vast majority of
the young intellectual elite. The leaders of
political parties played the game; the most pro-
gressive amongst them and the most critical
towards tribalism turned to tribal alliances dur-
ing their electoral campaigns.
The conservative f u q a h â ’ and the leaders of
brotherhoods in majority chose for those
already in power. While preaching a fundamen-
talist religious discourse strongly opposed to
the Westernization of customs, they remained
critical of militant Islam. They felt the threat
represented by the new movements focusing
on the young generation. Also, they situated
their political and social actions in a new reli-
gious register. The Islamists, on their side,
avoided direct confrontation with the f u q a h â ’
and brotherhood leaders. Nonetheless, they
marked their distance with the religious inter-
pretations and practices of that milieu; the dec-
larations of certain streams in this respect are
an open discrediting of the traditional religious
order. 
Thus the ulamas are accused of being ‘official
clerics good for legitimating any governmental
a c t i o n ’ (Nouveaux Horizons, No 2, 1991, p. 5) in
the same sense they are qualified as cUlamas of
the Sultan closer to the Ummayad period than
to ours’ (Nouveaux Horizons, No 5, 1993, p. 4 ).
The men of brotherhood are also criticized as
having diffused an archaic Islam de spectacle i n
manipulating the collective religious imagina-
tion of the masses (Nouveaux Horizons, No 6
n.d., p. 6).
Islam in its orthodox form transformed itself
almost into an official Islam; the men of tradi-
tional religion became more or less civil ser-
vants of the State which aimed at monopoliza-
tion and manipulation of the political, social,
and cultural fields. Mosques, Qur'anic schools,
and institutes for higher education, are con-
trolled directly or indirectly by the authorities
in power. The emergence of new religious
actors emphasized the State’s control over reli-
gion and on reactivating all categories of tradi-
tional men of religion. This policy cannot halt
the development of an Islam of contestation
encouraged by a quest for identity, a precari-
ous economic and social situation, the obvious
social disparities and a discredited political sys-
tem. ♦
Rahal Boubrik is a fellow of the Berlin-based Working
Group Modernity and Islam (Berlin, Germany) for the
academic year 1998/99. E-mail: boubrik@gmx.net
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The virtual wholesale migration of post-pubescent
males from the Igherm region of the Moroccan Anti-
Atlas mountains to northern Moroccan cities and to
Europe leaves women and young children to inhabit the
mountain villages for most of the year. Migrants retain
strong emotional and economic links to their home vil-
lages, which they reaffirm during the annual summer
return. This scattering of people makes it difficult to cir-
cumscribe the boundaries of any given local communi-
ty. But people try to do just that through collectively-
produced song: poetry sung in the local Berber vernac-
ular, Tashelhit. Both the implicit rules that govern which
individuals sing out and what they literally say articu-
late ideas about where community boundaries begin
and end in the Anti-Atlas, and about how people make




of Migration in Anti-
Atlas Community Song
Although some migrant men take their
wives and children to Casablanca with them,
most women experience migration from their
remote mountain villages, watching people
and goods come and go, which constantly
remind them of their ruralness and the combi-
nation of disdain and nostalgia with which city
dwellers perceive their way of life. More
immediate concerns are tending the sparse,
rain-fed barley fields and the animals which
provide the staple of their diet, and ensuring
peaceful social relations. The work of main-
taining community in these unforgiving hills
involves ensuring coherence within social
groups, establishing where alliances begin
and end, and carefully overseeing movements
in and out of the villages. This constant moni-
toring helps ensure a level of comfort within
volatile social and economic constraints.
Remittances from migrant workers have
been subsidizing the females who stay behind
and keep Anti-Atlas traditions alive since at
least the first quarter of this century, when
French colonial ethnographers began docu-
menting village demographics. One local oral
tradition is the call and response genre of
t i z r a r i n sung poetry, which is sung in four to
six-part verses. The t i z r a r i n are not flashy; they
require bare voices with no accompanying
drumming, musical instruments or dancing.
They will probably never make it into the ‘folk-
lore’ circuit performed in package tour hotels
in Moroccan cities. Instead, the verses are per-
formed by village females off-stage, so to
speak, marking liminal moments and spaces:
when people are sitting waiting to be served
meals, riding in the back of a pickup truck
from the bride’s village to that of the groom,
or welcoming guests into a village. 
These sung verses are never the explicit
focus of attention, yet they perform the
important function of suggesting cohesion in
potentially messy situations, which inevitably
characterize gatherings of 300-500 people.
Women, both through the practice of singing
t i z r a r i n and in the words themselves, reaffirm
the bonds linking villages and tribes by articu-
lating communally-held norms. Interdepen-
dence may be articulated explicitly, such as in
the verse sung by a grandmother sitting with
the bride’s fellow villagers at the home of the
groom 
There are significant differences between
themes treated by females of a younger gener-
ation. Unmarried girls, who presumably have
little experience managing inter-village social
relations, are more likely to sing about the pain
that accompanies parting, whether due to mar-
riage or to migration to the cities 
Females who spend the year in the city with-
out hearing these verses cannot produce them
even if they understand and can speak Tashel-
hit, which is not the case for many contempo-
rary schooled city-dwellers, despite their
mountain origins. Females who divide the year
evenly between city and village tend to have a
passive familiarity with the verses but remain
quiet. This leaves the year-long
mountain residents to sing out.
Appropriately enough, the
lyrics of their verses reflect very
local experience.
The significance of locality
takes on a different meaning
for migrant villagers estranged
from their lands than for the
year-round residents. In the
Anti-Atlas, this corresponds roughly to a gen-
der division. One recurring theme illustrates
this division: that of the t a m a z i r t, a word that
could be glossed as ‘homeland,’ or ‘country-
side,’ as well as the more generic ‘place.’ Both
Arabic and Berber-speaking Moroccans pre-
sume that for Tashelhit speakers, the home-
land i s the countryside. At an earlier historical
moment this may have been true, but genera-
tions of rural-urban migration have complicat-
ed such an elision. 
Male migrants and female villagers dwell dif-
ferently in the t a m a z i r t. Experiences of place
are reflected in song as well as everyday termi-
nology. For urban dwellers, the t a m a z i r t is a
concept, an almost fictive land, a place that in
reality they visit about once a year – hence the
kind of objectification that leads them to cele-
brate the concept of the t a m a z i r t h o m e l a n d
and its accompanying amarg, that is, its ‘mood’
or ‘music.’ These two concepts inspired the
refrain of one performance of Igherm-area
men’s collective song and dance (a h a w a s h), in
which the chorus juxtaposed the terms, singing
‘tama tamazirt, amarg amarg, ay.’ Although the
lyrics merely accompanied the group dance
and drumming, and arguably were not the
highlight, it is notable nonetheless that the
lyrics were sung by men back from their jobs
working in corner grocery stores in Casablanca.
Urban dwellers are familiar with mass Moroc-
can media which posits rural collective song as
a symbol of Berber custom; some men taking a
break from their a h a w a s h even asked this for-
eign researcher what she thought of their ‘f u l k-
l o r e.’ It is precisely such objectification of what
constitutes local community and customs that
can lead to a song refrain which draws on the
experience of reflection itself.
In contrast to objectification of
the homeland, year-round moun-
tain residents use the term t a m a z i r t
to mean an inhabited land or a
place which can be as small as a
hamlet or as large as a nation-state.
What migrant men talk about as t h e
tamazirt, is for year-round residents
a highly-diversified conglomeration
of multiple t i m i z a r n, multiple inhab-
ited places. Women talk informally
about how much they want to flee
the hard labour of the tamazirt f o r
urban conveniences and a break from agricul-
tural work. But their public use of the term
t a m a z i r t does not imply an urban counter-
p o i n t .
One example comes from a grandmother in
her mid-50’s who refers to the tamazirt (‘tama-
zar’, altered to fit the song metre) as a place,
assuming the voice of the bride. She sings 
In another verse, a woman articulates the
widespread Anti-Atlas norm of respecting the
boundaries of places that are not one’s own
Regardless of whether they spend the bulk of
the year in cities or mountains, people attached
to the Anti-Atlas are hyper-aware of movement.
Men move from the countryside to the city to
earn a living. For many women, the most signif-
icant move they will undertake is from their par-
ents’ home to that of
their groom. Marriage
in rural Morocco is
more about this move
than about romance.
The common Tashel-
hit way of saying ‘she
is going to marry a
boy in a place called
Tililit’ (tra Tililit) means
‘she is going to T i l i l i t ’
or literally, ‘she wants
Tililit’. The theme of
movement is reflect-
ed in wedding verses,
their lyrics reinforced
by their being sung
while moving and in
liminal moments 
The grandmothers who act as gatekeepers
between the mountain hamlets are the ones
authorized to call out such verses. Girls are less
interested in maintaining community bound-
aries than they are in crossing them – whenev-
er possible – to visit saints’ tombs or relatives,
attend weddings, or any occasion that will
broaden their familiarity with the social and
geographical landscape.
Migrants are an integral and crucial compo-
nent of village communities and economies,
providing the necessary revenue to sustain the
rural population as well as the widely-valued
symbolic capital of urban familiarity which
they share with villagers during their annual
return. The two poles of what sustains the con-
cept of the t a m a z i r t – men in the cities who
make money and women in the countryside
who work their men’s fields and maintain fam-
ily honour – are the people whose voices are
heard in collectively-produced community
music. Women’s singing of the t i z r a r i n genre of
sung poetry in liminal moments solidifies ties
between rural communities and expresses nor-
mative emotional aspects of the ways villagers
and urban migrants alike experience the dis-
placement of migration. Life for year-round
residents of the Anti-Atlas mountains is a bal-
ancing act between two extremes of human
existence: t e m a r a, ‘hard labour’ and laab o r
l h w a, ‘playing,’ which often implies music.
‘Playing’ brings together the different compo-
nents of Anti-Atlas communities, but their dif-
ferential roles in musical production reflect
their social roles in maintaining the idea and
tangibility of the homeland. Participating in
the singing signals adherence to a group with
which members share daily
labours and simple joys. Just
like with words in these com-
munities, it is perhaps less
important what one says than
the fact that one says some-
thing. ♦
a yen anga nkki dun yen shur nsherik
nsherik idek yuta d li‘yun arsan nit
u le tagwwa inagh nswa nsu winun
We are one, me and you, we share walls
we share with you boundaries, springs, they remain as they are
and the seguias that nourish us, we drink from yours. 
allahu akbar adunit takufremt
ar ukwan taTat mdden wakha suln 
By God I swear, the world is a heathen
it divides people although they’re still alive.
allah ihanikum a tamdakult a rbbi bdanagh
ighkm tektir ar talagh ighkm tugh henagh
Farewell oh my friend, God divided us
If I remember you I’ll cry, if I forget you I’ll be fine.
a haii fkigh y timizar ur khaliDagh
ur iyi gis baba ur gis imi qanDgh
ur iyi gis id dada magh imalan
Here I am I was given to a tamazar I’m not familiar with
my father isn’t here, my mother isn’t here, I’m lonely
there’s no older brother to show me how to behave.
igh ilkm yen imi n tamazirt irard aDar
ardas nan ait tamazirt marhaba serk
If you arrive at the edge of a tamazirt pull back your foot
until the people of that tamazirt welcome you there.
zayd aoudi zayd ukkan ima lrzq ad gan dar moulay rbbi
ar tawin yen silin ur itm
Go on, my dear, go on still fate is in the Lord’s hands
it takes one to places we never would have dreamed.
arja ditawin ay aman arJa jalnas
ad saram yawigh a tamazirt igan darnagh
The hope that you have for finding water that runs from you, 
brings you to a land that is ours, that you haven’t seen.
wallah amkd usigh aDar a ilih nsen,
is ur inkhalaf ghid d lmakaninu
By God, you won’t put down your foot 
until we know that this place isn’t different from my place.
Katherine E. Hoffman is a doctoral candidate in
Socio-cultural Anthropology at Columbia University
in New York, USA. E-mail: kh56@columbia.edu
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So uth Af r ic a
AB DU L K A D E R  T A Y OB
Until recently, observers were generally unaware of the
Islamic presence in southern Africa. It was assumed that
Islam, in its southern spread, stopped somewhere
around Lake Malawi. Little was known about the arrival
of Muslims in the slave hulls of colonialism and during
nineteenth-century international trade in sugar, gold
and British manufactured goods. This obscurity changed
dramatically when groups of Muslims joined anti-apart-
heid demonstrations in the 1980s, which the interna-
tional media beamed across the world. Since then, Islam
has taken its small but influential place in the media
mosaic of southern Africa. In some cases Muslims are
important social and political leaders in the region,
emerging as champions of dramatic campaigns.
Transitional Islamic
I d e n t i t i e s
in Southern Africa
Islam in South Africa consists of a number of
communities that together constitute a broad
Islamic presence in the region. In spite of the
‘universal nature’ of Islam, one which Muslims
certainly espouse and experience, plural iden-
tities are deeply inscribed in religious institu-
tions and rituals. Muslims in South Africa con-
stitute a cosmopolitan group consisting of a
variety of ethnicities, language groups, and
social classes. These were formed by a combi-
nation of willing and unwilling immigrants
during various periods of colonial rule and
apartheid, and more recently, indigenous peo-
ples who have converted to Islam. These iden-
tities are historically unequal: The economic
support of Indians for mosques, in alliance
with a particular religious outlook, dominates
Islam in South Africa, but other identities con-
tinue to thrive. Ironically, the particular history
of South Africa, especially its apartheid conun-
drum, gave concrete shape to an Islamic uni-
versalism with two broad tendencies. One sup-
ported the nation-building exercise of the new
South Africa; the other espoused an exclusion-
ist Islamic position. Both, in one way or anoth-
er, placed an emphasis on relationships among
the local communities, the nation and the
international Muslim u m m a.
Muslims first arrived on the southern tip of
Africa in 1658 from the Indonesian archipel-
ago. For the next 150 years, a steady stream of
political exiles, convicts and slaves from the
islands of Southeast Asia and some parts of
India, established the foundations of what
came to be called the ‘Cape Malays’. Shaykh
Yusuf, a political exile banished to the Cape in
1694, has become a founding symbol for this
first Muslim community in South Africa. How-
ever, Muslims were only allowed to establish
mosques and schools in the nineteenth centu-
ry, over a hundred years after Shaykh Yusuf’s
landing. Since then, however, they have
become one of the most significant groups in
Cape Town. A second distinct group of Mus-
lims arrived from India from 1860 onwards as
British indentured labour on sugar plantations,
and a little later as independent traders, mer-
chants and hawkers. The latter contributed to
the building of mosques, schools and cemeter-
ies, and have since lived mainly, but not exclu-
sively, in the northern and eastern regions of
the country. Muslims from further north, par-
ticularly Malawi, but also Zanzibar, form the
third component of South African Muslims.
Although less influential than the Malays or
Indians, they have also contributed to the par-
ticular ethos of Islam in South Africa. Finally,
conversion has formed another distinct group:
During the nineteenth century, the Cape Town
region witnessed significant conversion of
indigenous people who were assimilated into
the Cape Malay community. Missionary activity
since the 1950s has led to a more distinctive
and notable presence of indigenous African
Muslims in the townships of South Africa. They
constitute the fourth visible group of the het-
erogeneous Muslim presence. 
South African Muslims represent only 0.2
percent of the total population. While Muslims
themselves had given their numbers as close
to one million, the last government statistics
published in 1991 recorded only 324,400. Nev-
ertheless, Muslims in South Africa are a highly
visible urban group concentrated in the major
cities of Cape Town, Durban and Johannes-
burg. They are now well represented in gov-
ernment and in professions such as medicine,
accountancy and law. The economic base in
the past had been business and trade among
Indians, and building and craftsmanship
among the Cape Malays. They have come a
long way from being slaves, indentured
labourers and hawkers. Muslims from Malawi,
however, have been less economically suc-
cessful as labourers in factories, farms, and
f o r e s t r y .
In 1922, the Jamiatul Ulama Transvaal was
formed to represent the aspirations of imams
and religious scholars. Since then, similar asso-
ciations have followed, representing different
regions and religious orientations. These have
played a significant role in promoting Islam. A
number of welfare and youth groups also serve
the community and express a variety of orien-
tations among Muslims. Sometimes, they rep-
resent particular political approaches, such as
with the Claremont Muslim Youth Association
of 1957 or the Call of Islam in 1983.
The role and place of Muslim women in
South African society should be mentioned
separately. In the western Cape, they con-
tribute significantly to the financial well-being
of the household. This was the case in Durban
and Johannesburg as well, but most often in
the context of family businesses in which
women’s contributions were not clearly reflect-
ed or acknowledged. Most Muslim homes do
not strictly define gender spheres, but men and
women generally gravitate around living
rooms and kitchens, respectively. The religious
sector, however, does not reflect this more lib-
eral social space. Women experts in religious
sciences are rare. In the western Cape, there
exists a more egalitarian understanding of
women’s rights within Islam. Women play a
large role in religious organizations including
anchorpersons at community radio stations,
women’s movements and more traditional
Mawlid organizations. However, under the
tutelage of the powerful mosque imams and
the dominant interpretations of Islam, a more
egalitarian approach to the woman’s place in
South African Islam is severely limited. The
overwhelming majority of religious leaders
have resisted any explicit change in this
respect, even as Muslim women make progress
outside the mosques.
In a forthcoming book from University Press
Florida entitled Mosques, Imams and Sermons, I
have explored the meaning of Islam through
some of its enduring institutions, notably the
mosque and the imam. These latter are regard-
ed, in the study, as patterns and institutions
that shape expectations and future directions
for Muslims. A mosque is not simply a building
within which religious obligations are per-
formed. More than that, it is an institution
developed in the context of a specific history
by individuals who make a variety of religious
and political choices. In this regard, the history
of colonialism and apartheid and a particular
understanding of the Hanafi, Shafii, Ashari, and
Deobandi approaches have shaped mosques
and imams in South Africa.
One can say that Islam in South Africa, and
particularly its institutions, reflect the tenacity of
a religious group that has been able to with-
stand a long history of prejudice and denial.
Against all odds, they built mosques, schools
and welfare organizations and maintained their
religious obligations in tightly knit communities
on the margins of the greater society. Thus, in
spite of their small numbers, there is a mosque in
almost every town of South Africa. From the
1950s onwards, however, many Muslims in
South Africa began to make tentative moves in
the broader social space. Greater and more
widespread exposure to modern education led
to greater mobility, which has led to an intense
debate on how to relate to Islam in the modern
world. At the time, the modernization of society
was enmeshed with the challenge of apartheid
and the debate on how Muslims should respond
to it. Not many Muslims openly supported
apartheid, but there were many that placed the
preservation of the community above the need
to stand up for justice. As apartheid drew to a
close, the difference between traditionalists and
modernists widened, and continues today. 
In post-apartheid South Africa, Muslims are
redefining themselves in relation to the
nation-state, democracy, and human rights.
These are the challenges thrown by the State
to Muslim individuals and communities as the
greater South African society enters the global
community. The country’s constitution makes
provisions for Muslim personal law, which
must be in conformity with the bill of rights.
Some Muslims, led by the u l a m a, insist that the
right to freedom of worship takes precedence
over the equality clauses. A small group of
Muslims believe that Islamic law may be inter-
preted in such a way that the basic rights of all
are not violated. This is but one example of
issues facing Muslims today. 
This change since the first democratic elec-
tions is not restricted to social and political
issues. One can even suggest that Muslims are
beginning to rediscover their religious roots
because apartheid had cast a shadow on the
social and political responses of all religions.
There is a visible and palpable increase in Sufi
groupings in the country. 
Muslims in South Africa can be compared to
the recently formed communities in Australia,
Europe and North America. Their institutions
reflect a modern history of Christian or Euro-
pean dominance of over three hundred years.
Some of the choices that Muslims have made
during this time may be seen in the contempo-
rary struggles and challenges they face in
these regions. Perhaps the history of South
Africa may provide interesting ideas for reflec-
tion. On the other hand, the politics of
apartheid has produced a particular relation
with modernity and globalization. It has tend-
ed to insulate, and isolate, Muslim communi-
ties. Muslims in South Africa can learn a great
deal from these much newer communities in
more open, democratic societies. ♦
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Otto ma n Empi r e
E L I Z A B E T H  F R I E R S O N
The Hamidian cheap illustrated press was a highly pro-
ductive arena for debate on Ottoman identities, includ-
ing discussions of Muslim inflections of daily life, and of
patriotic duties and responsibilities. By the end of the
century, this debate involved not only hundreds of new
professional journalists, but also readers who respond-
ed critically to editorials, articles, and advertisements.
In addition, the several branches of the Hamidian
bureaucracy which participated in censorship – Min-
istries of Education, Interior, and Police, and other
inspection and judiciary offices competed against each
other to promote or delimit client publications and jour-
nalists. 
The Debatability
o f I s l a m
in Late-Ottoman
Serials and Censorship
Once pan-Islamic ideology and Muslim iden-
tity became part of official ideology in the
Hamidian era, then Islam became debatable,
and was debated widely and by far more par-
ticipants in a public forum than ever before.
Journalists, readers, and censors have left a far-
reaching record of newly expanded public
debate on a variety of topics. A close study
reveals subtler and unexpected readings of
Islam by newly literate participants in the serial
press, as well as alignments of political influ-
ence revealed by conflict among and with
Hamidian censors over Islam in particular. For
example, letters to the editor and conflicting
editorials show different, wider perspectives
over what, precisely, writers and readers
thought was loyal and patriotic to the
Ottoman state and sultan. Increasingly in the
1890s and 1900s, loyalty and patriotism, as
well as public propriety, were inflected with
discussions of Islam, and in many ways which
do not always fit into our current notions
about how Islam and modernity were debated. 
The cheap illustrated press brings forth find-
ings by others (Davison, B. Lewis, McCarthy,
Mardin, van Zürcher, to name a few) that Islam
came to bear a greater weight as a component
of ethnic identity from the 1890s onwards. In
this sense, being Muslim acquired much more
significance as a public marker of identity
towards the middle and end of the Hamidian
era, as reforms and rhetoric carried out in the
name of a modern Islamic monarchy began to
bear fruit among the growing adult literate
population. For example, in the cheap illustrat-
ed press, Muslims began to play the part of
moral and patriotic exemplars, (see illustra-
tion) often contrasted with local or foreign
Christians, who were increasingly presented as
the miscreants in cautionary tales about
immorality, criminality, lack of Ottoman patrio-
tism, or just plain weird and freakish behav-
iours. For example, multiple births to Muslim
mothers were reported as bereket-i tenasül
(abundance or blessing of reproduction), a title
with a decidedly positive air, as when the wife
of Ismail ibn Shacban gave birth to triplets, two
boys and one girl, all in fine health and ‘among
the living’. Births to minority Ottoman women
often carried a far different inflection, as with
the report of a deformed baby on the island of
Patras, with the deformities described in
painful detail, or when the editors of a ladies’
weekly gazette reported with horror the mur-
der of a child on the island of Rhodes. In Istan-
bul, the largely Christian minority and Euro-
pean neighbourhood of Galata was the site of
shocking chid-related events as well, as
described in an article entitled ‘Birth in the
Streets’. This short item described a woman
who was walking in the streets of Galata when
she felt her first labour pains and took refuge
in a tavern, where she gave birth. Female
breaches of propriety were not limited to fam-
ily matters, though, as proven by the long-run-
ning career of a gypsy pickpocket operating at
ferry stops.
Clearly being Muslim in the Hamidian era
came to hold a number of new or altered
valences of identity, especially in attempting to
keep separate the distinct m i l l e ts which social
Darwinist notions threatened to blur into a few
scientifically flattened categories of human
being. There are also some indicators in the
Elizabeth Frierson is Assistant Professor, Department
of History, University of Cincinnati, USA. 
N o t e :
– My findings are drawn mainly from archival
records, and from publications of loyalists and
t h e loyal opposition of the Hamidian era from
1876-1908/9, with limited reference to Young Turk
publications. A fuller discussion of foreign/local
and Muslim/non-Muslim identities can be found
i n my essay, ‘Mirrors Out, Mirrors In: Domestication
and rejection of the foreign in late-Ottoman
women’s magazines (1875-1908)’ in the
forthcoming volume from SUNY Press, edited by
D. Fairchild Ruggles, Women, Patronage, and Self-
Representation in Islamic Societies.
cheap illustrated press that lay and non-elite
members of society were beginning to re-evalu-
ate Islamic models of male and female piety for
the rapidly changing social and economic con-
ditions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
This has led me to explore the possibility that
this increase in journalistic attention to Muslim
identity in the public sphere was accompanied
by a spiritual reappraisal of Islam, especially
among the non-elite sectors of society repre-
sented by the readership (and ‘listenership’) of
the illustrated gazettes. I was unable to come up
with definitive conclusions on this point, and so
continue to re-read print and archival sources
with these questions in mind. Suggestions and
feedback would be most welcome. ♦
It is usually amongst the diasporic Muslims of
the Western world that we find the Internet
being appropriated for political purposes. The
American media has recently been full of scare-
mongering about ‘radical fundamentalists’ who
use the United States as a fundraising base for
their overseas operations. Reports often cite the
Internet as a primary tool for the dissemination
of propaganda by Islamic militants. A more
sober examination of the situation, however,
reveals that very few of the Muslim groups who
have a presence on the Internet are involved in
this sort of activity. Moreover, there are also
those who argue that the Internet has actually
had a moderating effect on Islamist discourse.
Sacad al-Faqih, for example, believes that Inter-
net chat rooms and discussion forums devoted
to the debate of Islam and politics serve to
encourage greater tolerance. He believes that in
these new arenas one sees a greater conver-
gence in the centre of the Islamist political spec-
trum and a weakening of its extremes.
Thus, for the overwhelming majority of Mus-
lims who seek Islam online, the Internet is a
forum for the conduct of politics within their reli-
gion. In the absence of sanctioned information
from recognized institutions, Muslims are
increasingly taking religion into their own
hands. Through various popular newsgroups
and e-mail discussion lists, Muslims can solicit
information about what ‘Islam’ says about any
particular problem. Not only that, notes al-Faqih,
‘but someone will be given information about
what Islam says about such and such and then
others will write in to correct or comment on this
opinion/interpretation’. Instead of having to go
down to the mosque in order to elicit the advice
of the local mullah, Muslims can also now receive
supposedly ‘authoritative’ religious pronounce-
ments via the various e-mail fatwa services
which have sprung up in recent months. The
Sheikhs of al-Azhar are totally absent, but the
enterprising young mullah who sets himself up
with a colourful website in Alabama suddenly
becomes a high-profile representative of Islam
for a particular constituency. 5 Due to the largely
anonymous nature of the Internet, one can also
never be sure whether the ‘authoritative’ advice
received via these services is coming from a clas-
sically-trained religious scholar or an electrical
engineer moonlighting as an amateur calim.
More than anything else, the Internet and
other information technologies provide spaces
where diasporic Muslims can go in order to find
others ‘like them’. It is in this sense that we can
speak of the Internet as allowing Muslims to cre-
ate a new form of imagined community, or a re-
imagined u m m a. The Muslim spaces of the
Internet hence offer a reassuring set of symbols
and a terminology which attempt to reproduce
and recontextualize familiar settings and terms
of discourse in locations far remote from those
in which they were originally embedded. As has
become apparent, the encounter between
Islam and the transnational technologies of
communication is as multifaceted as the reli-
gion itself. The rise of IT has led to considerable
intermingling and dialogue between disparate
interpretations of what it means to be ‘Islamic’
and the politics of authenticity which inevitably
ensue from this also serve to further fragment
traditional sources of authority, such that the
locus of ‘real’ Islam and the identity of those
who are permitted to speak on its behalf
become ambiguous. This, in many ways, is an
Islam with a distinctly modern, or perhaps even
p o s t -modern ring to it. The vocabulary here is
eclectic, combining soundbites of religious
knowledge into novel fusions well suited to
complex, transnational contexts. Most impor-
tantly, the changing connotations of authority
and authenticity in digital Islam appear to be
contributing to the critical re-imagination of the
boundaries of Muslim politics. ♦
Dr Peter Mandaville is a Lecturer in International
Relations at the Department of Politics and
International Relations at the University of Kent at
Canterbury, UK. E-mail: P.G.Mandaville@ukc.ac.uk
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Fo r mer  C zec ho slo v a ki a
M ILOŠ M E N D E L
Historically, the Czech experience with Islam was mainly
influenced by the ‘Turkish Menace’ (the 150-year Otto-
man presence in Hungary, including land which later
became southern Slovakia, and the two Ottoman sieges
of Vienna in 1529 and 1683). Due to its geographical
location and the nature of its historical development,
however, the territory of historical Czech Lands (Bohe-
mia and Moravia) never actually had direct contact with
Islamic civilization.
B e g i n n i n g s
o f t h e M u s l i m
R e l i g i o u s
C o m m u n i t y
in Former
C z e c h o s l o v a k i a
There were, of course, marginal contacts on
the medieval commercial routes running
through the Lands, the negligible participation
of the Premyslid Dynasty in the Crusades to the
Holy Land, and individual journeys of discovery
made by Czech burghers and nobles to the
Islamic East. The cultural influence of Islam was
also tepid, evidenced only in the orientalist
trend of the contemporary nobles (Turkish and
other Islamic motifs in fashion and architecture,
e.g. the Romantic minaret from the turn of the
18th century at the Liechtenstein estate in Led-
nice, Southern Moravia) and in certain elements
of the urban lifestyle (‘Turkish’ coffee houses in
Prague, etc.). The modern Czech experience
with Islam has been, however, somewhat more
varied, yet always mediated and shaped within
the context of the political rivalry between the
Habsburg monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. 
The situation changed markedly only after the
Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1878 and full annexation in
1908. Thereafter, Bohemia and Moravia were
components of a state body which incorporated
a significant Islamic community. At first, the
Bosnian (as well as Croat) Muslims resisted Aus-
trian intervention, but during the period lead-
ing up to World War I, the Muslim national orga-
nizations used professed loyalty to the Habs-
burg authority to fend off the radical national-
ism of the Serbs and Croats. Of course, the Aus-
trian annexation brought no important eco-
nomic benefits to the Bosnian population; some
Muslims even took advantage of the mobility
within the new borders to seek work elsewhere.
From 1878 to 28 October 1918 (foundation of
the Czechoslovak Republic), there was a contin-
uous latent migration of ‘Bosnians’ to the north-
ern regions of the monarchy. Most were minor
craftsmen, confectioners, ice cream manufac-
turers, grocers, and university students in
Prague and Brno.
By 15 July 1912, the demographic charges
had eventually led to Emperor Franz Josef I‘s
signing of Act no. 159/1912 of the Imperial Code
in Bad Ischl, by which the State henceforth rec-
ognized the ‘Hanafite Islamic religious rite’. On
the basis of this Act, the Hanafite madhad w a s
‘to be understood within the Crown Lands and
those Lands represented in the Imperial Council
as a religious community in the sense of the
basic constitutional law of 21-12-1867’, i.e. the
December Constitution, which legally anchored
the new constitutional framework as part of
Austro-Hungarian settlement. The Act demand-
ed that legal and ritual norms be upheld so as to
comply with the established legal customs in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Act permitted the
participation of ulama' from Bosnia in setting up
and running the communities within the
Empire. However, their work had to be moni-
tored and if it was felt to contravene the ‘public
interest’, it could be forcibly disbanded. In terms
of later development, the key section of the Act
was para. 7, which stated that ‘concerning the
marriages of adherents of Islam and the mainte-
nance of birth, marriage and death records’
one‘s own (secular) regulations had to be
a p p l i e d .
The year 1918 marked the disintegration of
the Habsburg monarchy, but the previous
demographic movements did not abate with
the creation of the new borders. Many of the
Balkan Muslims who had settled in the territory,
which had become the Czechoslovak Republic,
decided to remain and others were attracted by
the better economic situation as well as by pre-
vious business and family relationships. These
were soon joined by the numerous Islamic emi-
grants from the Soviet Union (especially the
Cherkess and the Tartars). Only in the mid-1930s
did the Muslims, mostly residing in Prague and
Brno, begin to form a religious association.
Before then, only individuals gathered sponta-
neously to practise Islamic rituals – usually with
members of the same nationality.
The first considerations about the establish-
ment of an Islamic community were concretized
by the end of 1934. The mixed group of both
foreign and Czech individuals assembled a
group of practising Prague Muslims to found
the ‘Muslim Religious Community for Czecho-
slovakia with a Centre in Prague’. The partici-
pants agreed to ascertain the number of Prague
Muslims and to evaluate their willingness to
take part in building up a community, to obtain
as much information as possible about one
another, to organize educative and cautious
missionary activities and to construct a mosque
in Prague. The Community was then solemnly
founded on April 25, 1935 as an assembly,
which included ‘numerous sympathizers’ from
the Prague intelligentsia, business circles inter-
ested in trading with Islamic countries and the
diplomatic missions of Islamic states.
Four basic components contributed to the
birth of the Community: a) foreign Muslims liv-
ing in CSR; b) foreign Islamic institutions; c)
representative bodies of some Islamic states;
and d) Czech converts. Available archive mate-
rials reveal that the Community was the focus
of a mostly stable set of foreign practising
Muslims, who saw in their participation in the
Community, an opportunity to reinforce their
own spiritual identity amidst a ‘foreign’ civi-
lization, to organize Islamic rituals in collectivi-
ty and to broaden societal life in the spirit of
their own traditions. The idea of vehemently
spreading the Islamic mission never seemed to
be in the forefront – perhaps only because of
the foreigners’ caution in their relations to the
Czech state authorities, which did not seem to
express a particular understanding for the
Community’s purposes. On the government’s
side, the Ministry of Culture and Education, the
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice
alike, repeatedly postponed and administra-
tively complicated the Community’s demands
for recognition and some facilities throughout
the entire period of the ‘30s. Even the authori-
ties of Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren after 15
March 1939 did not take much notice of the
group of foolish ‘exhibitionists‘, excepting the
occasional suspicion of citizens of foreign ori-
g i n .
Besides the ‘foreign’ Muslims, in terms of
modern Czech history (and even current think-
ing on ‘Euro-Islam’), the rather small group of
Czechoslovak citizens who had converted to
Islam, is worthy of special mention. It was they
who made the greatest efforts in spreading the
faith in the CSR. The most influential figure
among them was Alois Bohdan Brikcius, who
assumed the name Mohammed Abdullah after
conversion. In addition, his name in his books
and in certain official documents is often pre-
ceded by the honorary title H a d j i, which Brik-
cius had the right to bear as a member of the
1933 pilgrimage to Mecca. This was shortly
after accepting the Islamic faith in the French
colony of Djibouti with his second wife Marie
through the decree of a local q a d i.
Brikcius was certainly a complex personality
to whom the author of this article cannot do
justice without a certain subjective impression,
even after so many years and with an almost
complete documentary background available.
The only sources missing are those concerning
his alleged imprisonment, having been sen-
tenced to eight years on the basis of president
Edvard Beneš’ ‘little decree’, punishing pro-
Nazi collaborators.
Brikcius’ positive, strongly romantic and emo-
tional relationship with the Arabs and Islamic
civilization had been shaped in his youth in the
’20s. This rapport was developed during his
journeys to the Middle East and had ripened in a
context of the international political situation,
especially in terms of the British and French rule
over much of the Islamic world. Brikcius had
some bad experiences with the British authori-
ties. As a European Muslim he was treated with
suspicion in India as well as East Africa, and,
together with his Muslim friends, he perceived
the arrogance of the colonial authorities as a
humiliating conspiracy. In this spirit he was also
willing to understand the sympathy of the Turks
and many Arab nationalists to the Third Reich.
This simplified vision prevented him from see-
ing the danger posed by Nazism to his own
country (although unambiguous signs of a
tense right-wing nationalism can be found in
his pre-Protectorate texts), as well as that posed
by Nazi racial theory to his beloved Arabs. His
beliefs reached their climax in the years of war,
when in H l a s (Voice), the mouthpiece of the
Community, he had published a couple of pure-
ly anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi articles.
Brikcius’ image of Islam as a remarkable civi-
lization rather than a religious system can espe-
cially be seen in his books and articles. He
worked mostly as a journalist in the Prague Mid-
day Paper and in the Vlajka (The Banner) journal
of the Czech Fascists. Only there and in the
Community’s H l a s did he have the opportunity
to formulate his sharpest critiques of Britain,
‘Jewish Bolshevism’ and Zionism and never
stopped informing those persuaded Arabs and
other Muslims that Germany would rid them of
Western colonialism, Marxism and the ‘Zionist
conspiracy’. However, nowhere in the archive
material does Brikcius express sympathy for
Nazi ideology as such. Unlike him, most other
Czech Muslims of a younger generation lived in
a kind of schizophrenia concerning prevailing
pro-Nazi feelings in many Islamic countries. In
the post-war political milieu, they changed their
views immediately.
In their ideas, Brikcius and his adherents were
unable to define a clear boundary between
Islam as a religious system (or at least a civiliza-
tion based thereupon) and the actual political
situation. When Hadji professed his admiration
of Islam, he often referred to its humiliation –
most frequently in the form of the betrayal and
exploitation of Arabs by the English in 1916 and
1917 in following their own colonial interests.
He was a romantic, a person who sincerely and
spontaneously adored the Islamic world of
deserts, oases and urban oriental architecture,
just as he did the openness and hospitality of
the local populations. On the other hand, as a
leader of a Muslim community, he did not
always have very precise ideas about Islamic
countries and customs, the peripeteia of Islamic
legislation and the plurality of modern currents
of Islamic thought.
The Czech Muslim community was at least
recognized in December 1941, in the darkest
days of Czechoslovak history. No wonder that
after May 1945, when the presidential ‘decrees’
were implemented, all the laws and decrees
from the years of occupation were eliminated.
Thus, neither the ‘First Republic’ nor the post-
war democratic regime was ready to accept an
‘innocent’ Muslim group in the midst of the
Czech society. It is quite natural that after the
Communist takeover (February 1948) the Mus-
lim community practically ceased to exist. The
life of Muslims under the Communist rule and
after the political events of the year 1989 is a
story of quite another chapter of the Czech con-
temporary history. ♦
Dr Miloš Mendel is a research fellow of the Oriental
Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech
Republic. E-mail: m e n d e l @ o r i e n t . c a s . c z
Brikcius a few days
before his death
i n1 9 5 9
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Nearly seven million Muslims live in Western Europe,
their presence being the unforeseen consequence of
migration flows towards the continent at the beginning
of the 1960s. Later, during the 1972-4 recession, Euro-
pean immigration policy drastically changed: Govern-
ments halted labour immigration yet allowed for family
reunification. From the 1970s, religious and cultural
dimensions did become important issues in relations
between Muslim communities and European societies
since the contact surface had been greatly expanded.
Islam is a major aspect of this settlement process in
terms of the increasing need for mosques, halal
butcheries, Koranic schools or Muslim cemeteries. 
Pluralism in the Context
of Globlalization
European Muslim
Yo u t h
Around these issues arise questions, doubts,
and sometimes-violent oppositions, all linked
to the integration of these newcomers in dif-
ferent national communities. The confronta-
tion no longer has the temporary, discreet or
even shameful character as it did in the 1950s.
Islam is a stable religion with adepts that
demonstrate a growing will to be recognized.
Muslims are becoming increasingly politically
active, reinforced by the emergence of the
‘second generation’. This is why the main
migration issues are now cultural and political,
not only economic. It is noteworthy that it was
not until the ’80s that Islam became the focus
of attention. This resulted from a number of
international incidents, such as the Islamic rev-
olution in Iran, the civil war in Lebanon, the
Rushdie Affair, the Gulf War and the collapse of
the Soviet Empire. It was suggested that a con-
nection existed between Islamic fundamental-
ism, as it was developing in many Muslim
countries, and the migrant groups in Europe.
This contributes to Islam still being defined as
a ‘problem’. Often only conflict situations, as
seen in the Rushdie Affair in Britain or the
‘headscarves affair’ in France, are taken into
account to define Islam in Europe.
This Islam-as-a-threat approach implies a
major misperception. It neglects the important
transformations in Islamic identity in general
and among the new generations born or edu-
cated in the West in particular. With the settle-
ment of Muslim groups, the controversial ques-
tion of Islam and modernity is actually trans-
ferred from the Muslim context to that of the
West. The key debate on compatibility of Islam-
ic values with secular organizing principles of
Western societies, a debate very well known to
the Muslim world, is still going on, only this
time within the Western democracies. In
Europe, the debate does not concern Islamic
governance as it does in Muslim societies, but
rather the experience of pluralism and democ-
racy. This question must be placed in a dynam-
ic perspective, taking the new context into
account. In others words, being a minority in
Europe implies deep change in Muslim identi-
ties and practices, especially among the new
generations born in the West. A relevant analy-
sis should thus take into account changes that
concern not only the Muslim groups, but also
the host societies. In this perspective, multicul-
turalism seems to become a real issue, redefin-
ing public space as it now means competition
amongst differing claims to universalism.
Embracing this new phenomenon requires an
integrated approach to the main features of
Muslims groups and European societies as well.
This scientific posture goes beyond the simplis-
tic vision of Islam as a threat; it considers Islam
as contributory to the process of integ r a t i o n .
A point worthy of mention here is the com-
petition between ethnic and Islamic ties, which
is responsible for the most important cleav-
ages among Muslim communities in Europe.
This can be partly attributed to the emergence
of ‘new Muslims’. This means, on the one hand,
new elaboration and discussions on the minor-
ity condition, and on the other had, new prac-
tices and identifications to Islam. 
With reference to the minority condition, the
introduction of Islam into democratic societies
contributes to changing the terms of the
ongoing ‘Islam and democracy’ debate as far
as tolerance and pluralism are concerned. This
may pose a challenge as most European Mus-
lims come from countries where Islam is either
the religion of the State or the majority.1 N e w
ways of reflecting upon the Minority condition
are now in debate among Muslims in the West
by which conventional interpretations of
Islamic tradition are being reformulated.2
Concerning practices, the major change is in
the process of individualization and privatiza-
tion of Islam. Membership to a post-migration
religious minority affects the Islamic identifica-
tion among contemporary Muslim youth. New
forms of religiosity defined by individualism,
secularism and privatization replace with
increasing frequency the uprooted Islam of the
first generation. This emergence of the individ-
ual is partially the consequence of the migra-
tion process. The process engenders differ-
ences in value transmission. For example,
among North African migrants, the gap
between the values of the first generation and
those of their children is more pronounced
than among other migrant groups. Parents, for
instance, belonging to the working class in
French society, have struggled to maintain the
cultural system of their country of origin; while
their children have been more socialized by
French institutions such as schools and social
work. Arabic language capacity as well as vari-
ous cultural practices are lost. The growth of a
‘vernacular’ Islam in Europe is the most inter-
esting sign of this change. Increasingly, ser-
mons, literature and public discussions are
being conveyed in the local European lan-
g u a g e .
Islam is now embodied in a paradigm of sec-
ularization that was, until now, the major
specificity of Western society. This means the
decline of religious references in structural dif-
ferentiation of society. Individualization means
a sharpening of self-consciousness, privileging
personal choice over the constraints of reli-
gious tradition. This individualization is most
often associated with privatization. This term
means that religion is more confined to the pri-
vate sphere and that religious values and rules
are not placed at the centre of one’s personal
orientation to life, but rather is conceived of as
a kind of annex or compartment. As with Euro-
pean Christians, many Muslims now experi-
ence religion only during large festivals, at
birth, marriage and death. In this way, Euro-
pean Islam is similar to other European reli-
gions, especially among the youth. Like ‘con-
sumers’, people are increasingly choosing
which tenets and rules of their religion to rec-
ognize and which to ignore. The inculcation of
Western values through the educational sys-
tems certainly has an influence and can explain
the emphasis on critical debate and reflexive
q u e s t i o n i n g .
But individualization as well as reflexive
questioning can also be associated with collec-
tive and social identification to religion. In oth-
ers words, fundamentalism or strict obser-
vance are also the outcome of individual
choice. Thus, within one generation, one can
simultaneously observe a wholesale abandon-
ment of Muslim attachments and the attrac-
tion of Islam as a global symbol of resistance to
Western political and cultural imperialism.3
Our own field experience allows us to assert
that the rediscovery of Islam can take various
forms. First, it is a credible option for those
who experienced unemployment, drug and
alcohol use, and delinquency. It enabled some
youth to recover personal dignity and to pro-
ject a better image of themselves. This is a clas-
sic use of religion as salvation. Second, most of
these ‘new Muslims’ actually come from Euro-
pean societies’ middle classes. They want to
reaffirm their identity and live according to
Islamic teachings, while trying to avoid the
temptations of the non-Muslim environment.
This identification to Islam, despite common
opinion, is not exclusively the expression of an
opposition to the West, but often results in an
affirmation of self-confidence among young
Muslims. Many of these latter are coming back
to an Islam ‘purified’ from the ‘accidents’ of its
traditional readings. For the more educated, it
is no longer an Islam of the Moroccan, Algerian
or Pakistani countryside, but rather a ‘return to
the basics’ of Islamic teaching direct contact
with its sources, the Koran and Sunna. Islam in
the West should have a specific and appropri-
ate actualization. This is the message the youth
are clearly conveying. 
The current reflection on the Koran and
Sunna serves to question the relevance of the
old concepts of Dar Al-Islam versus Dar Al-
Harb. This classic terminology is no longer
appropriate to describe the condition of Mus-
lim citizens in the context of secularized
democracies. Accordingly, opinions of the
ulama in the Muslim world on the situation of
Islam in Europe have evolved. Their perception
of the European context along with the specif-
ic situation of the Muslims has forced them to
re-consider previous assertions: to keep dis-
tant from the host society; not to take the
nationality of a Western society; to keep in
mind that they must ‘go back home’ as soon as
possible. All of these statements, presented as
fatwa, did not match the reality anymore and a
considerable number of ulama have eventually
come to the idea that the duty of Muslims in
Europe is to reflect upon organizing their
future in this area.4
So it is necessary to analyse these Islamic
identities within the European context. It is
impossible to understand the behaviour of
new generation Muslims without keeping in
mind that they now constitute a part of Euro-
pean youth. In the West, in general, there is a
questioning of progress and modernity. When
the collective landmarks provided by schools,
political parties, and trade unions are weak-
ened or missing and economy is insufficient to
define social status, religious membership can
contribute to shaping new collective identities
for a growing number of young people from all
religious groups, not only for Muslims. ♦
Jocelyne Cesari, CNRS - Groupe de Sociologie des
Religions et de la Laicité, Paris,Visiting Professor at
New York and Columbia Universities.
N o t e s
1. This politicization of Islam in various countries of
origin is a more accurate explanation than the one
focusing on the fact that the minority condition
within a voluntary migration had not been examined
by Muslim Law. According to this explanation, this is
because the latter was elaborated between the 8th
and 9th centuries, a time when Islam was dominant
both culturally and economically. This argument was
brought by Bernard Lewis (1994), ‘Legal and
historical reflections on the position of Muslim
populations under non-Muslim rule’, in: Lewis, B.
a n d Schnapper, D. (eds), 1994. Muslims in Europe,
P i n t e r Publishers, 1, p. 19.
2. See for example, the Journal of the Institute of
Muslim Minority Affairs published in England.
3. About this complex and contradictory use of Islam
see J. Cesari (1998), Musulmans et Republicains, les
jeunes, l’islam et la France. Bruxelles, Complexe.
4. For a reflection on this change and the main political
and cultural effects of this innovative debate on the
relationship to Sharica, in the French context, see also
J. Cesari, Musulmans et Republicains, les jeunes,
l’Islam et la France, op-cit.
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After 25 years of equivocation, the matter concerning
the representation of secular affairs of the Muslim com-
munity is finally on the verge of finding a resolution
acceptable to both the Muslim communities and public
authorities. In Belgium, the State recognizes and finan-
cially supports various faiths: Catholic, Protestant,
Orthodox, Anglican, Jewish, and Muslim. Even secular-
ism is supported. Unlike the other recognized faiths,
Islam does not fully benefit from the advantages that
are conferred theoretically to its followers. Until now,
the absence of a representative body, unanimously rec-
ognized by all Muslim groups, has been used in dis-




As in other European countries, Belgium has
seen during the last thirty years the nascence
of Islam as the second most professed religion
in the country. Not having viable statistics at
our disposition, which is due to the fact that it
is forbidden to register people according to
religion, the number of Muslims in Belgium is
estimated at approximately 350,000. Included
in this number are both practising and non-
practising Muslims, as well as those of Muslim
origins who have become atheist or agnostic.
The number of converts to Islam, however, is
highly speculative. According to sources, none
of which are genuinely viable, the number of
converts could be anywhere from 3,000 to
1 5 , 0 0 0 .
The Executive Body of Muslims in Belgium,
temporary interlocutor for public powers of
limited function, was set up after long negotia-
tions in the different Muslim communities dur-
ing the course of 1993. The Executive Body
proposed, in agreement with the Minister of
Justice, to organize elections in order to give a
legitimate and democratic base to a body that
would finally be able to obtain official recogni-
tion and which would have all of the powers
normally conferred to a Chef de Culte ( R e l i g i o u s
Group Leader).
In March 1998, the Executive Body re-sub-
mitted its project proposal to the Minister of
Justice and, on June 12, the Council of Minis-
ters ratified the project, entrusting the organi-
zation of elections to the Executive Body.
On 21 June 1998, the Executive Body invited
the representatives of all mosques, religious
teachers, and religious charity workers coun-
try-wide, in order to explain by means of a
multi-media demonstration, the i ns and o u ts of
the project. It was the first time that such an
event, bringing together Muslims from diverse
ethno-national communities and various dog-
matic sensibilities, took place in Belgium.
July 1998 saw the formation of an accompa-
nying committee comprised of, on the one
hand, three officials representing the Ministry
of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, and the
Centre for Equal Opportunity and the Fight
against Racism, and on the other hand three
members of the Executive Body. Its purpose
was to follow the preparation for elections, the
actual elections, and the process of validating
results. The project anticipated the election of
a 51-member assembly. This assembly was to
be increased by 17 co-opted members, 10 of
which were to be nominated by the current
Executive Body and 7 by those elected, plus
the first 10 members.
The goal of co-opting is to allow for continu-
ity in the work of the Executive Body as well as
to give equilibrium to results taken from the
voting boxes, calling upon Muslims who would
be less likely to be elected: women, youth, cer-
tain community minorities, and those with
specific technical qualifications useful for the
c o m m u n i t y .
These 68 persons would have to assign, from
amongst themselves, the Religious Group
Leader Organ, which would include 17 mem-
bers comprised of 7 Moroccans, 4 Turks, 3 con-
verts, and 3 ‘other nationalities’.
To respect the elective principle, at least
three-fourths of the members of the Religious
Group Leader Organ should be directly elected.
Regardless of what is claimed by certain reli-
gious tendencies, deciding upon a contingent
per community group has as its objective to
assure, from the outset, equal representation
and minority participation. At present, follow-
ers still frequent the religious loci of their own
communities. However, there are certain
minorities of which the converts do not have
their own mosques. Not taking this into
account would have given preference to
Moroccans, who clearly constitute a majority.
Muslims over 18 years of age domiciling in
Belgium since more than one year prior, were
authorized to register to vote between Sep-
tember 1 and October 31, 1998. On the register
form, the voter was asked to indicate his pref-
erence for voting either at a mosque or in a
public place.
Muslims (male or female) over 25 years of
age domiciling in Belgium since more than 5
years prior, utilizing their civil rights, having
neither political nor diplomatic mandate and
mastering one of the official languages of the
country, could present him/herself as a candi-
date. Each mosque had the right to present
from one to three candidates. 
In order to give a chance to those who do
not frequent a particular mosque, persons
wishing to do so could freely present them-
selves as candidates, 50 supporting signatures
being required. 
A D V E R T I S E M E N T
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The Caribbean has seen two waves of Muslim migration,
the first wave of which was comprised of slaves from
Africa. Indentured labourers of India, who came to the
shores between 1845 and 1917, formed the second.
Monique Renaerts, Centrum voor Gelijkheid
v a n Kansen en voor Racismebestrijding /
Centre pur l’Égalité des Chances et la Lutte
C o n t r el e Racisme, Brussels, Belgium.
T r i n i d a d
H A L I M A K A S S I M Muslims and
M i s s i o n a r i e s
of TrinidadThe estate proved to be the first place for thereconstitution of organized religion. While menwell-versed in Islamic knowledge generally did
not leave India, there were a few who arrived
and served a full or abbreviated indentureship:
Syed Abdul Aziz of Iere Village came to Trinidad
in 1883 from Afghanistan; Ruknudeen Meah, a
Punjabi of Tunupuna, arrived in 1893; and Hafiz
Nazruddeen of Tunupuna came to Trinidad in
1913. These were some of the indentured immi-
grants who assisted in the reconstitution of
Islam. The unlettered immigrants depended
upon these learned men to nurture their faith,
either on the estate or in the villages. At some
estates, for instance that of Waterloo, there were
mosques, or ‘bamboo sheds near to the barracks
where Muslims met nightly to read their prayers
and read the Qur'an’ (Fazal Ali, interview with ex-
indentured immigrant, 26/02/1998).
As village settlements developed, circa 1870,
each village or set of villages established its
own mosques with imams. John Morton, a
Presbyterian missionary, noted in his diary that
mosques began to appear as early as the 1860s
as ‘nice little buildings with galvanized roofs’
(Sarah Morton, John Morton of Trinidad, 1916).
Former immigrants and their descendants,
once they became prosperous, built mosques,
usually made of wood. The mosques that
sprang up throughout Indo-Muslim settle-
ments were primarily male bastions of worship
until circa 1928. It was at that point that the
females of Peru Village (St. James) began
attending certain special mosque activities,
such as the cId-ul-Fitr and cId-ul-Adha prayers.
By the early 1930s, m a k t a b s (religious classes)
were held in the mosque compound. These
classes were taught by imams or elderly
learned men of the district, imparting the rudi-
ments of Islam to young boys and girls. Classes
included such subjects as Arabic, Urdu,
prayers, and other basic Islamic knowledge.
Prior to the establishment of m a k t a b s, young
boys and girls were socialized into Islam by
emulation and by the knowledge imparted by
their parents and grandparents. In some
instances, this practice continued even after
young girls began attending m a k t a b.
From the early twentieth century, Muslims
began forming religious groups that would
cater to their specific needs. These groups
pressed for the recognition of Muslim mar-
riages, the right to establish their own schools
with state recognition, encouraged island-
wide Muslim unity, and sought to improve reli-
gious knowledge and increase spiritual aware-
ness. These religious organizations all sought
state recognition, first as Friendship Societies
and later as incorporated bodies. The first
among the multiple religious organizations to
be formed was the Islamic Guardian Associa-
tion (IGA) of Princes Town in 1906. This group
was organized by Syed Abdul Aziz, an ex-
indentured labourer from Afghanistan, who
had settled in Iere Village near a Presbyterian
mission. Aziz was also instrumental in the
establishment of the East Indian National Asso-
ciation (EINA), an all-Indian pressure group, in
1897. As a believer in Muslim unity, Aziz, along
with other prominent Muslims of the colony,
held a meeting at Crescent Hall, St. Joseph in
1925. Their intention was to organize the Mus-
lim community into one large religious body.
By the following year, the Tackveeyatul Islamia
Association (TIA, Society for the Strength of
Islam) was formed, and in 1931 it became an
incorporated body. Islam was also consolidat-
ed through the intermittent arrival of mission-
aries from India, which began as early as 1914.
Each of these missionaries rejuvenated the
faith, aiding the continuity of form or remedy-
ing discord, which would allow for a revamp-
ing of Islam.
Although missionaries were arriving, there
was also a reciprocal ‘back to India’ movement.
Yacoob Ali, at age thirteen in 1888, was sent
back to India by his father to acquire an Islamic
education. He returned ten years later as a
h a f i z and q a r i and established several m a k t a b s.
In 1923, another youth, Ameer Ali, left for
Lahore. He was influenced by m o u l v i F a z a l
Karim Khan Durrani, a Punjabi missionary of
Woking, England, who had been invited to
Trinidad by local Muslims in 1921. Durrani left
in 1923 and within a few months, Ali, by his
encouragement, left for the Ahmaddiya Anju-
man Ishaat-i-Islam Institute in Lahore.
Ali returned to Trinidad in 1930 as a m o u l v i
and immediately became involved with the
TIA. He introduced a spirit of inquiry into the
faith and preached Islam in conformity with
new thought and scientific discoveries. For
instance, he propagated that Jesus was dead
and that he was not taken up to Heaven alive
and as such could not return, and that the
m i r a j (ascension) of the Prophet Muhammad
(u.w.b.p.) was not in conformity with the ethos
of p u r d a h (veil or curtain of segregation) as
expounded by the Qur'an. Furthermore, he
advocated equal privileges for women in order
to aid in the social development of communi-
ty. He also spoke, without condemnation, of
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, nineteenth century
founder of the Ahmaddiya movement in India.
Traditionalists (Sunnis) at the time were prone
to persecuting Ahmad for his claims of being a
recipient of revelations, the Promised Messiah
and m a h d i (the One Rightfully Guided). Much
of his preaching ran counter to the beliefs and
interpretations of the faith as understood by
the Sunnis.
The ideas introduced by the m o u l v i met with
a storm of opposition. He was forced by his
peers to declare his position as either Sunni or
Ahmadi. Ali refused to condemn Mirza Ghulam
Ahmad and it was therefore assumed by the
traditionalists that he was indeed a secret
believer of his creed. He was consequently
accused of being a k a f i r (unbeliever) by the tra-
ditionalists. By 1931, a schism developed with-
in the TIA as a result of these varying ideologi-
cal positions. One faction remained the TIA,
more open to the then current intellectual
thought and scholarly trends relative to Islam;
while the other camp, now known as Anjuman
Sunnat-ul-Jamaat Association (ASJA, Propaga-
tion Group for the Way of Life of Prophet
Muhammad, u.w.b.p.), retained a conservative
and traditional view of Islam.
In order to consolidate their positions, these
two groups engaged in d awca h, that is, spread-
ing Islam through preaching and education.
They also encouraged foreign missionaries
from India to visit the island to substantiate
the claims of their respective, traditionalist or
modernist, positions. Again, lectures were the
medium used to consolidate the varying
stances and increase the number of followers.
From circa 1944, the TIA was again plagued
by tension, litigation and injunctions resulting
from disputes over the rightful claim to leader-
ship. This led to a split in the TIA and the sub-
sequent formation of the Trinidad Muslim
League (TML) on August 15, 1947, the same
date as the partition of India and Pakistan. The
Halima Kassim, Department of History,
U n i v e r s i t yo f the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad.
E-m a i l :k a s c 0 0 1 2 @ c e n t r e . u w i . t t
TML, led by m o u l v i Ameer Ali, proclaimed a
non-conformist position. That is, they did not
conform to any one particular school of
thought. In the late 1960s, the TML became
linked with the Ahmadi movement, but since
1976 they have abandoned this latter orienta-
tion and reverted to their non-conformist posi-
t i o n .
Missionaries continued to arrive from India
and Pakistan. But simultaneously, around the
late 1960s, missionaries from the Middle East
began visiting Trinidad and, along with return-
ing nationals educated at Al-Azhar University
in Cairo and universities in Saudi Arabia,
altered the practice of Islam. They attempted
to purge the faith of its Indian and Western
influences, hoping to make it ‘pure’. While they
encountered opposition from the traditional
Muslims, the youths disenchanted with the
seeming apathy and stagnation within the
faith were attracted to their ideas. The Tablighi
movement has, in recent times, gained ground
in Trinidad. While its followers constitute a
minority, their influence is nonetheless felt
within some of the mosques of the island. Tab-
lighi missionaries from the subcontinent also
visit the island from time to time. Sunni Islam is
prevalent, but there are small bands of Ahmadi
and Qadiani followers. While Shicite Islam
never gained momentum, during the month of
Muharram, the battle of Kerbala was celebrat-
ed with t a d j a h s (tomb-like structures, usually
large, colourful and disposable) in some dis-
tricts. This practice has continued, but is
marked with fierce condemnation by Sunnis.
Nevertheless, during the early part of the
month of Muharram, there are visits by Shici t e
missionaries from the United States.
The Muslim community continues to be a
minority in Trinidad and Tobago. Still for the
most part Sunni, other variations of Islam are
present. Islam in Trinidad continues to be open
to external influence, just as it was during the
epoch of indentureship and post-indenture-
ship. ♦
Those wishing to participate in the Religious
Group Leader Organ furthermore should have
a secondary school diploma.
At the closing of registration there were
72,000 voters and 264 candidates. Amongst
the latter, there were 8 converts, 43 ‘other
nationalities’ (Algerian, Tunisian, Pakistani,
Egyptian, Syrian, and sub-Saharan African), 170
Moroccans, and 43 Turks. Albanians did not
participate in the voting: based on their own
statistics, they demanded beforehand a certain
number of seats attributed without consulta-
tion in the grand assembly of 68.
Days before the election, the voters were
called upon by mail. The preferred location for
voting, as indicated by the voter on the regis-
tration form (mosque or public place), was
taken into account, as well as proximity to the
voter’s domicile. The elections took place on
December 13 between 11 a.m. and 5 p.m. at
124 voting stations, of which 20 were in public
places (schools, foreign integration centres,
communal locales) and 104 in mosques. These
latter were chosen from amongst all mosques
in the county by drawing lots. The electoral
process in the Muslim communities was a first
not only for Belgium, but for all of Europe as
well. Many countries followed the process with
great interest. 
The election results were validated on 6 Jan-
uary 1999. The first co-optation took place in
the second week of January. Elected members
and the first co-opted group came together for
the first time on Friday, January 15. They pro-
ceeded to co-opting 7 additional persons. 
The members that fulfilled the diploma and
language requirements were asked whether
they wished to take part in the Religious Group
Leader Organ. The names of those who
responded affirmatively are to be presented to
the Ministry of Justice. Though the Minister
does not have the right to designate the repre-
sentatives of religious groups, he can nonethe-
less reserve the right to refuse certain candida-
tures for reasons of public security. 
Despite the fact that candidates were
informed of this step in the process ahead of
time, it still risks being the most delicate part of
the process. Amongst the names accepted by
the Minister, each community group is to
choose its representatives for the Religious
Group Leader Organ. Should a community
group not come to an agreement, the grand
assembly will intervene. If the entire process
runs smoothly, the Religious Group Leader
Organ will be, in theory, instituted by the end
of February at the latest. ♦
… continued from previous page 
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Aysha Parla, doctoral candidate in Anthropology at
New York University interviews Lila Abu-Lughod, Pro-
fessor of Anthropology and Middle East Studies at New
York University, USA.
F e m i n i s m ,
N a t i o n a l i s m ,
M o d e r n i t yA.P. — Beginning withthe 1980s, we observe a
proliferation of writing on
women in various parts of
the Middle East (and also
South Asia), in particular
on the ways women have






How would you locate
your edited volume on
Remaking Women:
Feminism and Modernity
in the Middle East,
recently published by
Princeton University Press,
with respect to this body
of literature?
L.A. — There is no doubt that books like Deniz
Kandiyoti’s edited collection, Women, Islam and
the State, that insisted that women in the Middle
East must be studied not in terms of an undiffer-
entiated ‘Islam’ or Islamic culture but rather
through the differing political projects of nation-
states, with their distinct histories, relationships
to colonialism and the West, class politics, ideo-
logical uses of an Islamic idiom, and struggles
over the role of Islamic law in state legal appara-
tuses, paved the way for Remaking Women.
But this ground-breaking work, published in
1991, was only a beginning. Some of what
Kandiyoti’s volume could not do was accom-
plished by several books published in the past
few years that paid special attention to the cru-
cial moment of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries when the terms of the
debates about ‘women’s emancipation’ were set
and when, it might be said, ‘the history of the
present’ regarding feminism and its possibilities
in the Middle East was made. These books made
extensive use of the writings of Middle Eastern
women themselves to analyse the period in
question. The rediscovery of women’s writings
and the analysis of the active women’s press,
especially in turn-of-the-century Egypt, but also
in Iran and Ottoman Turkey, has enabled schol-
ars to shift their attention from the prominent
male reformers to the many women who were
active participants in the shaping of the new dis-
courses on women.
The work of these earlier scholars crystallized
for me, and for the contributors to Remaking
Women, a number of questions that needed to
be pursued. First and foremost were questions
about the politics of modernity. In particular, we
asked ourselves, how might new ideas and prac-
tices considered ‘modern’ and progressive,
implanted in Europe’s colonies or simply taken
up by emerging local elite, have ushered in not
only forms of emancipation but new forms of
social control? Second were questions about the
politics of East/West relations. How are we to
think about those discourses that borrowed
from Europe, were supported by Europeans, or
were shaped in response to colonial definitions
of the ‘backwardness’ of the East? Third were
questions about class that enter into both of
these, such as who became involved in debates
about ‘the woman question’ and what relation-
ship did their involvement have to consolidating
class projects and identities? Pursuing these
questions has led us to what I believe are some
very new interpretations of ‘feminist’ projects in
the Middle East.
A.P. — One of the critical terms that marks
the collection is ‘modernity.’ In your introduc-
tion, you urge a rethinking of the ways in which
discourses of the modern have been deployed
by various political groups at critical historical
moments. How do you understand/define
modernity, and through what sort of critical
lens do you view it, especially as it pertains to
gender, or to use that favourite phrase of
nationalist discourse, to the ‘woman question’?
L.A. — Some people have argued that it is
impossible to define modernity. Instead, we
should track the diverse ways the insistent
claims to being modern are made. One thing we
need to do to study ‘the woman question’ in the
Middle East is to explore how notions of moder-
nity have been produced and reproduced
through being opposed to the non-modern in
various dichotomies. Even more important,
however, is to ask how modernity, as a condi-
tion, might not be what it purports, or tells itself
– in the language of enlightenment and pro-
gress – it is.
This kind of critical rethinking of modernity
helps us reassess the projects of modernizing
Middle Eastern women that have characterized
this century. How best to become modern and
what role should be given to Islam and how
much of the West to emulate were certainly con-
tentious issues. But that something new was to
happen was not doubted. The rhetoric of
reformers and literate women themselves was
full of references to ‘the new’ – with calls for
‘women’s awakening’ and ‘the new woman’
reverberating through the magazines, books
and speeches of the era. We wanted to explore
how in various parts of the Middle East these
projects were conceived and promoted, in all
their complexity, contradictions, and unintend-
ed consequences, but with a critical eye for the
ways in which they might not only be liberatory.
A.P. — You seem to be asserting that there was
something distinct to modernity, that some-
thing(s) did change in quite fundamental ways.
In which sites, or which aspects of women’s lives
would you situate these transformations? 
L.A. — The calls for remaking women at the
turn of the century and into the first half of the
twentieth century included advocacy of both
women’s greater participation in the public
world – through education, unveiling, and polit-
ical participation – and women’s enormous
responsibility for the domestic sphere. National-
ism and visions of national development were
central to both arguments. While some scholars
have dismissed the cult of domesticity promot-
ed by writers in women’s journals as conserva-
tive and as a deplorable extension of women’s
traditional roles, we suggest that it depended on
a radical re-figuring of gender roles. In other
words, to be a wife and mother as these mod-
ernizers conceived of it was to be a very different
kind of subject than the wife and mother of
before. It was not insignificant that the ‘new’
wife and mother was now to be in charge of the
scientific management of the orderly household
of the modern nation, as well as the rearing and
training of the children who now were seen as
the future citizens of the modern nation.
This new vision of wifehood and motherhood
underwrote developments in the education of
women and intersected with nationalist aspira-
tions. Novel visions of child rearing and house-
hold management – and the prescriptive litera-
ture through which they were reiterated – not
only intersected with nationalist projects but
articulated the national struggle in terms of a
politics of modernity. Moreover, this new
domesticity worked to enforce a single bour-
geois norm, devaluing other forms of marriage
and family. The sources of these new visions of
women’s roles can be traced to Europe, whose
prescriptive literatures were being translated
and whose definitions of the modern deeply
affected the Middle Easterners’ images of them-
selves and their society.
What I think we have done that is most origi-
nal is to have critically analysed the ways that
these forms of modernization – the induction of
women into new domestic roles as ‘ministers of
the interior’, the professionalization of house-
wifery, the making scientific of child rearing, the
drafting into the nationalist project of producing
good sons, the organization into nuclear house-
holds governed by ideals of bourgeois marriage,
and even the involvement in new educational
institutions – may have initiated new coercive
norms and subjected women to new forms of
control and discipline, many self-imposed, even
as they undermined other forms of patriarchy.
A.P. — Given these new modes of subjection –
to the nation-state, to the nuclear family, to the
conjugal couple – secured through everyday
disciplinary regimes which train the body as
well as the mind, you are suspicious, then, of the
emancipatory claims of the projects of moderni-
ty. Do you see a danger, however, that this criti-
cal reassessment of modernity and its emanci-
patory claims, might veer dangerously close to a
yearning for a romanticized traditional past? 
L.A. — You are right to point out the dangers.
The tricky task in all this is how to be sceptical of
modernity’s progressive claims of emancipation
and critical of its social and cultural operations
and yet appreciate the forms of energy, possibil-
ity, even power that aspects of it might have
enabled, especially for women. How can one
question modernity without implying that one
longs nostalgically for some pre-modern forma-
tion? Feminist scholars feel this dilemma acutely
because they cannot ignore the fact that gen-
dered power has taken and can take many
forms.
We try in Remaking Women to assess the
impact for women of the kinds of modernizing
projects and discourses that marked the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries in the Middle
East, being aware of the ways these projects, as
Afsaneh Najmabadi puts it, might have been
simultaneously regulatory and emancipatory.
For example, the ‘discourse of domesticity’ in
Iran seems to have provided the very grounds
from which the male domain of modern educa-
tion could be opened up, and with it women’s
movement into public life and national recogni-
tion. Later, women could use notions of serving
the State to claim higher education and profes-
sions. In Egypt, as Marilyn Booth points out, the
prescriptive biographies of famous women that
appeared in the Arab press in the first decades of
this century seem to have been both constrictive
and expansive for women’s lives. In sharpening
the distinction between the public and private
realms, writers of the era could now problema-
tize women’s absence from the public (and thus
encourage them to enter it) while enforcing new
norms of the private, now elaborated as a
unique and busy domain in which women
should exert themselves. 
A.P. — The implicit term prowling around the
already vexed relationship between modernity
and feminism, is, as you stress, the West. In
nationalist discourses of modernization, we wit-
ness over and over women’s central role simul-
taneously as the representatives of civilization
and progress, and as the bearers of the so-called
unique, authentic, traditional values that distin-
guish the nation from those aspects of the West
seen as corrupting, such as sexual license, excess
individualism. Similarly, you emphasize how
women’s issues have all too easily become the
grounds on which battles over cultural authen-
ticity are waged. What does this mean for the
place of feminism within postcolonial politics? 
L.A. — You’ve put your finger on the most
troubling question for scholars and activists
alike: the relationship between modernity and
the West. In colonial or semi-colonial contexts,
the distinction between modernity and tradition
(with its correlate, backwardness) had a particu-
larly active life because it was paired with that
between the West and the non-West.
It is difficult for anyone thinking about ‘the
woman question’ today, as at the turn of the
century, to escape the language of accusations
and counteraccusations about cultural authen-
ticity. Are attempts to transform the condition of
women indigenous or foreign? We try in this
book to more calmly interrogate the genealogy
of feminism in the Middle East, working against
reified notions of separate cultures. To label
indigenous the feminism of women who had
strong ties to Europeans, not only in the lan-
guages in which they wrote, but their formative
influences, their interlocutors, and their liberal
ideas, risks passing over too quickly the conjunc-
tures between the projects of Europeans and
Middle Easterners and the actual role of Euro-
pean discourses in Middle Eastern ones, often
mediated, as I said earlier, through the projects
of modernity.
But to ignore the differences in local femi-
nisms and projects to reform women is just as
misleading. For example, being framed within
an Islamic discourse and argued with some of its
tools (of reference to the Qur'an, etc.) subtly
transformed translated discourses, such as those
on motherhood and housewifery. Translations
always involved rewritings of the original Euro-
pean texts or framing by commentaries that
drew from the texts different meanings. Western
cultural forms and ideas were appropriated
selectively, often piecemeal. In the Egyptian
case, Omnia Shakry shows that European mod-
ern notions of child rearing were aligned with
Islamic notions of bodily discipline. Even ‘Islam’
has no doubt been transformed by being made
the object of derision by missionaries, the sign of
barbarism by the Europeans, and, in response,
both the banner of authenticity for those oppos-
ing domination and the framework in which
debates about society and women have come to
take place. 
One of the most productive lines of thought
made possible by Edward Said’s Orientalism,
which re-framed world history as a global phe-
nomenon, was that the division between East
and West had to be understood not as a natural
geographic or cultural fact but a product of the
historical encounter of imperialism. Following
this lead, we argue that condemning ‘feminism’
as an inauthentic Western import is just as inac-
curate as celebrating it as a local or indigenous
project. The first position assumes such a thing
as cultural purity; the second underestimates
the formative power of colonialism in the devel-
opment of the Middle East. ♦
This is an adapted version from an interview
published in the Turkish journal, Cogito 1 6 ,
F a l l1 9 9 8 .
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Mass Culture and Modernism in Egypt began as my dis-
sertation research. My plan was to write about concepts
of the person in Egypt, and one of my sources was to be
media, though this was not necessarily to be the prima-
ry focus of the research. At the outset, my plans were
quite flexible. I was interested in the relation of local




My potential sources were eclectic. For
example, I had hoped to incorporate a histori-
cal perspective through looking at late
Ottoman-period Turkish-language manu-
scripts. In particular, I wanted to search for
texts that made use of terms of appellation
comparable to (or contrasting with) contem-
porary terms like ibn al-balad – literally ‘son of
the country’, though the exact referent can
change according to context, evoking various
shades of locality in one situation, class distinc-
tions in another, and national identity in still
others. Sawsan el-Messiri, the anthropologist
who originally analysed the term in the con-
text of modern Egyptian identity, suggested
that the term was not frozen, and had taken on
a range of contemporary meanings in relative-
ly recent historical memory. I had hoped to
elaborate on her observation.
As often happens, once the research began, I
changed my focus. Mediated culture is an
inescapable part of contemporary Egypt, and
yet writing on it was, and remains, astonishing-
ly thin. The idea of trying to augment anthro-
pological research through archival sources
began to seem absurd in the face of the mas-
sive quantities of mediated material that were
all around me. These materials were, of course,
meaningful in various ways to my steadily
expanding circle of informants and friends. But
they were also characterized by historical
depth, albeit not as great a depth as I had once
hoped to explore through archival documents.
In the end, my ethnographic material ranged
from 1930s popular magazines and cinema to
college students of the 1990s.
By default, the only modern medium that has
really mattered in the study of Middle Eastern
societies has been print. Not print as a medium
of mass communication, but print simply as the
vehicle for ideas that could be translated fairly
unproblematically. Given the narrow range of
Western academic interest in the Middle East
(and to a great extent in all non-Western cul-
tures), it has proven exceedingly difficult to
think of Egypt as a modern society closely tied
to the experience of mediated communication.
The media in question are certainly not only, or
necessarily even primarily, those that utilize
print. Nonetheless the study of media in Egypt
and the Arabic-speaking world has remained
shackled by an academic division of labour that
creates an implicit cultural divide. This is a vari-
ant of the sort of high/low cultural divides that
have developed in the United States and
Europe. In Middle East Studies, research and
publishing agendas define low culture as pre-
modern or ‘folkloric’, and high culture as liter-
ate and book-bound. The metagenres of Egypt-
ian popular culture and broad media discours-
es on modernity employ a language of dichoto-
my – folk culture/high culture, traditional/mod-
ern, religious/secular, etc. But in the mass-
mediated popular culture of Egypt and many
other colonial and postcolonial societies, the
purpose of such discourses has not been to
reinforce cultural dichotomies. Rather it is to
transcend them, or at least to create a hybrid
form of modernity, conceptually linked to the
local past, but fully conversant with imported
technique. 
Such binarisms have, of course, been fiercely
criticized in American academia during the past
two decades. The effect of such critiques has
been to slowly recast research agendas, but also
to facilitate an overall decrease in the institu-
tional status of Middle East-oriented scholar-
ship. There are many reasons for this, and cer-
tainly there are exceptions to the obsessive
American preoccupation with characterizing
the Middle East as a place sharply divided
between pre-modern and ‘westernized’ ele-
ments – in other words as a place with no real
modernity of its own. In short, at precisely the
time when intellectual critiques of Middle East-
ern Studies and Orientalism might have led to
more effective and less rigidly channelled stud-
ies of the region, the American political and cul-
tural establishment invested heavily in promot-
ing an image of the Middle East as a threatening
cultural opposite, particularly with the demise
of the Soviet Union. I would argue that most
new PhD’s of the past two decades have been
out of sync with the campaign of disinformation
promoted by the American media and govern-
ment. Hence there has been a steadily decreas-
ing market for Middle East specialization within
American academia. The mainstream of new
Middle Eastern scholarship was reduced to a
trickle. Consequently the capacity to explore
such topics as the role of mass media in con-
structing modern culture is far less than it would
have been if the demand for Middle Eastern
specialization had been even a tenth as great as
the demand for specialization in Latin America,
Asia, and Africa. Political and economic interests
in those areas have led to vastly greater institu-
tional investment in the United States. 
Research agendas, if not the institutional
prestige of Middle East specialists, are changing.
However, new research agendas are not neces-
sarily leading to a more comprehensive consid-
eration of the sorts of media I wrote about in
Mass Culture and Modernism. This is because the
impetus for the study of media in the Arab
world stems from a growing concern for the
transnational effects of ‘new media’ – the inter-
net, fax, and satellite television. Interest in such
phenomena is perfectly understandable up to a
point. Computers and digital technology are
changing the world; Egypt and the Arabic-
speaking world are undeniably caught up in
these changes. However, I believe that to focus
on new media without relating them to the
effects and constructed meanings of older
media is short-sighted, and leads to a deceptive
emphasis on globalization, and the hope (or, for
some, the spectre) of a world without borders. 
Globalization rhetoric is not innocent of poli-
tics. It tends to obscure relations of power
between a metropolitan centre (Europe, the
United States, parts of Asia), and a formerly col-
onized periphery. Flows of culture, people, and
capital are in fact still structured in favour of the
metropolis, despite popular and academic
assertions to the contrary. ‘The global con-
structs the local’ has become a mantra of Amer-
ican academia, but ‘the global’ almost always
privileges the activities of an Europhone elite.
The ‘new media’ most amenable to globaliza-
tion rhetoric – the internet and satellite televi-
sion – were largely still on the horizon in Egypt
when I did the fieldwork upon which Mass Cul-
ture and Modernism is based. They have since
become far more prominent. But I do not
believe the analysis of new media can be ade-
quately done without due consideration for the
effects of media that do not easily fit the ‘glob-
alization’ mantra.
An emphasis on globalization built through
the effects of new media is deceptive because
new media never eliminate old media. What
actually happens in every case is that new
media augment the old. The internet, the
newest of the new media, is a metaphor for the
way all media work in that it links texts often in
non-linear relationships. Songs on cassette,
films, celebrities, poetry, magazine imagery,
books, and television are intertextual by nature.
Communication itself is intertextual. To put it
simply, the ability to link diverse texts in individ-
ualized networks happens apart from the inter-
net. 
The intertextuality of media – old as well as
new – was an essential part of Mass Culture and
Modernism. Often the ‘content’ of media is
inseparable from its deployment in the social
networks of everyday life. For example, Muham-
mad Abd al-Wahhab, the great singer and com-
poser who died while I was doing my fieldwork,
was a historical figure, but also a contemporary
social reference point in 1991 for young people
who felt compelled to justify their own tastes in
music through him. I found that Ahmad
Adawiyya, a singer of the younger generation,
and for many a controversial figure of dubious
taste, was linked in conversation to Abd al-Wah-
hab, a popular figure of an earlier era who, by
the time of his death, was an icon of highbrow
sensibilities. The two were not necessarily
linked as similar figures – depending on one’s
attitude toward Adawiyya, the association
might well be one of contrast rather than of sim-
ilarity. But there was no question that Adawiyya
made more sense in a network of intertextual
references – to Abd al-Wahhab and to many
others from many different historical periods –
than he would have as a phenomenon relevant
only to class and generational segments in
1 9 9 1 .
The rise of Adawiyya certainly is tied to the
transnational processes that occupy the atten-
tion of American social science. He is a per-
former emblematic of the age of portable music
– of a decentralized system of production in
which cheap and easily pirated cassette record-
ings prevent the sort of market domination that
Abd al-Wahhab built through the gramophone,
cinema, and national radio broadcasts. And
Adawiyya is also representative of a crisis of
confidence in the institutional success of mod-
ernist and nationalist projects – a crisis of confi-
dence that has contributed to the rise of the
Islamist movement. This too is consonant with
the globalist rhetoric of the moment. But it is
also true that much of what makes Adawiyya
meaningful in contemporary Egypt takes place
well below the radar of the English-oriented
transnational ‘new media’ that will very likely
attract a growing share of scholarly attention in
coming years.
The crisis of confidence in modernist and
nationalist discourses of the older generations
that Mass Culture and Modernism c h a r a c t e r i z e s
as having occurred since the 1970s is not a
negation of modernity itself. My basic assump-
tion in researching and writing the book was
that modernity must be thought of as a plural
process rather than as something that radiated
from Europe. Despite the egregious underem-
phasis by Western scholars on Egyptian mass-
mediated culture, throughout the twentieth
century it has been a key factor in creating
modernity in Egypt. I am confident that this
omission will be corrected – that studies of
mass culture and modernity in Egypt and the
Arabic-speaking world will flourish in the near
future. ♦
Walter Armbrust is Visiting Assistant Professor,
Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown
University, USA.
E-mail: armbrusw@gusun.georgetown.edu
An icon of his
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for Muhammad
Abd al-Wahhab’s
film Yaum Saci d
(Happy Day, 1940).
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centralized media
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According to classical Western social theory, the institu-
tions, networks, and projects of civil society operate in a
pluralistic, continuously contested public civic realm.
Distinct from either the government’s coercive bureau-
cratic functions or profit-seeking private businesses,
often conceptualized as a buffer between states and
households, civil society represents a third, non-gov-
ernmental, non-profit, voluntary sector of modern soci-
ety. Viewed differently, the civic realm is a zone where
culture interacts with politics and economics. Recent
research shows that rates of civic activism – of joining,
communicating, demonstrating, donating, organizing,
and participating in events and projects that affect com-
munity services, public opinion, and national politics –
vary across countries and across time. The question is
whether cultural ‘traditions’ explain why the civic
sphere is more vibrant in some places and periods than
o t h e r s .
Researching Civic
A c t i v i s m
in the Arab World
It is important to distinguish a moral econo-
my or ‘primordial civic realm’ from modern
civil society. Historically, Middle Eastern com-
munities provided themselves with collective
water supplies, dispute management, school-
ing, way-stations, market-places, sanitation,
policing and other municipal or community
services through mechanisms including waqf,
zakat, sadaqah, tacawun, guild, tribal or ad hoc
initiatives. Although states forever strove to
centralize legal practice, religious tithes, and
private bequests, individual and collective pro-
jects reflecting a mix of Muslim piety, political
competition, and economic rationality were a
centripetal force. In the case of Yemen, philan-
thropic and community mechanisms for fund-
ing and maintaining collective goods, ground-
ed in a pre-capitalist social formation, gave
towns and regions relative autonomy from
imams and sultans. Religious endowments
(waqf) supported independent seminaries
where scholars and judges were at least some-
times free to contradict ‘official’ versions of
sharia by, for instance, writing rationales for
spending zakat (religious tithes) on local pro-
jects (tribal, artisan, and Jewish communities
also marshalled a meagre surplus for essential
services). It is also important not to romanti-
cize what was a zone for contestation of the
allocation of very scarce resources. 
Times change, and with them the parame-
ters for civic projects. Almost everywhere in
the Middle East, governments have captured
endowments, zakat, and education, offering in
return public-sector sanitation and infrastruc-
ture. Currently there is a veritable explosion in
numbers of Arab NGOs, formal organizations
that register with the government as non-prof-
it fund-raising bodies. Nowhere in the Arab
world (if anywhere), however, has the expan-
sion of civic space been a V-shaped opening,
smooth and regular. With the waxing and wan-
ing of economic fortunes and with greater or
lesser government success in co-opting
autonomous initiatives, exigencies and outlets
change. My research on twentieth-century
Yemen documents three quite distinct periods
of civic animation. In the modern enclave of
late-colonial Aden, class-based labour syndi-
cates and merchant’s associations filled expan-
sive public spaces both physically and
metaphorically – the streets, salons, schools,
publications, legal loopholes, and access to
Yemeni and British public opinion. A second
efflorescence of civic activity, the Yemeni self-
help (tacawun) movement, peaked in the
1970s when recycled migrants’ remittances
financed country roads, primary schools,
mechanized water retrieval, and the first elec-
trical generators in many cities, towns, and vil-
lages. Activism in the ’90s has been character-
ized, on the one hand, by unprecedentted
overt partisanship, formal political organizing,
publishing, and holding of public events; and,
on the other, by significant growth of the char-
itable voluntary sector whose projects include
emergency relief, welfare programmes, health
clinics, informal and parochial education. The
sudden, rapid expansion of political space
after unification and its constriction after 1994,
together with deepening economic crisis
prompted particular responses from various
segments of urban and rural society. Different
movements have been reactionary or progres-
sive, resisting or inviting commercial markets
and/or central political authority. Civic
activism tends, then, to be episodic, oppor-
tunistic, and contingent, as people act on con-
crete local circumstances. 
If culture is a constant, it cannot explain such
wide discrepancies. Of course activism is
expressed in Arabic, with ample references to
local, Yemeni, or Islamic tradition. Yet what an
array of ‘traditions’ to choose from – a trea-
sure-chest of symbols, customs, and sayings
for special occasions. Whereas in an era of
road-building, ranchers adapted tribal auto-
taxation mechanisms to hire bulldozers, in
other times tribes resort to roadblocks to hold
the antagonistic state at bay. ‘Declarations of
public opinion’ issued by conferences and
available on newsstands mix republican, tribal,
sharia, Greek, socialist, historical, and interna-
tionalist phrases and concepts in a real, literal
contest of public discourses. In lieu of old
forms of social capital formation, charitable
donations are solicited in the name of a ‘new
tradition’, the formalized jamaciyya khayriyya,
or welfare society, as distinctly modern as com-
mercial Islamic banks. 
Looking at civil society as a series of projects
or initiatives rather than a collection of ‘civil
societies’ has methodological implications.
First, studying civic activism is at least partly an
archaeological venture of digging around
architectural sites and unearthing documents.
Who built the mosques, schools, public spaces,
clinics, and clubs? How are they used? Main-
tained? What is the documentation, and how
or where is it published or preserved? What, in
other words, is the output of civic activism,
what material traces are left?
Secondly, we can read texts and public dis-
plays. In contemporary Yemen the plethora of
newspapers, tabloids, and pamphlets reflect a
wide range of opinion and constant competi-
tion between the government, political par-
ties, and others for the hearts and minds of an
ever-growing reading public. One can fill
weekly calendars with seminars, conferences,
and meetings, or attending court trials and
town council sessions – all scripted scenes
open to observation, participation, and con-
tention. Publications and events document
dominant and dissident discourses, positions,
and projects. Legal defence of newspapers
Dr Sheila Carapico, Department of Political Science,
University of Richmond, USA.
against allegations by the press prosecutor’s
office is a drama acted out in the press, the
courts, in journalists’ and attorneys’ syndi-
cates, and in human rights organizations. 
One case study of tribesmen building roads
or activists defying censorship is interesting; in
the aggregate, such acts can transform materi-
al and political conditions. Thirdly, then, the
study of political culture requires comparative
use of ethnography, close reading of first-hand
accounts by anthropologists, development
consultants, human rights monitors, and other
outside ‘participant observers’ as well as
‘native’ reports. Mapped geographically and
arranged chronologically, case studies help
show how and why rates of activism vary from
one place or season to the next.
Research in Arabic for publication in Euro-
pean languages is partly a translation exercise.
Decisions about what to transliterate or abbre-
viate are crucial: should one render jamaci y y a
khayriyya as such, or as a welfare society, or as
an NGO? Nowadays there is often the further
choice of accepting a given English version of
an Arabic name and correcting its spelling or
wording. In addition to the important question
of what to call things, however, is a further
issue of the unit of analysis. It is one thing to
research non-governmental organizations and
quite another to document clusters of activity
within spheres such as education, social wel-
fare, legal practice, or publishing that may be
nationalized, secularized, privatized, or rein-
vented depending on national politics and
economic circumstances. Current conditions in
Arab countries are hardly conducive to wide-
spread formal political participation, but we
may nonetheless discover ways in which civil
society constitutes a buffer against authoritari-
anism and deprivation. ♦
The 1998
P r i n c e
C l a u s
A w a r d s
The Netherlands' Prince Claus Fund for
Culture and Development granted its
Prince Claus Awards to 16 artists and
inellectuals who have demonstrated
exceptional creativity, courage, and
commitment in their work in the do-
mains of culture and development. The
1998 winners have proven the capacity
to bring about fortuitous change in
their surrounding environments and
thus deserve the recognition and
encouragement given by the awards,
which are a means to make the other-
wise little-known efforts of these indi-
viduals recognised world-wide. 
The Prince Claus Fund, in addition to the awards,
offers funding, produces publications, stimulates
world-wide cultural debate, and supports activities
and initiatives which emphasize innovation and
experimentation. 
The Principal 1998 Prince Claus Award was
awarded to the Art of African Fashion represented
by three leading figures in that field: Alphadi
(Niger); Oumou Sy (Senegal), and Tetteh Adzedu
(Ghana). Thirteen other Prince Claus Awards were
presented to individuals from the world over.
Three of these merit special mention here:
Redza Piyadesa 
Redza Piyadasa (1939, Kuantan, Malaysia) devotes
himself both to the practice and to the theory of art.
During the sixties and seventies he filled a serious
vacuum, at a time when there was scarcely any
debate on the subject of art history or art criticism
in his country. Partly due to his persistent efforts,
the situation is now quite different.  In his many
publications, both in English and in Malay, in his
countless articles in the Malay press and also in his
work as an artist, he examines the contexts of art
and their significance for the construction of artistic
traditions and artistic values. His interest is centred
on modern Asian art, which he places in relation to
traditional Asian art forms and Western contempo-
rary art. Piyadasa's art, such as the collage-like
'Malaysian Series', which he has been working on
since 1980, and his art criticism are his answer to
neo-nationalistic, Islamic, and globalization cur-
rents in Malaysia, which have threatened to margin-
alize minority groups and alternatives.
Nazek Saba Yareb
Nazed Saba Yareb (1928, Jerusalem, now based
in Beirut, Lebanon) is an academic, literary critic,
essayist, novelist and human rights activist. She is
concerned in human relations, seeking to stimulate
a better understanding of other people and other
societies. Her literary and academic work reflect
this concern. Culture and art are essential in the
rebuilding of a country emerging from a terrible
civil war (1975 - 1992). It is in this light that one
should see Nazek Saba Yareb's commitment to the
Baalbeck Festival in Lebanon, which reopened in
1997. She works wholeheartedly and with unflag-
ging energy in order to help her country regain its
place on the international cultural map. The
themes in her works include: women's issues, mar-
riage, religious fanatacism, minority identities.
Through communication between people and cul-
tures, Yareb has stretched out her arms and creat-
ed new perspectives for Lebanese culture, a new
vision for the future of its people.
Rakshan Bani-Etemad
Rakshan Bani-Etemad (1954, Tehran, Iran) was
one of the first women to make films after the Iran-
ian Revolution of 1979. She is now the foremost
female director in her country, enjoying both
national and international renown. Bani-Etemad
extends the boundaries of officially permitted
imagination. Her work appeals to women in her
own country and beyond, subtly researching and
presenting womanhood and moving people's
hearts and minds. While never alienating the main-
stream audience, her films have a distinctly female
perspective, a strong sympathy for the feminist
cause and a preoccupation with female sensibility
and the role of women in love and society. But
Bani-Etemad does not want to be called a feminist,
since she fears being confined by ideology. She is
first an artis, and she needs the freedom to explore
and explain positions that may not be placed high
on the feminist agenda. The result is a true change
of attitude through art. ♦
For further information on the 1998 laureates,
p l e a s e consult Prince Claus Awards, p u b l i s h e d
b yt h e Prince Clause Fund, The Hague, 1998.
URL: www.princeclausfund.nl
E-mail: prclausf@wxs.nl
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Re sea rc h a pp r o ac hes
R I C H AR D  C .  M A R TI N
Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, many of us
in Islamic Studies have found ourselves being asked
repeatedly by reporters, students, and even university
colleagues to explain and interpret Islamic fundamen-
talism. Certain assumptions often surface in public dis-
cussions of Islam. For example, many reporters (and
many of my students and colleagues) believe that Islam
is an intrinsically violent religion. Another assumption
I often encounter is the view that orthodox Muslims
(Sunni and Shici) are medieval, irrational, anti-modern,
and dangerously anti-Western intellectually.
Getting Beyond
F u n d a m e n t a l i s m
in Islamic Studies
It is this modern public perception of Islam
that induced Mark R. Woodward and myself to
write, with Dwi. S. Atmaja, Defenders of Reason
in Islam: Muctazilism from Medieval School to
Modern Symbol (Oxford: Oneworld, 1997) xv +
251 pages including a glossary, bibliography
and index. The following three paragraphs,
adapted from the Introduction, entitled ‘A Tale
of Two Texts’, explain our project.
‘In the late 1970s, the Indonesian Modernist
theologian Harun Nasution published a pam-
phlet in defense of a Medieval Muslim “rational-
ist” theological school known as the Muct a z i l a .1
This was somewhat unusual. Although Muc-
tazili theology is discussed, sometimes posi-
tively, by modern Muslim scholars, very few
have identified themselves with Muctazilism to
the extent that Nasution had. 2 After the heyday
of the school in the ninth and tenth centuries,
Muctazili dominance in theological discourse
(k a l a m) began to wane, giving way to more
centrist and populist discourses, such as those
of the Ashcari and Maturidi theologians
(m u t a k a l l i m u n), and the Hanbali, Hanafi, and
S h a f ici jurist consults (f u q u h a).’ 
‘Theological rationalism did not altogether
disappear in Islamic thought, however. Shici
theologians continued to dictate and comment
on medieval Muctazili texts as part of their
madrasa curriculum… With the emergence of
Islamic modernist thinking in the latter part of
the nineteenth century, however, Muct a z i l i
rationalism began to enjoy a revival of interest
among Sunni Muslim intellectuals. During this
past century, the discovery of several Muct a z i l i
manuscripts hibernating in Middle Eastern
libraries has led to an increase of scholarly
interest in Muctazili texts by both Western and
Muslim scholars…’ 
‘The current study is structured by two short
expositions of Muctazili doctrine, one dictated in
Arabic in Iran toward the end of the tenth centu-
ry C.E., and the other written, as we have indicat-
ed, by Harun Nasution in Bahasa Indonesia in the
late 1970s-. In addition to Nasution’s text, this
study also presents the original treatise at the
basis of the commentary, cAbd al-Jabbar’s Kitab
al-usul al-khamsa (Book on the five fundamen-
tals).3 These two texts, cAbd al-Jabbar’s original
treatise and Harun Nasution’s modernist com-
mentary form the two textual and historical foci
of this study.’ 
A premise of this study is that during the past
century very few books have been written about
Islam by scholars trained in history of religions or
comparative studies of religions. Most studies of
Islamic fundamentalism written by scholars in
the US, for example, have been written by Orien-
talists, political scientists, public policy special-
ists in government, or journalists. We wanted to
write about the importance of Islamic religious
thought today for each of these groups, but our
primary target was scholars and students of reli -
gion. It is important to note that in North Ameri-
ca there are some 900 departments of religion in
private colleges and public universities, and that
the study of Islam is still woefully underrepre-
sented in these departments. A large number of
departments still do not offer courses on Islam;
at best they may cross-list a course in anthropol-
ogy or political science or history by a Middle
East specialist in another discipline to teach
about the Islamic religion. 
In the Introduction, we try to locate the history
of Islamic theology in relation to the political
dimensions of Islamic and religious studies in
the past century. A section entitled ‘From the
Project of Orientalism to the Fundamentalism
Project’ argues that the Western textual study of
Islamic theological texts, and particularly the
rediscovery of a number of Muctazili texts in this
century in Yemen and elsewhere, has influenced
the direction of both of the modern study of
Islamic thought and Islamic thought itself.
Defenders of Reason in Islam challenges the main
theses of the Fundamentalism Project at the Uni-
versity of Chicago headed by Martin E. Marty and
R. Scott Appleby and the book by Bruce B.
Lawrence on the cultural sources of fundamen-
talism. Indeed, the title Defenders of Reason in
Islam was inspired by Lawrence’s 1989 work,
Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt
Against the Modern Age (San Francisco: Harper
and Row). Marty, Appleby and Lawrence have
argued that fundamentalism is primarily an ide-
ological reaction to modernity, and particularly
to modernism. Defenders of Reason argues that
so-called fundamentalism in modern Islamic
thought is not merely a reaction to modernism;
it is a contemporary species of the historically
rooted traditionalist reaction to rationalist ten-
dencies in Islamic thought that goes back at
least to the circle around Hasan al-Basri in the
early eighth century. Hence, the book tells the
story of Muctazilism and both the political and
theological reactions to it in Islamic history.
The rest of the Introduction has the task of
explaining the concepts of ‘rationalism’, ‘tradi-
tionalism’, and theology (cilm al-kalam) itself – all
of them multivalent terms – in scholarly dis-
course. The strategy is not to be comprehensive
and detailed, but rather to be schematic in order
to bring contrasting trends into relief. Historians
will easily be able to problematize the informa-
tion provided in defence of the main theses
when they look at particular thinkers and peri-
ods. Our purpose, however, was to find theolog-
ical patterns over what historian Fernand
Braudel has termed la longue durée, the larger
scope of trends over time. The pattern that dom-
inates this study is the long historical tension
between Muctazilites and Hanbalites/Ash carites,
rationalists and traditionalists, modernists and
Islamists. Interestingly, these two conflicting
trends were never mutually exclusive: some
Hanbalites were accused (accurately, in some
cases) of rationalism, and some Muctazilites
relied heavily on scriptural arguments. Nonethe-
less, we argue that Islamic orthodoxy (Sunni and
Shici) was always fluid and pluralistic. Muctazil-
ism and Hanbalism each enjoyed moments of
being at the centre of orthodox thinking in vari-
ous times and places, but for the most part they
formed on the margins and each tried to influ-
ence the orthodox centre. Since the Middle
Ages, Muctazilism has been more successful in
Shici Islam, Hanbalism and certainly Ashcarism in
Sunni Islam.
Defenders of Reason also claims that the strug-
gles going on within Islamic societies today have
to be seen as theological disputes that matter
deeply; they can not simply be reduced to social,
political, or economic causes, even though a par-
ticular political breakdown (fitna), for example,
may provide a context in which theological
arguments are reformulated and vivified. A
quote from Christian theologian Alister E.
McGrath, citing German sociologist of religion
Niklas Luhmann, summarizes the book’s con-
cept of the social origins of theology: ‘[D]octrine
arises in response to religious identity, which
may be occasioned socially (through encounters
with other religious systems) and temporally
(through increasing chronological distance from
its historical origins and sources of revelation)…
Doctrine is thus linked with the affirmation of
the need for certain identity-giving parameters
for the community, providing theological justifi-
cation for its continued existence.’ 4 Theology, or
cilm al-kalam, then, is a function of what ethnol-
ogist Fredrik Barth calls ‘boundary formation’
and ‘boundary maintenance’. It is the language
by which members of a group reach an agree-
ment and thus a self-identity (madhhab), which
is fortified by a corresponding notion of the
other – those who are outside the community.
The poetics and social uses of that language,
theological discourse, as well as its social con-
texts, constitute data the scholar must take seri-
ously.
The first two parts of the book present transla-
tions, textual analyses, and historical expositions
of the two texts, cAbd al Jabbar’s eleventh-cen-
tury Kitab al-usul al-khamsa and Nasution’s
twentieth-century Kaum Muctazilah dan Pandan-
gan Rasionalanya . A chapter in Part II, ‘The Per-
sistence of Traditionalism and Rationalism’, sum-
marizes the history of this theological tension
from the waning Muctazili influence in the Seljuq
Age (eleventh and twelfth centuries) through
the fourteenth-century revival of traditionalism
of Ibn Taymiyya, down to the modernism of
Muhammad cAbduh and its influences in South-
east Asia. In Part III, entitled ‘Muctazilism and
(Post)Modernity’, we look at traces of Muctazil-
ism in the work of contemporary thinkers whose
writings are available to our readers in European
languages: Fazlur Rahman, Mohammed Arkoun,
Fatima Mernissi, and Hasan Hanafi. In the final
chapter, ‘The Implications of Modernity: Decon-
structing the Argument’, the bracketed question
of the relation of modernity/modernism to fun-
damentalism closes the book. 
The final discussion within that chapter is on
‘Other People’s Texts’. The post-Enlightenment
critical study of religious texts was rooted in
nineteenth-century textual and historical criti-
cism, mainly by Protestant scholars examining
the Old and New Testaments – the texts of
their own faith tradition. The reaction within
Christianity to critical biblical scholarship is
well known and still at play. The same century
saw the beginnings of sustained Western
research by some of the same Protestant schol-
ars on the ‘Sacred Books of the East’, including
the Islamic textual tradition. Orientalism and
R e l i g i o n s w i s s e n s c h a f t have dealt with other
people’s texts, thus crossing certain bound-
aries that had been unmarked earlier in post-
Enlightenment modern scholarship. During
the second half of the twentieth century in par-
ticular, those boundaries have become more
clearly marked. That is the problem with which
Defenders of Reason in Islam ends. It is the prob-
lem raised by a recent controversial article,
‘What is the Koran?’, in the popular American
magazine Atlantic Monthly.5 It is a problem that
defenders of reason and of other warrants in
religious studies – Muslim, Christian, Buddhist
and non-religious – shall have to negotiate at
the boundaries of scholarly and religious
domains in the public marketplace. ♦
Richard C. Martin is Professor and Chair of
t h e Department of Religion, Emory University, USA.
E-mail: rcmartin@emory.edu
N o t e s
1. Kaum Muctazilah dan Pandangan Rasionalnya
‘ T h eM uctazila and Rational Philosophy’.
2. Regretfully, Nasution died in the early fall of 1998.
3. I based the translation on the edition of the Arabic
text prepared by Daniel Gimaret,
‘ L e s U s u la l-H a m s a du Qadi cAbd al-Jabbaret
L e u r sC o m m e n t a i r e s , ’
Annales Islamologiques 1 5( 1 9 7 9 ) .
4. Quoted in Defenders of Reason, 17, from Alister
E . McGrath, The Genesis of Doctrine: A Study in
t h e Foundations of Doctrinal Criticism ( O x f o r d :
Blackwell, 1990), 38.
5. Toby Lester, ‘What is the Koran?’,
A t l a n t i cM o n t h l y 283/1 (January 1999): 43-56.
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C i t i z e n s h i p
S A M I N A  Y A S M E E N
The debates surrounding the theory and practice of cit-
izenship have gained increased prominence in the last
decade. They have been partially prompted by an in-
creasing awareness of the role played by the civil soci-
ety and its relationship to state apparatus. But the
emergence of cross-border migration as a major feature
of the post-Cold War era has also aided this phenome-
non. 
W o m e n
as Citizens
in Australia
With a large number of individuals and
groups migrating across the globe due to a
variety of political, economic and social rea-
sons, issues have emerged surrounding the
rights and responsibilities of citizens, natives
and denizens. That analysts are grappling with
the effects of these changes is apparent in the
publication of a number of good books on citi-
zenship in the last ten years. Will Kymlicka, for
instance, has delved into the question of multi-
cultural citizenship, whereas Thomas Janoski
has investigated the linkages between civil
society and citizenship.1
The project on ‘Women and Citizenship’ at
the University of Western Australia is attempt-
ing to contribute to this renewed investigation
into the theory and practice of citizenship,
placing a special emphasis on women. The
project, consisting in two distinct phases, has
been funded through a Large grant from the
Australian Research Council since 1995. Profes-
sor Trish Crawford and Dr Philippa Maddern of
the History Department, University of Western
Australia, directed the first phase, which lasted
from 1995-97. It focused on the theoretical
issues of citizenship and its implications for
women in Australia during the last century.
The second phase, currently being directed by
Dr Samina Yasmeen from the Department of
Political Science, University of Western Aus-
tralia, is concerned with assessing the views of
women from ethnically-diverse backgrounds
on being Australian citizens.
To this end, the methodology developed to
assess the settlement needs of Muslims in the
Perth metropolitan area has become a valu-
able tool for investigating attitudes towards
citizenship among women.2 Initiated in 1994,
the project relied heavily on detailed qualita-
tive interviews that enabled the respondents
to identify their most pressing settlement
needs and elaborate the reasons behind their
specific choices. It also encouraged Muslim
women to discuss their own specific needs
instead of articulating their views on the needs
of other Muslim women and men. The data
thus collected indicated significant differences
in the manner in which Muslim men and
women understood and articulated their set-
tlement needs and elaborated on their rela-
tionship to their adopted homeland, Australia.
While Muslim men focused on education and
employment as their most pressing needs,
their female counterparts treated their settle-
ment needs in an integrated and holistic man-
ner. For them, access to female health profes-
sionals, availability of halal food, and safety
were as important as the educational needs of
their children. Significantly, unlike men, who
were concerned about preserving the Islamic
identity of Muslims living in Australia, women
were more concerned about their day-to-day
living. This involved their concerns about the
acceptability of Muslim women who wore
h i j a b, obviously subscribing to a different dress
code. Cumulatively, the data collected indicat-
ed that Muslim men focused more on the eco-
nomic and political aspects of citizenship,
whereas Muslim women attached equal
importance to the psychological aspect of
being an Australian citizen. 
These ideas raised a number of questions of
linkages between religion, ethnicity, gender
and citizenship. Why do women migrate to lib-
eral democracies? How do they define their
identity? To what extent are their views influ-
enced by their experiences in their home coun-
tries? What role does religion play in formula-
tion and articulation of identity? How signifi-
cant is culture in determining women’s notion
of citizenship. The methodology used in the
project also indicated the value of in-depth
interviews in which women were encouraged
to voice their opinions on numerous issues
without the interference or presence of other
members of their family. The experience thus
gained has formed the basis for a large-scale
sociological survey to ascertain the views of
immigrant women on being Australian citi-
zens. A questionnaire has been developed
which consists in two parts. The quantitative
part deals with the demographic profile of the
respondents and uses indices that facilitate
placing the information gathered within the
larger Australian and Western Australian con-
text. The second part of the questionnaire is
essentially qualitative in nature. It is designed
to elicit the views of the interviewees on what
it means to be an Australian, and how they per-
ceive themselves in relation to other Aus-
tralians. The respondents are also asked to dis-
cuss their conceptions of their rights and
duties as Australian citizens and the extent to
which they are willing and able to act on the
basis of these conceptions. These data are
being used to assess linkages between migra-
tion, ethnicity, religion and citizenship among
Australian women.
With the exception of its native inhabitants,
the aborigines, Australians are essentially a
nation of migrants. While selecting a sample of
immigrant women, therefore, the project on
‘Women and Citizenship’ has chosen to assess
the views of Anglo-Celtic women as well as
those from other ethnic communities. The list
includes women from Afghanistan, China,
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Malaysia,
Pakistan, Palestine, Poland, Singapore, South
Africa, Taiwan, Thailand and the United King-
dom. The sample is not restricted to Muslim
women and includes representatives from all
major religious groups such as Baha'is, Chris-
tians, Hindus, Buddhists, and Sikhs. A number
of research associates are employed to inter-
view representatives from these communities.
They are also entrusted with the task of inter-
preting the data by using a qualitative data
analysis programme, Nu-Dist. 
The results of individual sub-projects will be
published as an edited volume. The prelimi-
nary results, however, have already led to a
number of interesting observations. To begin
with, a large majority of women interviewed
have immigrated to Australia as part of a fami-
ly unit. Irrespective of their socio-economic
background, most of the women interviewed
have not dealt with the question of citizenship
at a conceptual level. Hence, when asked to
define their identity with respect to ’a per-
ceived Australian identity’, they refer to the
experience of living in a space as the evidence
of their ‘Australian-ness’ rather than discussing
the legal rights and duties conferred upon
them as Australian citizens. Beyond the exis-
tential aspect of their citizenship, however, dif-
ferences do exist in the manner in which
women from different ethnic backgrounds
define their identity. An assumed, but not
clearly articulated, hierarchy of citizens seems
to exist. Those from Anglo-Celtic background,
including women who have migrated from
Britain, feel more accepted and acknowledged
than, for instance, women from Iran, Egypt and
even Italy. The level of belonging changes with
the duration of stay and is closely linked to the
socio-economic background of the respon-
dents. Interestingly, however, Afghan women
who migrated since the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan do not fit into this pattern. Aware
of the impossibility of returning to their home
country, these women demonstrate a distinct
ability and willingness to operate in both the
market and public spheres and ensure that the
state structures are aware of their specific
needs. They have achieved this in less than 20
years. In fact, these women also are different
from a large majority of other Muslim women
who shy away from participating in the politi-
cal and economic spheres. 
Equally interestingly, for some women the
legal act of being conferred citizenship is not
an essential prerequisite for feeling and being
an Australian. For instance, some Malaysian
and Indonesian women have lived in Australia
as permanent residents and chosen not to
forego their Malaysian and Indonesian citizen-
ship for economic and legal reasons. Neverthe-
less, their sense of belonging and willingness
to be active members of civil society have not
been compromised. ‘We feel homesick for Aus-
tralia when we are away in our home country’
is a remark heard from these women.
Culture appears to be the main area in which
women tend to distinguish themselves from
other fellow Australians. While acknowledging
that they are all Australians, most of the
women, including immigrants from England,
emphasize the differences between them-
selves and the ‘others’ in Australia. So domi-
nant is this emphasis on culture that some-
times it even ignores religious differences.
Women from Egypt and Iran, for instance, rely
more on their cultural identity than their reli-
gious identity to differentiate themselves from
the rest of the Australians. Similarly, women
from India and Pakistan acknowledge the reli-
gious and political differences between their
home countries, but often refer to the com-
mon cultural context in which they operate as
citizens in Australia. 
This is not to deny the role played by religion
in defining a respondent’s sense of identity.
Rather, the interviews suggest that the
women’s cultural identity incorporates their
religious identity and guides them in the
extent to, and the manner in, which they move
beyond the private sphere into market, public
and state spheres. Nor is it to suggest that reli-
gion is always subservient to cultural identity.
A number of Muslim women interviewed do
refer to themselves as, say, Pakistani, Afghan or
Iranian. But for some other women, Islam
emerges as the main defining feature of their
identity. Some of the Muslim women inter-
viewed, for instance, belong to such nascent
Muslim organizations as the Muslim Women’s
Support Group and the Sisters-in-Islam group.
Their social interactions are restricted to these
groups which also emerge as a main source of
information on Islam for these women. Both
these women and others who are not mem-
bers of associations tend to explain their atti-
tudes towards, and opinions on, social, eco-
nomic and political issues in terms of Islamic
teachings. Religious affiliation and ideas, how-
ever, also creates differences among these
women and their sense of identity. Some Mus-
lim women, for instance, regularly attend lun-
cheon seminar sessions organized at neutral
venues such as educational institutions or gov-
ernment support centres. Others insist on
gathering only in places that are clearly ‘Islam-
ic’ and unquestionably serve halal meals. To
put it differently, the data collected for Muslim
women through the ‘Women and Citizenship’
project builds on the knowledge acquired
through the project on ‘Gender-Based Assess-
ment of Settlement Needs of Muslims Living in
Perth Metropolitan Area’. It suggests that while
Islam plays a unifying role for Muslims living in
Western Australia, different interpretations of
Islamic teachings intermingled with cultural
differences can also contribute to divisions
among Muslim women. These different inter-
pretations can also form the matrix within
which Muslim women define their identity as
Australian citizens. ♦
For further information, please check our web-site.
This can be found by looking up ‘projects’ at
h t t p : / / w w w . a r t s . u w a . e d u . a u /
Dr Samina Yasmeen is Senior Lecturer in
International Relations, Department of Political
Science, University of Western Australia.
E-mail: syasmeen@cylenne.uwa.edu.au
N o t e s
1 . Will Kymlicka (1995), Multicultural Citizenship.
Oxford: Clarendon Press; Thomas Janoski (1998),
Citizenship and Civil Society. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. Other examples of
good works on citizenship include J.M.Barbelet
(1988), Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class
I n e q u a l i t y. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press; Bryan Turner (1993), Citizenship and Social
T h e o r y. Newbury Park, California: Sage; and
Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller (1993),
T h eA g e of Migration. New York: Guilford Press.
2 . Samina Yasmeen and Salma Al-Khudairi, Gender-
Based Assessment of Settlement Needs of Muslims
Living in Perth Metropolitan Area, Research Report
submitted to the Department of Immigration,
Government of Australia, Canberra, 1998.
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Gl ob a l Netw o rk s
S T E V E N  V E R T OV E C
Transnational Communities is a £3.8 million, five-year
research programme recently commissioned by the
British Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).
Through a range of commissioned projects, conferences
and publications, it aims to increase social scientific
understanding of the contemporary rise of various
kinds of long-distance social networks affecting both
local and large-scale economic patterns, international
migration, political movements and cultural inter-pene-





T r a n s n a t i o n a l
C o m m u n i t i e s
There are many historical precedents and
parallels to such networks. Yet today informa-
tion technologies – especially involving tele-
communications (telephone, faxes, e-mail and
the Internet) – serve to connect such networks
with increasing speed and efficiency. Transna-
tionalism describes a condition in which,
despite great distances and notwithstanding
the presence of international borders (and all
the laws, regulations and national images they
represent), many kinds of relationships have
been intensified and now take in real time in a
planet-spanning arena of activity.
Many different kinds of transnational com-
munities are gaining in power and signifi-
cance. The overseas Chinese, for example, are
estimated to have a national Gross Domestic
Product larger than China’s. Several countries,
such as Egypt, Pakistan, El Salvador and the
Philippines, are hugely dependent on the
remittances of their emigrants. Transnational
communities pool resources, distribute infor-
mation, mobilize politically, and exercise con-
siderable cultural influence across borders.
Contemporary transnational communities are
at once the products of, and catalysts for, glob-
alization. They also represent challenges to
many areas of foreign and domestic policy,
such as security, investment and trade, asylum,
immigration and multiculturalism.
Among the seventeen projects commis-
sioned within the ESRC Transnational Commu-
nities Programme, research concerns topics
such as: the role of exiles in post-conflict
reconstruction, the Russian diaspora and post-
Soviet economic restructuring, Japanese and
Korean corporations in Britain, immigrants and
dual citizenship, the indigenous people’s
movement, the place of broadcast media with-
in ethnic diasporas. One of the programme’s
flagship projects concerns global Islamic net-
works by way of Sufism.
Entitled ‘Ethnicity, politics and transnational
Islam: A study of an international Sufi order,’
the main aim of this project is to broaden our
understanding of how Islam functions across
boundaries of states, communities and ethnic
groups. The project leaders are: Prof. Jorgen S.
Nielsen of the Centre for the Study of Islam and
Christian-Muslim Relations, Selly Oak Colleges,
Birmingham; Dr Galina Yemelianova of the
Centre for Russian and East European Studies,
University of Birmingham; and Dr Martin
Stringer of the Department of Theology, Uni-
versity of Birmingham. 
While contemporary research attention on
Islam has concentrated on its political expres-
sions, the Sufi tradition continues to be impor-
tant for the majority of Muslims. Through a
hierarchical chain of adherence to the spiritual
leader, or s h a y k h, the Sufi orders (t a r i q a s) link
local communities across many different
regions. One of the more ubiquitous of such
contemporary t a r i q a s is that led by Shaykh
Nazim al-Qubrusi al-Haqqani. With roots in the
Ottoman Empire and especially in the Cauca-
sus, it now has centres in North America,
Britain and most of Western Europe, the Mid-
dle East and South and Southeast Asia. The
t a r i q a has had particular success in attracting
converts from outside Islam and among young
educated professionals in the Muslim world. 
Communications play a significant role in
maintaining the cohesion of this transnational
network and the t a r i q a makes extensive use of
all forms of media publication including a
notable presence on the Internet managed
from the US. Through fieldwork and a detailed
analysis of texts, the project aims to develop
an understanding of how, and with what
degree of success a form of Muslim organiza-
tion, which is central to traditional Islam, is
able to adjust to rapidly changing contempo-
rary environments, to establish the signifi-
cance of modern electronic communications
relative to more traditional media, and to
update and refine our knowledge of how Sufi
forms of Islam function locally and transna-
t i o n a l l y .
Dr Steven Vertovec is Research Reader in Social
Anthropology at the University of Oxford, UK,
a n d Director of the ESRC Research Programme
o n Transnational Communities.
E-m a i l :s t e v e n . v e r t o v e c @ a n t h r o p o l o g y . o x f o r d . a c . u k
For further information contact Anna Winton,
T e l . : +44/0 1865-274711; fax +44/0 1865-274718;
email: anna.winton@anthro.ox.ac.uk
The project will be based on ethnographic
and anthropological fieldwork running con-
currently in three locations. In parts of the
northern Caucasus, the t a r i q a exists in a more
or less traditional form, which is now relating
actively to the post-Soviet weakening of the
central state and general economic and politi-
cal instability. In Lebanon, the t a r i q a h a s
grown significantly in the years following the
end of the civil war and, with fast-growing
telecommunications links, could be seen as
being in a state of transition. In Britain, the
t a r i q a has a number of centres, some with a
mainly ethnic minority following, others with a
multi-ethnic composition including significant
numbers of converts. Texts in a variety of
media forms will also be gathered in the three
locations together with a regular survey and
recording of materials on the Internet. These
will be analysed in terms of content, audience
and the circumstances of their production and
in relation to the fieldwork results.
The interdisciplinary nature of such study of
religious organization is likely to raise a num-
ber of theoretical issues to do with the interac-
tion between ideas and organization and how
far a shared community can function with dif-
ferent discourses. The project will contribute
to a broadening of our understanding of con-
temporary transnational Islamic organizations
and thus assist policy makers, the media, and
agencies working with Muslim communities in
reaching better informed policies and prac-
t i c e s .
Other activities of the ESRC Transnational
Communities Programme include: a weekly
seminar series; annual conferences; and work-
shops organized within Britain and abroad,
bringing together academics and non-academic
users. A Working Paper Series has been estab-
lished in both hardcopy and internet-download-
able formats, and the programme is associated
with three academic book series. The Transna-
tional Communities Programme will also be sup-
porting a newsletter, an on-line world news
digest and an internet-searchable bibliography.
Information on the projects and all other aspects
of the research programme can be found on the
ESRC Transnational Communities Programme
website (http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk). ♦
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Euro p ea n Sci en ce Fo unda t i o n 
R AN DI  D E G U I L H E M
This past July, Istanbul’s Topkapi Palace welcomed the
second plenary gathering of the international research
programme, Individual and Society in the Mediterranean
Muslim World (ISMM), a European Science Foundation
(ESF) programme headquartered in Strasbourg. Initiated
and chaired by Robert Ilbert, professor at the University of
Provence and founder/director of the MMSH (Maison
Méditerranéenne des Sciences de l’Homme) in Aix-en-
Provence (France), ISMM represents a four-year (1996-99)
research programme whose major objective is to study
pre-defined aspects of the individual within the Mediter-
ranean Muslim context. 
Seeking the
I n d i v i d u a l
in the Mediterranean
Muslim World
The overall intellectual framework for the
research was initially articulated largely
around the ideas expressed by Norbert Elias,
among others, that the process of individua-
tion allowing a person to differentiate him or
herself from others, presupposes a certain lib-
erty in ideological, religious, political and eco-
nomic choice which only began to arise on a
large scale in the post-Gutenberg and Enlight-
enment era. Yet, this liberty of choice, which
purportedly made possible the prevalent
appearance of unique individuals, was simulta-
neously tempered by unconscious and con-
scious communal, societal and political influ-
ences exerted upon the individual. Taking this
supposition as its theoretical point of depar-
ture, the programme founders and partici-
pants theorized whether the process of indi-
viduation in the Mediterranean Muslim milieu
is comparable to that of the European experi-
ence. Despite the oft-repeated concept in the
West that the very essence of Islam personifies
a unified community of humans intimately and
inextricably associated with one another in the
pursuit of religiously oriented objectives,
research in this programme (and elsewhere) as
based upon the abundant and highly diverse
primary sources dating from the early cen-
turies of Islam to the present day, has shown
that throughout its more than fourteen cen-
turies of existence, the Islamic world has fos-
tered a society of differentiated individuals
who pursue their own personal itineraries as
well as taking part in their immediate and larg-
er environments. In order to uncover and
define the individual in the Mediterranean
Muslim context, not only mainstream mem-
bers of society – men, women and children
alike – but also marginals and nonconformists,
emphasis is particularly put upon micro-histor-
ical and case study approaches.
Nearly 100 papers were presented at the July
plenary by participants coming from all over
Western Europe as well as Eastern Europe (in
particular, from Poland), Turkey, the Middle
East and North Africa. Editorial Board and
Steering Committee meetings prefaced and
closed the Istanbul plenary. Similar to the pre-
vious plenary held in Grenada in May 1996,
which officially opened our programme’s
activities, the July 1998 Istanbul plenary pro-
vided the venue for an across-the-programme
gathering for researchers who have been
working, for the past three years, within the
framework of the separate seven research
t e a m s :
Team 1: Forms of belonging and modes of social integration,
subthemes: sources of history for the Arab and Turkish
woman, child-woman relations in Middle Eastern Muslim
societies, intellectual and social education of the individual;
team led by Klaus Kreiser, Bamberg University, seminars also
organized by Manuela Marin, CSIC (Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Cientificas), Madrid and Avner Giladi, Haifa
U n i v e r s i t y ;
Team 2: Norms, oppositions and marginality, subthemes: mar-
ginality and exclusion, the emergence of individual owner-
ship, customary law and individual expression; team led by
Walter Dostal, Vienna University, seminars also organized by
Eugene Rogan, St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, Huri
Islamoglu-Inan, Ankara University, Martha Mundy, London
School of Economics and Baudouin Dupret, CNRS (Centre
National de la Recherche Scientifique) at CEDEJ (Centre de
Documentation et d’Etudes Juridiques) in Cairo; 
Team 3: Power relationships, subthemes: individual identity
and power relationships, the individual and power in the
colonial experience, individual paths in Egyptian, Syrian and
North African societies; team led by Paul Dumont, Strasbourg
University, seminars also organized by Mounira Chapoutot-
Remadi and Mohamed-Hédi Chérif, Tunis University and
Michael Ursinus, University of Heidelberg; 
Team 4: Modes of production, subthemes: the individual and
his relation to finances in the Mediterranean Muslim world,
the individual’s place within the political economy and eco-
nomics, the individual’s relation with wealth and poverty;
team led by Zafer Toprak, Bosphorus University, Istanbul,
seminars also organized by Nelly Hanna, American University
in Cairo, Jean-Paul Pascual, CNRS, IREMAM (Institut de
Recherches et d’Etudes sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman),
Aix-en-Provence, and John Davies, All Souls College, Oxford
U n i v e r s i t y ;
Team 5: Images and representations, subthemes: individua-
tion in literature and art, the poet and the writer’s mission as
seen by himself, subversity of the individual in art; team led
by Robin Ostle, St. John ’s College, Oxford University and
Remke Kruk, University of Leiden;
Team 6: Religious activity and experiences, subthemes: politi-
cal action, language and religion in the Mediterranean Mus-
lim basin, conversion to and from Islam; team led by Mer-
cedes Garcia-Arenal, CSIC, Madrid, seminars also organized
by Knut Vikor, Bergen University and Jan Hjärpe, Lund Uni-
versity; 
Team 7: Muslims in contemporary Western Europe, sub-
themes: current Islamic discourses in Europe, conversion to
Islam in contemporary Europe, team led by Felice Dassetto,
Catholic University of Leuven.
As the Istanbul event marked a bit more than
the midway point through the programme,
emphasis was especially put upon analysing
the progress made towards reaching the three
major goals expressed at the outset: 
– Producing original analytical research within the European
context on chosen aspects of the above seven topics with the
participation not only of established scholars but also of
recent doctorates so that the programme will contribute
towards the training of the next generation; this is one of the
principal reasons for holding the great majority of our semi-
nars, workshops and symposia in accordance with university
calendars and very often, within university premises
(between the university years 1996-1999, ISMM has hosted
some 50 events within over 30 different university locales
held in approximately 130 sessions with more than 550 pre-
s e n t a t i o n s ) ;
– Encouraging the participation of specialists from the
Mediterranean Muslim world not only as paper givers but
also as event leaders such as the seminars organized and led
for the past three years in Cairo by Nelly Hanna, within the
framework of group four and in Tunis by Mounira Chapoutot-
Remadi and Mohamed-Hédi Cherif in group three; 
– Preserving the results of the research and circulating it with-
in the larger scientific community by means of a three-tiered
publication programme:
• working papers which, with permission of the individual
authors, are copied and circulated among team and other
members of the programme;
• publication hors séries; the first one of this nature
appeared just in time for the July plenary: Individual and
Society in the Mediterranean Muslim World: Issues and
S o u r c e s, directed by Robert Ilbert, edited by Randi Deguil-
hem, Paul Roubaud Printers, Aix-en-Provence, 1998; the
second which is edited by Felice Dassetto, will appear in
spring 1999 in the form of an issue of The Social Compass
(academic journal published at the Catholic University in
Leuven) devoted to New Islamic Discourses in Europe; the
third and fourth hors séries volumes are currently being
edited by Stephen Guth, The Author’s Mission in the
Mediterranean Muslim World, German Oriental Institute in
Beirut Press and by Robin Ostle and Remke Kruk, I n d i v i d u-
ation in Literature and Art: Marginal Voices, Paul Roubaud
Printers, Aix-en-Provence, with both books appearing at
the end of 1999 or during 2000, additional volumes are
being prepared by seminar leaders;
• creation of two new publication series consisting of 5-7
books each; ISMM Editorial Board is headed by Leila Fawaz
and Manuela Marin, other members are Paul Dumont,
Ulrich Haarmann, Robert Ilbert and Remke Kruk, publica-
tion series editor is Randi Deguilhem: 
1 Maisonneuve et Larose, Paris (final contract is signed)
for French language or mixed French-English books;
the first volume in the collection which concerns ‘Con-
temporary Islam in Europe’ is now being edited by
Felice Dassetto; 
2 SUNY Press, New York (final negotiations are under-
way) for English language books; the first volume
scheduled to appear: Historical Sources for the Arab
W o m a n, has been edited by Manuela Marin and Randi
Deguilhem; the second book on Individual Behaviour
and Economics in the Mediterranean Muslim World i s
currently being edited by Nelly Hanna.
Now into its fourth and final year, ISMM sem-
inars, workshops and symposia taking place
throughout 1999 in Vienna, Strasbourg, Hei-
delberg, Oxford, London, Leiden, Madrid, Leu-
ven, Sarajevo, Salamanca, Cairo, Tunis and Aix-
en-Provence have the overall objective of con-
solidating results of research conducted in the
programme over the past three years. Apart
from concluding the study of each team’s sep-
arate topics, a final research objective in 1999
is to further identify and deepen the analysis of
transversal themes which cross through the
work of the different groups. A special brain-
storming session is being organized for the
end of 1999 for this specific purpose where
programme participants will meet with invited
outside scholars to develop transversal
themes. One such theme which has particular-
ly emerged from the teams’ research concerns
the role of the individual Mediterranean Mus-
lim woman in the cultural, social, religious,
political and economic spheres from medieval
Andalous to contemporary Europe as well as
modern Middle East and North Africa. This very
theme was the leitmotiv of the Istanbul ple-
nary session where speakers, including two
Turkish female professors from Bosphorus Uni-
versity, Yesim Arat and Binnaz Toprak, devel-
oped this issue in relation to contemporary
T u r k e y .
Research on the European level regarding
the individual’s place and role in society within
the Mediterranean Muslim world is vital to the
understanding of this most highly complex
multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual
region. While studying a problematic very
much in the forefront of current humanities
research in Europe, the focus of the ISMM pro-
gramme is quite innovative in that members of
the seven teams have been researching the
individual in the Mediterranean Muslim world
– man, woman and child – through his or her
‘private life’ by delving into primary documen-
tary sources. Even if the objective is to go
beyond this aspect, this approach highlights
the value and brings to the fore persons who
are not necessarily studied under the classical
approaches normally used in research on
Islamic societies, namely, children, women and
those living on the fringe of society. It is there-
fore possible in this way to undertake the
research and writing of the history of these
neglected spheres in the Southern Mediter-
ranean basin, that is, the history of the family
and socialization processes. Over and above
the individuals themselves, new light is shed
on social and economic behaviour which may
therefore be looked at in a new way. The
processes of enrichment of the individual, the
creation and formulation of property wealth
and career profiles are currently the objects of
study in the programme, even if not all
researchers agree on the use of macro and
micro-research procedures. By investigating
religious (Sufism and conversion), cultural and
artistic experiences, researchers have gone
beyond the habitual schemata in studying
Islamization processes. New questions have
emerged from this approach such as, for exam-
ple, the question of creativity, which goes right
to the heart of studying the conduct of each
i n d i v i d u a l .
Although ISMM’s scientific events are sched-
uled to formally conclude at the end of this
year, the intellectual life of the themes studied
within the programme will certainly outlast
the four years allocated to it through the for-
mal and informal networks which have been
woven among the more than 150 participants
of the programme, seniors and juniors alike.
Individual and Society in the Mediterranean
Muslim World has taken its place in the acade-
mic landscape. In years to come, researchers
associated with our programme will no doubt
be involved in projects undertaking compara-
tive analyses for the purpose of studying the
specificity (if such be the case) of both the
Islamic world and that of the Mediterranean.
Although research on the question has been
advanced via the ISMM programme, investiga-
tion into the processes of individualization as
related to the Mediterranean Muslim world is
by no means terminated. ♦
Dr Randi Deguilhem is a tenured researcher at the
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS),
IREMAM/MMSH in Aix-en-Provence, France, and is
ESF ISMM Programme Scientific Coordinator.
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A A R
T A ZI M  K A S S A M
The American Academy of Religion is the world’s largest
learned society and professional association of scholars
and teachers in the field of religion. Through academic
conferences, publications and a variety of programme
and membership services, the American Academy of
Religion (AAR) fosters excellence in scholarship and
teaching. It also aims to advance publication and schol-
arly communication on religion; to welcome multiple
perspectives on the study of religion; to support racial,
ethnic and gender diversity within the Academy; and to
seek ways to contribute to the public understanding of
religion. 
The Study of Islam
American Academy
o f R e l i g i o n
tion’s offerings rich and diverse from year to
year. The themes of the sessions fall under the
following categories:
1 . The study of Islamic texts and scriptures;
2 . The study of lived Islam in various regions
and cultures;
3 . Methodology and approaches to the study
of Islam;
4 . Issues such as gender, liberation theology,
human rights;
5 . Subfields of Islamic studies including Mysti-
cism, Law, Theology, Philosophy, Shici s m .
Our policy is to encourage methodological
sophistication, ideological diversity and inter-
disciplinary discussion in our programme.
Shared sessions with other programme units
of the academy have encompassed fields such
as Islamic Ethics, Gender, Islamic and Judaic
Studies, and Islam and Academic Teaching,
and the Study of Religion. Given the impor-
tance of scripture in Islam, the Study of Islam
section regularly sets aside one session for
Qur'anic Studies. The section encourages the
use of inter-disciplinary discourses that bridge
textual, philological, sociological and anthro-
pological approaches to the Qur'an as well as
other Islamic texts.
The AAR’s annual meeting is held every year
in late November and provides a lively and
enabling context for free inquiry, disciplined
reflection and scholarly exchange on the
world’s religions. The Study of Islam section is
one of fourteen programme units of the AAR
and was officially recognized in 1986. It is one
of the major sections of the AAR with a long-
standing and committed participation of more
than a hundred active members. One of the
most diverse groups in the AAR, the section’s
presenters, panellists, and audience represent
scholars at all stages of their academic careers.
The section also features regular attendance
and participation of international scholars
from countries including Egypt, Malaysia,
Indonesia, South Africa, and China.
The Study of Islam section serves as a forum
for current research on Islam. The annual
meeting of the AAR sponsors at least five ses-
sions related to the study of Muslim faith and
practice as well as additional individual pre-
sentations on Islamic topics in other pro-
gramme units and sessions. The cultural and
linguistic diversity, the regional and historical
range, and the varieties of methodologies cur-
rently used in Islamic Studies make the sec-
An additional aspect of the Study of Islam sec-
tion is its outreach to the broader membership
of the AAR by offering sessions concerning the
teaching of Islam in the undergraduate liberal
arts curriculum. Many American university pro-
grammes in Religious Studies draw upon non-
specialists to offer introductory courses on the
Islamic world. The sessions on teaching Islam
provide a forum for addressing important peda-
gogical issues. They also offer scholars an
opportunity to deliberate on the broader con-
ceptual categories and frameworks used in the
study of religions. The Study of Islam section is
thus a critical resource within the AAR for other
scholars of religion who may not have Islamic
experts in their departments.
The Study of Islam section also has an e-mail
list for its members called ‘Islam-AAR’. The list
facilitates communication about scholarly top-
ics and disseminates information about grants,
employment, workshops and AAR business.
Recent topics of discussion on the list have
ranged from the best software for studying the
Qur'an to the pros and cons of using novels in
undergraduate teaching. In addition to the e-
mail list, a special leaflet informing members of
all papers and panels with content of special
interest to Islamicists is mailed to the member-
ship before the annual meeting. As the pre-
miere international forum for the study of reli-
gions, the AAR plays a key role in influencing the
way that scholars and teachers of religion in
North America and abroad construct their cur-
ricula and discipline. Within this context, the
Study of Islam section has a unique and impor-
tant role to play in shaping the academic study
of Islam. Considering its growing importance as
the world’s second largest faith and its social,
economic and political relevance in contempo-
rary life, the Islamic world has not received the
attention it deserves in higher education. Thus,
the Study of Islam section’s goals are: to anchor
the study of Islam centrally within the wider
academic study of religions; to provide a disci-
plined forum for critical inquiry and high quali-
ty, original scholarship in Islamic Studies; and to
encourage comparative and inter-disciplinary
study of Islamic history and societies. ♦
Dr T. Kassam, Department of Islamic Studies
a n d Religion, Colorado College, Colorado, USA.
• The Annual Meeting for 1999 is to be held in Boston,
November 20-23, 1999.
• For more information, please consult the following
Internet address: http://www.aar-site.org/
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Insti tute f o r Ad va nc ed S tud y
G E O R G E S  K H A L I L
The Working Group Modernity and Islam is a Berlin-
based interdisciplinary research network of scholars
working at various universities and extra-university
institutions on the questions of modernity and Islam.
The Working Group, hosted by the Wissenschaftskolleg
zu Berlin (Institute for Advanced Study, Berlin) is com-
mitted to fostering a deeper understanding of Muslim
cultures, their histories, and their social structures with
the two-fold aim of revealing their complexities and of
offering deeper insights into the phenomena of ‘moder-
nity’ and ‘modernization’.
The Working Group
M o d e r n i t y
a n d I s l a m
This should be of interest to scholars well
beyond the fields of Islamic Studies. The project
Modernity and Islam was launched in 1995 with
the support of the Körber Foundation in Ham-
burg. From 1996 on, the German Federal Min-
istry of Education, Science, Research and Tech-
nology has funded the Working Group’s scien-
tific programme, while the Land Berlin finances
its business office. 
The Working Group was initiated under the
impression that in Germany, and indeed in
Europe as a whole, the level of scientific and
intellectual interest in Islam neither reflects its
growing political importance nor its role as a
reference for modern and post-modern criti-
cism. Whereas traditional Islamic Studies, as a
‘small discipline’ – not in relation to the object
of study but in comparison to the institutional
size of the main academic disciplines – method-
ically started to embrace the social sciences, his-
tory, and economics, representatives of the lat-
ter persist in delegating the study of Islam to
regional experts. The notions of civilizational or
cultural clashes, conflicts and exceptionalisms
aptly express Western neglect of the analysis of
non-European societies, in particular, the world
of Islam. A survey of the social and cultural stud-
ies on the Muslim world in the Federal Republic
of Germany, funded by the German Federal
Ministry of Education (see ISIM-Newsletter No 1,
p. 40), gave empirical evidence of the need for
additional effort to overcome the ‘dual margin-
alization’ of Islamic Studies. On the basis of the
survey, the Ministry asked the Working Group to
formulate recommendations to adequately
support and strengthen studies on the Muslim
world in Germany. 
The Working Group Modernity and Islam does
not wish to suggest a fundamental polarity
between Muslim societies on the one hand and
the modern world on the other. Modernity here
also refers to an inherent crisis and thus reflects
a genuine European preoccupation as well. The
group therefore tries to examine the assimila-
tion of modernity within Islam in conjunction
with a range of varying experiences in other
parts of the world. The proposal is to articulate
common problems facing modern societies,
conduct relevant fieldwork in Islamic regions
and refer the findings to the analysis of, for
instance, European societies. We hope this will
pave the way for useful interaction between
Islamic Studies and other disciplines. Consider-
able stress is laid on the principle of ‘research
with’ as opposed to ‘research on’, the traditional
asymmetrical European relationship to Islam
(‘Orientalism’) being replaced by one of gen-
uinely mutual collaboration with researchers
from the Islamic world. 
Cooperative Framework
The Working Group aims to create optimum
working conditions for talented young schol-
ars engaged in innovative projects. In an envi-
ronment conducive to interdisciplinary coop-
eration, less orthodox issues also feature high
on the agenda. The international character,
firmly established through a growing network
of foreign institutions, ensures the high quality
of the work. Collaboration within the Working
Group has assumed various forms. Three ele-
ments constitute the basis of its scholarly pro-
gramme. 
The Berlin Seminar
The Berlin Seminar, a regular fortnightly
event following the rhythm of the academic
year, forms the central pivot of the Working
Group Modernity and Islam. It fosters commu-
nication amongst the various Berlin institu-
tions, ensuring in particular that younger
researchers are no longer arbitrarily, but rather
systematically, informed of other activities in
the field. The seminar creates an opportunity
for younger scholars from Berlin to develop an
appropriate style of research by presenting
their own work and familiarizing themselves
with the work of colleagues from various disci-
plinary and geographical backgrounds invited
within the Working Group’s postdoctoral fel-
lowship programme. The seminar thus serves
as a bracket for all other activities in an inter-
disciplinary research environment. Fellows of
the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin are present
in a consultative capacity. Since 1996, the
Berlin Seminar was held on themes such as
‘processes of modernization’, ‘the transferabili-
ty of concepts’, ‘modernity and the past’, ‘the
relation of modernists to popular Islam’ and
‘Islam in Europe’. The theme of the seminar in
the summer semester of 1999 will be ‘notions
of law and order in Muslim societies’. 
F e l l o w s h i p s / P o s t d o c t o r a l
S t i p e n d s
Doctoral stipends are already provided by
the various Berlin institutions. An international
programme for postdocs has been conceived
in order to anchor individual themes in a
framework of more complex issues and to
strengthen dialogue between the various dis-
ciplinary and geographical areas of research. In
addition to researchers of Islamic Studies, can-
didates for the postdoc programme include
doctors of the social sciences, historians, law
graduates, economists and urban planners.
The latter should be formally qualified in the
subject of Islam, while those whose back-
ground is Islamic Studies should have scientific
exposure to some other discipline. Without
losing sight of broader issues not specifically
connected to Islam, the scholarship holders are
given the opportunity to work for one year on
a research project related to the Islamic world.
In this way, regional findings can be chan-
nelled into the mainstream institutional disci-
plines. Since 1997, ten postdoctoral researchers
from Algeria, the Comoro Islands, Georgia,
Egypt, Iran, Turkey, the Western Sahara and
Germany have been invited to work in Berlin on
issues of modernity from architectural, cultural,
historical or social-scientific perspectives. The
fellowships for the academic year 1999/2000
have been announced under the theme
‘notions of law and order in Muslim societies’.
The Summer Academy
In order to guarantee the international and
interdisciplinary nature of the programme to
promote young scholars, an annual two-week
summer academy has been organized since
1996. The venue is either one of the institutions
involved in the Working Group Modernity and
Islam or a research institute of the Middle East /
North Africa. The Academy focuses primarily on
doctoral and postdoctoral researchers, offering
them a forum to present their research. The
idea is to draw up a sort of interim status report,
so that the critical findings of the academy can
be integrated into the further work of the
young scholars. The programme differs from
the normal lecture-hall set-up, since the main
contributors are the young researchers them-
selves. Leading scholars attend the academy in
an advisory capacity, adding their own
methodical questions. After the first pilot acad-
emy, directed by Rémy Leveau on ‘modernity
and Islam’ at the French-German Centre Marc
Bloch in Berlin, the second academy, directed
by Peter Heine on ‘processes and counter-
processes of modernization’ took place in 1997
at the Humboldt University in Berlin. In 1998,
the academy was held at the German Orient-
Institute in Beirut under the direction of Angeli-
ka Neuwirth on ‘crisis and memory’. ‘Notions of
law and order in Muslim societies’ will be the
theme of the 1999 academy. It will be directed
by Gudrun Krämer and be held in cooperation
with the Moroccan Fondation du Roi Abdul-
Aziz Al Saoud in Casablanca.
Scholarly Partners
The Working Group Modernity and Islam
aims at conducting research on socio-scientific,
historical and cultural developments in Islam
within a European and trans-mediterranean
dimension. In this respect, Berlin, with its
wealth of university and non-university institu-
tions, provides considerable scholarly poten-
tial. Members of the Working Group are:
Georges Khalil, M.A., works at the
Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin/Institute for Advanced
Study as the Coordinator of the Working Group
Modernity and Islam. E-mail: khalil@wiko-berlin.de
Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin
Coordinator: Georges Khalil
Fax: +49 – 30 – 89 00 12 00
E-Mail: khalil@wiko-berlin.de
– Prof. Dr Ingeborg Baldauf, Mittelasienwissenschaft, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin;
– Prof. Dr Friedemann Büttner, Arbeitsstelle Politik des Vorderen Orients,
Freie Universität Berlin;
– Dr Gérard Darmon, Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin;
– Prof. Dr Yehuda Elkana, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin;
– Prof. Dr Ulrich Haarmann, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie
d e r Wissenschaften; Geisteswissenschaftliches Zentrum Moderner Orient Berlin;
– Prof. Dr Peter Heine, Institut für Asien- und Afrikawissenschaften,
Humboldt Universität zu B e r l i n ;
– Prof. Dr Gerhard Höpp, Geisteswissenschaftliches Zentrum Moderner Orient Berlin;
– Prof. Dr Gudrun Krämer, Institut für Islamwissenschaft, Freie Universität Berlin;
– Prof. Dr Wolf Lepenies (chairman), Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin;
– Prof. Dr Angelika Neuwirth, Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen
Gesellschaft, Beirut;
– Prof. Dr Udo Steinbach, Deutsches Orient Institut, Hamburg;
– Prof. Dr Fritz Steppat, Institut für Islamwissenschaft, Freie Universität Berlin;
– Prof. Dr Dieter Weiss, Fachgebiet Volkswirschaft des Vorderen Orients,
Freie Universität Berlin.
♦
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C D E I S I
R I C H AR D  C .  M A R TI N
The famous Hadith ‘seek knowledge, even in China’
expresses a passion that true scholars will always have,
although the ways and means of seeking knowledge
have changed greatly over the centuries. The hajj was
for centuries an important means for Muslims to learn
about the world and Islam beyond the local m a d r a s a.
Steamship, rail, and air travel made Western scholar-
ship on Islam and Muslim scholarship in the West far
more accessible than when this Hadith first began to cir-
culate. Computers and the Web have added a whole
new dimension of accessibility. Among institutions,
consortia of scholars and departments of Islamic Stud-
ies, such as those associated with ISIM, are creating
fields such as Islamic Studies across many universities
into single venues of study. Another example of inter-
institutional cooperation in Islamic religious studies in
the south-eastern United States is the Carolina Duke
Emory Institute for the Study of Islam (CDEISI).
Consortium for
Islamic Religious
S t u d i e s
in South-Eastern
United States
The idea for CDEISI arose out of a circum-
stance of serendipity in the spring of 1996 in
Durham, North Carolina. Three chairs of
departments of religion, who also happened to
be specialists in Islamic Studies – Bruce
Lawrence (Duke University), Carl Ernst (Univer-
sity of North Carolina – UNC), and Richard Mar-
tin (Emory University) – along with Gordon
Newby (Chair of Middle Eastern Studies at
Emory), met at the home of Bruce Lawrence to
discuss ways to combine the resources of the
three universities. Present at that first meeting
was also Vincent Cornell (Duke).
The Need for a Graduate
C o n s o r t i u m
The need that brought together five histori-
ans of religion who specialize in comparative
studies of Islam was the fact that few North
American universities train scholars in Islamic
religious studies. One of the founding scholars
of Islamic religious studies in North America,
Prof. Charles J. Adams, studied history of reli-
gions with Joachim Wach at the University of
Chicago, then turned specifically to Islamic
Studies. In 1967, he concluded ruefully: ‘As
time has gone by, it has proven increasingly
difficult to see a direct and fructifying relation-
ship between the activities of Islamicists and
those of historians of religions.’ 1
By the 1980s the situation had begun to
c h a n g e ,2 but even at the end of this century
specialists in Islamic religious studies are rela-
tively rare in the nearly one thousand depart-
ments of religious studies in North American
colleges and universities. In order to offer stu-
dents instruction about Islam, departments of
religion typically cross-list courses on the Mid-
dle East in departments of history, anthropolo-
gy, political science, inter alia. The absence of
Islamic religious studies at the doctoral level
has also been striking. Departments of Religion
at the top universities have relied heavily on
departments of Middle Eastern Studies to
guide graduate students who wished to spe-
cialize in Islam. 
Since the Departments of Religion at UNC,
Duke and Emory were among the few in North
America that had hired two or more specialists
in Islam, the question the five of us asked our-
selves in 1996 was: Can we accomplish more
together than separately? Can we combine the
resources in Islamic religious studies in our
three universities in practical ways that would
greatly benefit our colleagues and attract the
best students? Can we create a national,
indeed an international, centre to train histori-
ans of religion in the comparative study of
Islam? That afternoon was the nascence of
CDEISI. 
CDEISI Programmes
The CDEISI consortium actually builds on
prior local cooperative arrangements among
universities in the Research Triangle area of
North Carolina, linking Duke, UNC, and North
Carolina State University in Islamic and South
Asian Studies. Administrative arrangements
have now been made among CDEISI universi-
ties for graduate students in religion at Duke,
Emory or UNC to study at one of the other
member institutions for one semester. This
enables students to work with additional facul-
ty during their residencies or research phases
of their doctoral studies. Their tuition and fel-
lowship arrangements at their home institu-
tions remain unchanged during that term.
Thus, for example, a UNC student may choose
to study Shici texts with Devin Stewart and/or
Islam and international human rights with
Abdullahi an-Nacim for one semester at Emory;
an Emory graduate student can now spend a
semester in North Carolina and study Islam in
South Asia with Bruce Lawrence at Duke and
Carl Ernst at UNC, or Maliki law with Vincent
Cornell at Duke. 
A second feature of the consortium is the
exchange of faculty for guest lectures and fac-
ulty colloquia. On two or three occasions each
semester (four to six times per year) each
department of religion will host a faculty mem-
ber from a member institution for a couple of
days for the purpose of delivering a guest lec-
ture in a graduate or undergraduate class as
well as participate in a faculty colloquium on
an issue in Islamic Studies and/or a recent
scholarly book. Usually a more informal gath-
ering in the evening includes graduate stu-
dents and colleagues who do not specialize in
Islamic religious studies. The exchanges give
graduate students brief access to faculty at the
other universities and thus opportunities to
decide on the possibility of spending a semes-
ter working with that professor and his or her
colleagues. The faculty visits have become an
excellent way for us to communicate our cur-
rent research and have critical responses
among wider circles of colleagues in Islamic
Studies than exist at our own institutions, and
on a regular basis. The next stage may be for
Emory to join Duke and UNC in producing tele-
courses on Islam. Broadcast from studio-class-
rooms at each of the universities, such courses
could offer students at several institutions lec-
tures by a cast of experts on many aspects of
Islamic civilization.
In the nearly three years since CDEISI was
formed, colleagues at universities across the
country and in Canada have expressed interest
in CDEISI. At a conference last year at the Uni-
versity of Washington on teaching Islamic
Studies in the undergraduate curriculum, par-
ticipants discussed the idea of forming several
regional consortia, such as the CDEISI in the
south-eastern United States, which might then
link up with each other through an umbrella
organization that could affiliate with a profes-
sional society, like the American Academy of
Religion or the Middle East Studies Associa-
tion. That is a project for the beginning of next
century. Such consortia must be conceived
and developed, however, at the local and
regional level. We hope colleagues in Islamic
Studies in many regions around the world will
have serendipitous moments, such as ours in
North Carolina in May of 1996, when they dis-
cover how much more they can do program-
matically if they can establish a structure and
the means to share human, material, and elec-
tronic resources in Islamic Studies.
Please visit our new web site, which is still a
work in progress: http://www.unc.edu/depts/
cdeisi. Inquiries and insights may be sent by e-
mail to rcmartin@emory.edu. Relevant informa-
tion will be shared with the CDEISI executive
committee, which includes Bruce Lawrence
and Carl Ernst. ♦
Dr Richard C. Martin, Professor and Chair,
Department of Religion, Emory University, Atlanta,
Georgia, USA. E-mail: rcmartin@emory.edu
N o t e s
1 . Charles J. Adams (1967), ‘The History of Religions
and the Study of Islam,’ The History of Religions:
Essays on the Problem of Understanding,
ed., Joseph M. Kitagawa, Chicago,
U n i v e r s i t yo f Chicago Press, p. 177.
2 . See Richard C. Martin, ed. (1985), Approaches to
Islam in Religious Studies (e.g., the Foreword by
Charles J. Adams and the Introduction by Martin),
Tucson, Ariz., University of Arizona Press.ISL Software Corporation, makers of the Alim, is based in Maryland, USA.
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Univ er s i ty o f  Amste rd a m
P E T E R  VA N  D E R  VE E R Research Centre
Religion and
S o c i e t y
N a t i o n and Religion
A Comparative Study of
C o l o n i z e r s and Colonized
As the argument goes, nationalism belongs
to the realm of legitimate modern politics, and
is assumed to be ‘secular’, since it is thought to
develop in a process of secularization and mod-
ernization. Religion, in this view, assumes polit-
ical significance only in the ‘underdeveloped’
parts of the world – much as it did in the past of
‘the West’. When religion manifests itself politi-
cally in the contemporary world, it is thus con-
ceptualized as ‘fundamentalism’. This term,
which derived from early twentieth-century
American evangelicalism, is now taken by both
scholars and media as an analytical term to
describe collective political action by religious
m o v e m e n t s .1 It is almost always interpreted as
a negative social force directed against science,
rationality and secularism; in short, modernity.2
The dichotomy between religion and nation-
alism is an ideological element in the Western
discourse of modernity.3 The research pro-
gramme is therefore devised as a comparative
one. It examines religion and nationalism in
three sets of societies: India and Great Britain;
Ghana/Tanzania and Great Britain; and Indone-
sia and Holland. It focuses on the modern peri-
od, between 1850 and the present, which is the
period of both high colonialism and high
nationalism as well as their aftermath. The pro-
ject is based on the idea that a combination of
metropolitan and colonial perspectives should
lead to very different kinds of conversations and
insights than have previously been possible
among scholars who tend to work along the
divide of colonizing and colonized nations.4 I t
also suggests that comparative work on these
issues on both sides of the divide might show
that what seemed entirely separate is, in fact,
r e l a t e d .5 This project aims at revitalizing the dis-
cussion of the place of religion in modern soci-
ety which theories of secularization have
brought to a dead end.
The project examines the following sets of
q u e s t i o n s :
1) The ‘secular’ nature of British
society in comparison with
t h e ‘religious’ nature of Indian,
African and Indonesian
s o c i e t i e s .
Britain and the Netherlands are examples of
modern nation-states in Western Europe. The
understanding of nationalism in the social sci-
ences depends largely on a conceptualization of
historical developments in this area and should
therefore fit these two exemplary cases. 
It is a fundamental assumption of the dis-
course of modernity that religion in modern
societies loses its social creativity and is forced
to choose between either a sterile conservation
of its pre-modern characteristics or a self-effac-
ing assimilation to the secularized world. In fact,
new and highly original religious organizations
proliferated in Britain and the Netherlands in
the 19th century, resulting in unprecedented
levels of personal involvement of the laity. Ideo-
logical pluralization, resulting in ecclesiastical
and theological strife, only served to reinforce
these mobilizations. 
Both in the Netherlands and in Britain, the
second half of the 19th century was a period of
theological and eccelesiastical strife, and
marked a turning-point in the development of
organized Christianity. The mechanisms which
were developed to pacify tensions between reli-
gious groups merit attention. For instance, both
in the Netherlands and in Britain the formal re-
establishment of a Roman Catholic hierarchy in
the 1850s called into question the traditional
identification of national identity with an un-
denominational Protestantism. In the second
half of the 19th century this religious national-
ism came under attack from different directions.
Right-wing Protestant movements rejected its
enlightened base. Catholics strove to prove
their own adherence to the nation. More mod-
ern forms of political discourse endeavoured to
found the nation on race or history. 
Revival movements of indigenous religion in
India, Africa and Indonesia have arisen, at least
partly, as a reaction to Christian missionary
activity. While much work has been done on
their nineteenth-century history, too little is
known about the development of these move-
ments in the twentieth century, and it is one of
the aims of the programme to write this history.
The religious revival in India and Indonesia
occurred in a period of great religious activity in
Britain and Holland. These socio-religious devel-
opments in both the colonized areas and in the
metropoles have never been studied in a com-
parative framework.
2) The Discourse of
‘ C o m m u n i t y ’ and ‘Nation’ 
The impact of the colonial state and its vari-
ous institutions on African, Indian and Indone-
sian societies grew significantly in the second
half of the nineteenth century, which saw a
massive state project enumerate, classify and
thereby control huge native populations of Indi-
ans and Indonesians by small groups of British
and Dutch officials. In this project, categories
such as caste, religious community, gender and
race were applied with a great deal of variation.6
One crucial element of this project was the divi-
sion of populations into religious communities.
When the British sought to apply indigenous
law in India, they made a clear-cut division
between Hindu and ‘Muhammedan’ law. This
conceptual division was further institutional-
ized in the census operations which established
a Hindu ‘majority’ and a Muslim ‘minority’ which
became the basis of electoral representative
politics. The ‘establishment’ of the ‘Hindu
majority’ as well as that of the ‘Muslim minority’
was largely the result of the manner of classifi-
cation, not of pre-existing facts. In Indonesia the
Dutch created a distinction between Islamic
and a d a t law, and in Africa, the creation of
‘tribes’ (as both linguistic, political and religious
communities) made for similar divisions.7 T o
some extent one may say that the project of the
colonial state created these facts.
The division of Hindu and Muslim communi-
ties in pre-colonial India is not a colonial inven-
tion as such. What was a colonial novelty, how-
ever, was to count these communities and to
have leaders represent them. This was funda-
mental to the emergence of religious national-
ism. It is this colonial politics of ‘community’ and
‘representation’ which have to be examined in
relation to notions of ‘citizenship’, ‘democracy’
and ‘the public sphere’ which are often said to
characterize politics in the modern West.8 W h i l e
nation and state seem to belong together, as
expressed in the hyphenated term ‘nation-
state’, ‘community’ is often used to mean a form
of identity which is in direct contestation of the
S t a t e .
The discourse of ‘community’ versus ‘nation’ is
also of great importance in the politics of ethnic-
ity which characterize the post-colonial nation-
states of Europe. Immigrants have to organize as
communities to gain access to the resources of
the State. There are a number of questions here,
centring on the issues of recognition and entitle-
ment, which are being addressed. For example,
what is the relation between the colonial politics
of ‘community’ and the contemporary ‘minority’
politics? What is the relation between ‘ethnicity’
and ‘religious identity’ in the imagination of
immigrant communities? 9 The programme also
examines the expectations of immigrants from
ex-colonial societies about the place of religion
in the political systems of the ex-colonizing
receiving societies. 
3) Missionization and
C o n v e r s i o n
In the historical and anthropological study of
the missionary project, there has been an
almost exclusive interest in the effects of mis-
sionization on the target peoples. It is, however,
important to look also at the other end of the
missionizing process. 
The effect of organizing for missionary
endeavours on the religious history of the West-
ern countries needs to be studied. In early mod-
ern times, Protestant churches had always been
closely tied to a particular political regime, with
neither the opportunity nor the will to organize
missions. The great Protestant missionary soci-
eties, founded at the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, were not controlled or run by churches.
They were the first real mass-organizations and
played a crucial role in the transformation of the
Protestant churches from the spiritual part of
the social order to organizations within society.
Yet their effects have hardly been studied at all,
and are ignored in modern studies of enlight-
ened sociability.1 0 Their 19th-century history –
most of them ended up under ecclesiastical
control – can serve as an important indication of
the fundamental changes which took place in
the ways the churches conceived of themselves.
The sheer scale of the advertising undertaken
by the missionary societies to raise funds served
to introduce new notions of religion and con-
version in the West.
It is important to look at the ways in which
Christian concepts of religion and conversion
have been adopted in Hindu, Muslim, and
‘pagan’ understandings of ‘nation’, ‘religion’
and ‘conversion’. In India and Indonesia this
should be studied in the context of the Islamic
d acwa movements as well as in those of the
Hindu nationalist shuddhi movements, in Africa,
among new regional cults and independent
Christian churches. Like the European Christian
missionary project, these Asian missions also
have a strong transnationalist, globalizing com-
ponent. Special attention is to be given to the
rise of so-called ‘fundamentalist’ movements
and their contribution to the globalization of
r e l i g i o n .1 4 The impact of the mission is definitely
not confined to the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of con-
version, but should be studied as an aspect of
religious transformation in both the colonizing
and colonized areas. ♦
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Prof. Dr Peter van der Veer is Professor of
Comparative Religion, University of Amsterdam,
t h eN e t h e r l a n d s .
It has become increasingly important to study the social
force of both religion and nationalism in many contem-
porary movements all over the world in an analytical
framework cutting across conventional dichotomies.
Until now, social theory as well as Western common
sense have been often content to assume an ideological
a priori distinction between the nationalist and the reli-
gious imagination.
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Le id en Uni v er s ity
M A RC E L  K U R P E R S H OE K
On 18 September 1998, Dr Marcel Kurpershoek deliv-
ered his inaugural speech as Professor of Arabic Litera-
ture and Politics at the Department of Languages and
Cultures of the Islamic Middle East at Leiden University.
Its title was: ‘Wie luidt de doodsklok over de Arabieren?’:
Arabisme, Islam, en de Wereldbank (‘Who Rings the
Death Bell on the Arabs?’: Arabism, Islam and the World
B a n k ) and is published (in Dutch) by Leiden University.
The following is a passage from his speech:
Marcel Kurpershoek
Chair  of Arabic
Literature and
P o l i t i c s
at Leiden
U n i v e r s i t y
Prof. Kurpershoek is the author of, amongst others,
Oral Poetry and Narratives from Central Arabia,
t h e third volume of which is forthcoming.
‘Awad (Arab poet, literary critic, polemist
and indefatigable rebel) remained an inim-
itable optimist until his death in 1990. But
whoever is interested in the fate of liberal
thinkers in the Arab world will sometimes get
the same feeling as that which the Norwegian
Arne expresses in his comments on the Lapps
in W.F. Hermans’ novel Nooit Meer Slapen
(Never to Sleep Again): ‘I sometimes get the
impression that the stubbornness people dis-
play in hanging on to their traditions is
enough to give up any hope of people
becoming happier by implementing rational
steps.’ Arne’s solution is a simple one: ‘A Lapp
only has to take off his attire and he will
become a Norwegian like any other.’ ‘So why
don’t they?’, Alfred asks. ‘Because they think
they are different (…). A Lapp fears he will
become a fake Norwegian at best (…).’ ‘But it
is highly uncomfortable’, Alfred argues. But
Arne knows: ‘Most people base their self
respect on one or another kind of lack of com-
f o r t . ’
In the academic year of 1998/1999, Prof.
Kurpershoek lectures on freedom of speech in
the Arab world, together with Prof. Nasr Abu
Zayd. This series of lectures runs parallel to a
project of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
‘Freedom of Speech in the Middle East and
North African Region’. ♦
B oo k pr esenta t i o n
J . G . J .  T E R  H A AR
On 15 May 1998, Dr J.G.J. Ter Haar (1941) delivered his
inaugural speech as Professor of Persian Language and
Literature and the Cultural History of Iran. The speech
was entitled: In De Stilte Van De Sharîca, Een debat over de
islam in het moderne Iran (In the Silence of the Sharîca ;
a debate on Islam in Modern Iran). The following is part
of his conclusion. The entire speech has been published
by the Research School CNWS, Leiden.
Johan G.J. Ter Haar
Chair  of Persian Language
and Literature
and the Cultural
History of  Iran at
L e i d e n U n i v e r s i t y
’Sorûsh and his fellows belong to that group
of intellectuals which is called rowshanfekrân-
e dînî in present day Persian. They are – literal-
ly translated – the religious intellectuals, the
religious intelligentsia, intellectuals who do
not only designate a central role in their think-
ing to their religious convictions, but who also
give Islam a not unimportant social and politi-
cal role, even though they vary amongst them-
selves in their interpretation of this role. How-
ever, not all Iranian intellectuals belong to this
category. There are also intellectuals in Iran
who as a matter of principle do not see any role
for Islam in public life, who hold the opinion
that religion is at most something for the pri-
vate sphere and who advocate a completely
secularized society. But, different from the reli-
gious intellectuals, who can disseminate their
views in Kiyân and other magazines, they are
not – or virtually not – capable of having their
voices heard, at least, not in public. However
difficult it is to estimate the size and influence
of this movement, it would be a mistake to
think that secularism does not exist in Iran. Per-
sonally, I am inclined to say that the views of
the religious intellectuals in Iranian society are
more widely accepted than those taking a
purely secularist stance.
On the other hand (…) we should not over-
estimate the importance and the influence of
the debate. Not only since the importance of
any intellectual debate should not be overesti-
mated, but also because in Iran many other
things are going on in many other fields than
the debate on Islam. (…) This does not mean
that the debate (…) is for debate’s sake only.
This is so because in the debate there is a cen-
tral question that is of great importance for the
development of Islam within, as well as out-
side, Iran. What that question entails has, in my
opinion, never been put more poignantly than
in the title of the article by Sorûsh in K i y â n
(April/May 1998), ‘Serâthâ-ye Mostaqîm’, which
means ‘the proper ways’. Every Muslim who
sees this title will immediately think of the first
sura of the Quran, where this is also men-
tioned, in singular, in the prayer ‘lead us to the
right path’. The question Sorûsh and his fel-
lows ask is whether there is only one right path
in Islam, or whether perhaps more ways lead to
Mekkah. ♦
Prof. Ter Haar is the author of, among others,
Volgeling en erfgenaam van de profeet: de
denkwereld van shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi, 1564-1624
(Leiden 1989) (Follower and Heir of the Prophet:
t h e Thinking of shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi) and
Volgelingen van de imam: een kennismaking met
d es j icitische islam (Amsterdam) 1995 (Followers
o f the Imam: an Introduction to Shicite Islam).
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Bo o k p r esenta t io n
Tu r ki s h  R e l i g i o u s  Fo u n d a ti o n
C e n t r e  f o r  I s l a mi c  S tu d i e s  
This new Turkish encyclopaedia of Islam is an ambitious
and wide-ranging project that will rapidly become an
indispensable reference work for the study of social,
political and cultural aspects of the Muslim world. As
stated in the preface to Volume 1, the work is a state-
ment of pride and confidence in the Islamic religious
and cultural heritage, at a time when the Muslim world
is overcoming, with great determination, its long-held
inferiority complex vis-à-vis the modern West. Accord-
ingly, the TDV Islam Ansiklopedisi was conceived and
designed by – and is being overwhelmingly executed
from within – a community of Muslim scholars, mainly
Turkish. It is thus markedly different in scope and in
tone from Leiden’s Encyclopaedia of Islam. This latter is
seen by the editors of the new encyclopaedia as primar-
ily a project of European orientalists.
Turkish Religious
F o u n d a t i o n
E n c y c l o p a e d i a
o f I s l a m
Systematic work on the TDV encyclopaedia
began in 1983, with publications averaging
almost two volumes annually since 1988.
Approximately 40 volumes are envisaged in all.
Indices of essential topics in fifteen (later to
become seventeen) different subject areas
(e.g. Arabic language and literature, history of
religions, h a d i t h, Islamic arts, geography of
Muslim countries, Sufism, Turkish history and
civilization, etc.) were compiled mainly by
trawling through relevant published works
and manuscripts, rather than by relying upon
existing encyclopaedic models. The result is a
unique combination of ‘gazetteer’, ‘who’s
who’, a dictionary of terminology, and an
‘enquiry within and upon everything’. As such,
it is certainly a guide to what almost every spe-
cialist in Turkish and Middle Eastern / Islamic
Studies generally uses.
Entries on persons include, as expected,
caliphs, sultans, shahs and vezirs, teachers,
judges, seyhs and Sufis, mathematicians, legal
experts, artists and literary figures, statesmen
and politicians, from the seventh to the twenti-
eth centuries, and from all over the Islamic
world, though with an understandable prepon-
derance of Ottomans and Turks in later periods.
In addition to covering all Muslim countries,
major cities, staging posts, watering holes, etc.,
the geographical coverage also includes more
surprising entries on, for example, ‘Amerika
Biírlesik Devletleri’, ‘Almanya’, ‘Avrupa’, ‘Fil-
ipinler’. For each country/continent, coverage
is generally in three parts: physical and human
geography, history, and Islam in that area. The
entry ‘Avusturya’ also has a fourth section on
Austrian scholars of Islam from the sixteenth
century onwards.
The TDV Islam Ansiklopedisi is being pub-
lished by Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi, which was
established in 1975. Among the purposes of
this foundation are the following: promoting
religious values, relieving the economic prob-
lems of the destitute, and offering grants to
students. ♦
• Ístanbul Türkíye Diyanet Vakfi.
Vols. 1-18 published
c. 550 pp. per volume.
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C O R I E N  W .  H O E K Shifting Sands
S o c i a l - e c o n o m i c
development in
a l-Sharqiyah region,
O m a n
Dr Corien W. Hoek is an economic anthropologist
and works for the Centre of Islamic Culture in
Rotterdam, the Netherlands.
The Sultanate of Oman is endowed with oil
resources, as are its neighbouring Gulf coun-
tries. Exploitation of the state-owned resources
began at the end of the 1960s, and the oil rev-
enues were used by the government to initiate
a countrywide process of development. S h i f t i n g
S a n d s analyses this process for al-Sharqiyah, a
region without oil resources of its own, which
has as its main economic activities animal hus-
bandry, agriculture, fishing and commerce. The
study is based on extensive fieldwork conduct-
ed between 1985 and 1990 and a number of
visits thereafter.
Regional development in a historical-geo-
graphical perspective provides the setting of the
book. The present situation is analysed through
highlighting the roles of the three major devel-
opment forces: the government, the private sec-
tor and tribal organization. Furthermore, eco-
nomic activities are investigated in terms of pre-
sent performance and future prospects. The
question at hand concerns the potential of an
activity to offer employment to the rapidly
growing population. For example, growth in
agriculture and herding is defined by the limited
water resources and arable land. At the same
time, sustained development of agriculture and
herding are seen as prerequisites to continued
life in the desert and oases settlements. The fish-
eries sector could potentially be a core business
in the region and a large part of this study is
devoted to its modernization process. 
The study discusses the significant phenome-
non of two opposite labour flows in the region.
One is represented by an influx of people mainly
from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, which con-
tributes to commercial expansion yet poses a
threat to the employment of Omani people. The
other is a temporary outflow of locals employed
outside the region, which provides the main
source of income to the region. The study con-
siders the rapidly improved living and working
conditions and the flexibility of people to adapt
to changing opportunities, as assets in the
development process.
Macro policies affect the main topics in the
regional development process and the region’s
situation sets conditions to national develop-
ment. This linkage is explored in the concluding
chapter of the book and tentative suggestions
are given to attune the two strategic levels.
Cooperation at all levels amongst the three
major forces (government, the private sector,
and the tribal organization – or other compara-
ble social organizations), is seen as vital to a suc-
cessful approach to development in al-Shar-
qiyah region.  ♦ Shifting Sands
Social-economic development
in al-Sharqiyah region, Oman
Nijmegen University Press,
N i j m e g e n
1998, xviii + 350 pp.
ISBN 90-5710-049-5
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Many Westerners, and many Muslims, consider ‘Liberal
Islam’ to be a contradiction in terms. This is not the case.
The term ‘liberal’ has negative connotations in much of
the Islamic world, in part because of the hypocrisy of its
introduction to the region by colonialists and imperial-
ists who flouted the liberalism they touted. Yet the
Islamic world is witnessing a thriving movement of Mus-
lim thinkers who address ‘liberal’ concerns such as
democracy, the separation of Church and State, the
rights of women, the rights of minorities, freedom of
thought, and the idea of human progress – hardly the
only concerns that might be labeled ‘liberal’, but




While liberal Islam shares parallel concerns
with Western liberalism, it is no mere echo of
the West. Both traditions may support freedom
of thought, for example, but they do so within
different discourses. As I have tried to demon-
strate in my recent anthology, Liberal Islam: A
S o u r c e - B o o k (Oxford University Press, 1998),
the Islamic discourse has generated three
tropes, or meta-narratives, through which lib-
eral concerns are expressed.
The ‘Liberal S h a r ica’
The ‘liberal s h a r ica’ trope argues that the rev-
elations of the Qur'an and the practices of the
Prophet Muhammad – the body of Islamic
guidance and precedence handed down from
7th century Arabia – c o m m a n d us to follow lib-
eral positions. For example, in the case of free-
dom of thought, some ‘liberal s h a r ica’ argu-
ments take verses from the Qur'an that urge
the believers to think independently. cAli Shar-
icati (Iran, 1933-77), for example, draws on the
Qur'anic distinction between b a s h a r ( t h e
human animal) and i n s a n (the fully human
being): ‘Humankind is a chooser, that is, the
only being who is not only capable of revolting
against nature and the order which is ruling
over it, but can revolt against its own natural,
physical, and psychological needs. Humans
can choose things which have neither been
imposed on them by nature, nor is their body
fit to choose them. This is the most sublime
aspect of humanity.’ Similarly, Abdelwahab El-
Affendi (Sudan, born 1955) argues that all
humans must be endowed with free will and
the ‘freedom to sin’, or they will also lack ‘the
freedom to be virtuous.’
Other ‘liberal s h a r ica’ defences of freedom of
thought draw on the right to conduct i j t i h a d,
or Islamic interpretation. This was one of the
rallying cries of the modernist Islamic move-
ment of the 19th century, as exemplified by
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (born in Iran, 1838-97):
‘In their beliefs they [the members of each
community] must shun submission to conjec-
tures and not be content with mere imitation
of their ancestors. For if man believes in things
without proof or reason, makes a practice of
following unproven opinions, and is satisfied
to imitate and follow his ancestors, his mind
inevitably desists from intellectual movement,
and little by little stupidity and imbecility over-
come him – until his mind becomes complete-
ly idle and he becomes unable to perceive his
own good and evil; and adversity and misfor-
tune overtake him from all sides.’ Similarly,
Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Egypt-Qatar, born 1926)
urges those who wish to impose strict interpre-
tations of Islamic law to recognize that those
‘who hold different views or approaches are
also capable of i j t i h a d like themselves.’
Indeed, Ghulam Ahmad Parwez (India-Pak-
istan, born 1903) has argued that the Qur'an’s
protection of individual freedom is so strong
that it overrides all forms of authority: ‘No per-
son has the right to compel any other person
to obey his orders: ‘It is not [possible] for any
human being unto whom God has given the
Scripture and wisdom and prophethood that
he should afterward have said unto mankind:
“Be slaves of me instead of God” (Sura 3, Verse
79).’ Political systems that do allow individual
freedom of thought, according to this trope,
are un-Islamic.
The ‘Silent S h a r ica’
A second trope of liberal Islam I call the
‘silent s h a r ica’. In this trope, freedom, for exam-
ple, is not r e q u i r e d by the s h a r ica, but it is
a l l o w e d by the s h a r ica. This trope argues that
the s h a r ica is silent on certain topics – not
because the divine revelation was incomplete
or faulty, but because the revelation i n t e n t i o n-
a l l y left certain issues for humans to choose.
S acid Ramadan of Egypt, for example, has writ-
ten that ‘the s h a r ica of God, as embodied in
Qur'an and sunna, does not bind mankind in
m uca m a l a t (worldly dealings) except by pro-
viding a few broad principles of guidance and
a limited number of injunctions. The s h a r ica
only rarely concerns itself with details. The
confinement of the s h a r ica to broad principles
and its silence in other spheres are due to
divine wisdom and mercy. The fact that the
s h a r ica is silent on these points – and we
should bear in mind that, as the Qur'an
remarks, “God is not forgetful” – means only
that the application of the general injunctions
of the s h a r ica to the multifarious details of
human life, and the confrontation of new
problems according to the dictates of m a s l a h a
(public good) have been left to the discretion
of the body of conscious Muslims.’
Within this general argument, definitions of
the public good may vary. Nurcholish Madjid
(Indonesia, born 1939) phrases the public
good in terms of intellectual progress: ‘We
must have a firm conviction that all ideas and
forms of thought, however strange they may
sound, should be accorded means of expres-
sion. It is by no means rare that such ideas and
thoughts, initially regarded as generally
wrong, are [later] found to be right. Further-
more, in the confrontation of ideas and
thoughts, even error can be of considerable
benefit, because it will induce truth to express
itself and grow as a strong force. Perhaps it was
not entirely small talk when our Prophet said
that differences of opinion among his u m m a
[community] were a mercy [from God].’ Laith
Kubba (Iraq-England, born 1954) phrases the
public good in terms of economic progress: ‘As
Muslims devise strategies for economic
growth in a competitive world and redefine
their priorities, their outlook will shift from the
abstract concepts and values of Islam to the
realities of the Muslim world. They will contin-
ue to turn to Islam as a source of personal and
communal identity and moral guidance, but
they will also critically assess the legacy hand-
ed down by previous generations who may
have narrowed Islam in ways that had less to
do with the essence of the faith than with his-
torical accidents and parochial circumstances.’
In both of these examples, the s h a r ica a l l o w s
Muslims freedom of thought in order to attain
these public goods.
The ‘Interpreted S h a r ica’
The first trope of liberal Islam holds that the
s h a r ica r e q u i r e s liberty, and the second trope
holds that the s h a r ica a l l o w s liberty. But there is
a third liberal Islamic trope that takes issue
with each of the first two. This I call the ‘inter-
preted s h a r ica’. According to this view, ‘Reli-
gion is divine, but its interpretation is thor-
oughly human and this-worldly.’ I quote here
from cAbdul-Karim Soroush (Iran, born 1945):
‘the text does not stand alone, it does not carry
its own meaning on its shoulders, it needs to
be situated in a context, it is theory-laden, its
interpretation is in flux, and presuppositions
are as actively at work here as elsewhere in the
field of understanding. Religious texts are no
exception. Therefore their interpretation is
subject to expansion and contraction accord-
ing to the assumptions preceding them and/or
the questions inquiring them… We look at rev-
elation in the mirror of interpretation, much as
a devout scientist looks at creation in the mir-
ror of nature … [so that] the way for religious
democracy and the transcendental unity of
religions, which are predicated on religious
pluralism, will have been paved.’
Similarly, Hassan Hanafi (Egypt, born 1935)
has written: ‘There is no one interpretation of a
text, but there are many interpretations given
the difference in understanding between dif-
ferent interpreters. An interpretation of a text
is essentially pluralistic. The text is only a vehi-
cle for human interests and even passions. The
conflict of interpretation is essentially a socio-
political conflict, not a theoretical one. Theory
indeed is only an epistemological cover-up.
Each interpretation expresses the socio-politi-
cal commitment of the interpreter.’
Syed Vahiduddin (India, born 1909) said: ‘But
as the Qur'an’s vision of God cannot be con-
fined exclusively to any one of its historical
expressions, religion itself cannot be a static
construct made once and for all without
revealing fresh nuances in its historical devel-
opment. This static concept of religion
neglects the truth that at no point of history
can all possibilities be exhausted, though a
given point in history might be pregnant with
implications for the future. History is a process
of creative expression; not a perpetual repeti-
tion, and hence it is presumptuous to limit
Islam to its classical expression.’
Challenges of Liberal Islam
Liberal Islam is thriving, propelled by rising
education in the Islamic world and the global
wave of democratization. Yet it has enemies.
On one hand, Muslim opponents accuse it of
being overly Westernized, of abandoning the
core values and traditions of Islam. Liberal
Islam, one Muslim scholar wrote me, is the
work of Muslims who ‘want to do nothing
more than fade into the Judaeo-Christian
woodwork.’ Another Muslim scholar, Gai
Eaton, has referred to liberals as ‘Uncle Toms’
(a derisive term used by African-Americans to
describe a black person who is grotesquely
servile to whites). The force of these critiques
echoes debates of the early 20th century,
when a traditionalist Muslim scholar called
modernist Islamic thinkers ‘stupid’ and ‘manip-
ulated by Satan’.
On the other hand, many Westerners consid-
er liberal Islam to be overly Islamic. Leonard
Binder’s Islamic Liberalism argues that liberal
positions grounded on ‘explicit Islamic legisla-
tion of divine origin’ – what I call the ‘liberal
s h a r ica’ trope – constitute an impossible
‘anomaly’ (p. 244). One wonders whether liber-
alism based on Christian scripture would be
considered similarly anomalous. Samuel Hunt-
ington’s The Clash of Civilizations makes no dis-
tinction between liberal and non-liberal Mus-
lims – they are all in the ‘other’ camp. Similarly,
a cartoon in the New Yorker magazine in early
1998 showed a caricature of Iranian President
Muhammad Khatami saying, ‘We are interest-
ed in a cultural exchange. We will give you one
of our writers, and you will give us Salman
Rushdie’ – this despite Khatami’s support for
rule of law in Iran and his opposition to the
groups seeking Rushdie’s execution.
Liberal Islam thus faces hostility on two
fronts, both of which treat it as a contradiction
in terms: Muslims who consider it not properly
Islamic and Westerners who consider it not
properly liberal. Liberal Islam is caught in the
crossfire, as the party of war on both sides joins
in tacit collusion against those seeking to build
bridges in between.
Is this not the same dilemma in which the
field of Islamic Studies finds itself? ♦
© Charles Kurzman, 1999
Dr Charles Kurzman is Assistant Professor of
Sociology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill,
USA. He is author of Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook.
(See page 43).
E-mail: kurzman@unc.edu
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Since 1993, six volumes have appeared in the series
Manuscripta Indonesica, now a joint publishing project
between INIS (Indonesian-Netherlands Cooperation in
Islamic Studies, Leiden University) and the Legatum
Warnerianum in Leiden University Library. More are in
the making. Each volume contains (at least) an actual
size black-and-white reproduction of an Indonesian
manuscript, with an introduction containing a physical
description of the original manuscript and placing it in
its cultural or ritual context. The contents of the volume
sometimes go beyond these basic descriptions by
adding a transliteration, translation or an electronic
v e r s i o n .
M a n u s c r i p t a
I n d o n e s i c a
Basic Tools
of Research
Not all volumes present an Islamic text. How-
ever, all volumes have a direct or indirect rele-
vance to Indonesian culture, thus in most cases
to Islam. To date, five of the six originals repro-
duced originate from the Oriental collections
of the Leiden University Library, the sixth
being held in a private collection. There are
plans to expand through cooperation with
other institutions. This is not due to difficulty in
choice or reproduction of manuscripts; they
are available in overwhelming numbers, both
in Leiden and in other public collections. Sim-
ply reproducing them as they are would be a
merely technical operation. Compiling the
introduction to each volume, however, takes
time, effort and expertise. Such a detailed
introduction gives added value, considered by
the editors to be of primary importance, to
each volume.
Since the beginning of the 19th century, an
impressive number of manuscripts from
Southeast Asia have come to the Netherlands,
as opposed to the 17th and 18th centuries
when few made their way to Europe. British
collections were the first (end of the 18th cen-
tury) to add Southeast Asian materials to their
holdings on an organized scale. The collection
of Oriental manuscripts at the Leiden Universi-
ty Library comprises one of the largest reposi-
tories of Southeast Asian manuscript materials
in the world. This collection is enlarged on a
regular basis, made possible by governmental
and private funding. Gifts or bequests consti-
tute, and have constituted, a considerable
amount of the manuscripts acquired. Those
manuscripts commissioned by scholars in the
field form an important part of the latter cate-
gories. In colonial times, manuscripts were
sometimes acquired as war booty or by confis-
cation. Leiden University Library and the
library of the Bataviaasch Genootschap, now
the Perpustakaan Nasional (National Library) in
Jakarta, have equally profited from these cir-
cumstances. About two thirds of the approxi-
mately 25,000 Oriental manuscripts in the Lei-
den collection are of Southeast Asian origin.
The majority of these originate from the
Indonesian archipelago and Malaysia, most of
them having been produced in the 19th or
20th century. One may fairly say that all cul-
tures and languages from the areas that have
possessed a written tradition are represented
in the collection. 
In Manuscripta Indonesica, the focus is on the
manuscript. Publishing the manuscript in fac-
simile should cause as little alteration as possible
with regards to form, size, and overall outward
appearance. Some concessions are inevitable,
however. The use of contemporary paper would
be impossible, and lontar (palmleaf), dluang (tree
bark paper) or other traditional materials even
more so. Ideas to manufacture facsimiles of
Batak texts on bamboo or tree bark have at some
stage been entertained by the editors of the
series, only to be quickly discarded as either
impractical or too costly to implement. Due to
financial considerations it is even out of the
question to reproduce the original colours in
print, the print-run of the series totalling only a
few hundred copies. Furthermore, it is not laxity
but rather fundamental theoretical considera-
tions, which have brought the editors to decide
not to do any ‘textual editing’ whatsoever. The
original manuscript is held in high esteem and it
is therefore reproduced without any editorial
modification, thus maintaining all its characteris-
tics of form, spelling and other peculiarities. ♦
Manuscripta Indonesica is edited by
W i m Stokhof, Roger Tol and Jan Just Witkam.
The volumes appear at irregular intervals.
Orders can be sent to Legatum Warnerianum,
Leiden University Library, P.O. Box 9501,
N L-2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands
( e-m a i l :w i t k a m @ r u l u b . l e i d e n u n i v . n l ) .
Dr Jan Just Witkam is Interpres Legati Warneriani,
and Curator of Oriental Collections,
L e i d e nU n i v e r s i t y Library, the Netherlands.
E-m a i l :w i t k a m @ r u l u b . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
The following volumes of
Manuscripta Indonesica
( I S S N 0 9 2 9 - 6 4 8 4 )
have been published:
Volume 1: Hikayat Isma Yatim by Ismail
and Hikayat Sultan Mogul mengajarkan
anaknya : a facsimile edition of
manuscript Cod. Or. 1693 in the Library of
Leiden University / with an introduction
by Roger Tol & Jan Just Witkam.
L e i d e n : Indonesian Linguistics
Development Project (ILDEP) in
c o-operation with Legatum
Warnerianum in the Library of Leiden
University, 1993. XVI, 144 p., facs;
35 cm. ISBN 90-73006-02-3
Volume 2: Mukhtasar Tawarikh al-Wusta :
a short chronicle of the Riau region :
a facsimile edition of manuscript Cod.
O r . 1999 in the Library of Leiden University
/ with an introduction by Roger Tol &
Jan Just Witkam. Leiden: Indonesian
Linguistics Development Project (ILDEP)
in co-operation with Legatum
Warnerianum in the Library of Leiden
University, 1993. XIII, 26 p., 36 cm.
I S B N9 0 - 7 3 0 0 6 - 0 3 - 1
Volume 3: Serat lokapala kawi :
a n eighteenth-century manuscript of
t h e old Javanese Arjunawijaya by Mpu
Tantular : a facsimile edition of
manuscript Cod. Or. 2048 in the Library
o f Leiden University / with an
introduction by Bernard Arps & Willem
van der Molen. Leiden:
I n d o n e s i a n Linguistics Development
Project (ILDEP) in co-operation with
Legatum Warnerianum in the Library of
Leiden University, 1994. XLVI, 90 p . ,
facs., 35 cm. ISBN 90-73006-04-X
Volume 4: Gita Yuddha Mengwi or Kidung
Ndèrèt : a facsimile edition of manuscript
Cod. Or. 23.059 in the Library of Leiden
U n i v e r s i t y / with an introduction by
H.I.R. Hinzler. Leiden: Indonesian
Linguistics Development Project (ILDEP)
in co-operation with Legatum
Warnerianum in The Library of Leiden
University, 1994. 32 p., facs., 50 x 20 cm.
ISBN 90-73006-05-8
Volume 5: Mystical illustrations from the
teachings of Syaikh Ahmad Al-Qusyasyi :
a facsimile edition on paper and CD-ROM
of a manuscript from Aceh (Cod. Or. 2222)
in the Library of Leiden University /
w i t h introductions by Aad Janson,
Roger Tol & Jan Just Witkam. Leiden:
Indonesian-Netherlands Cooperation
i n Islamic Studies (INIS) in co-operation
with Legatum Warnerianum in the
Library of Leiden University, 1995.
XXXIV, 30 p., facs., 27 x 17 cm.
ISBN 90-73006-07-4. There is a web
presentation of this volume:
h t t p : / / w w w . l e i d e n u n i v . n l /
p u n / u b h t m / u b o r . o r 2 v i e r . h t m l .
Volume 6: Nabi Aparas. The shaving of
the Prophet Muhammad’s hair :
a facsimile edition of a Javanese
manuscript from Lombok, MS M.53 in
t h e private collection of Dick van der Meij
/ with an introduction, transliteration
and translation by Dick van der Meij.
Leiden: Indonesian-Netherlands
Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS)
i n co-operation with Legatum
Warnerianum in the Library of Leiden
University, 1996. 80 p., facs., 16 x 16 cm.
ISBN 90-73006-08-2.
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UC  Be r kel ey
L A U R E N C E  M I C H A L A K
& R E N A T E H O L U B
In October 1998, The Middle East and West Europe Cen-
ters of the University of California at Berkeley jointly
sponsored a two-day symposium, ‘Islam and the Chang-
ing Identity of Europe: Culture, Politics and Citizenship
in an Era of Globalization’. The programme focused on
the deep ideational changes which have been taking
place in Europe due to the Muslim populations which
have sprung up in the United Kingdom, France, Ger-
many and elsewhere. The symposium explored political
and cultural aspects of the emerging identities of these
relatively new citizens – how they view themselves and
how they are viewed by non-Muslim Europeans, as well
as how the relatively indigenous populations of Europe
are being forced to rethink their own collective identi-
ties, both as Europeans and as citizens of specific coun-
tries. 
In their symposium prospectus and introductory re-
marks the organizers argued that these are no longer
migration issues in the traditional sense, because most
Muslims in Europe are no longer migrants. Muslim pop-
ulations have been present in Europe for several gener-
ations, although many Europeans have been slow to
recognize that Islam is now a European religion.
Report on
a S y m p o s i u m
‘Islam and
the Changing
I d e n t i t y
of Europe’
The conference featured
s i x scholars and a number
o f discussants: 
Tariq Modood (University of Bristol, UK) point-
ed out that minorities in the UK are protected as
members of ethnic/racial groups rather than as
Muslims. As in the US, there has been a shift in
emphasis from the right to assimilate, to the
right to maintain one’s ‘differences’ and to have
them positively valued. Modood contrasted the
UK, where a multicultural approach seems to be
making headway, with France, which remains
essentially assimilationist and anti-multicultural. 
Michel Wieviorka (École des Hautes Études en
Sciences Sociales, Paris) addressed processes of
cultural transformation that occur as Muslim
youth in Europe inevitably alter the Islamic tra-
ditions that shape their responses to non-Islam-
ic environments, calling what results the ‘Islam
of the Youth’. He placed this in a larger context
of French national destructuration and the
decline of republicanism and of mechanisms of
national integration. 
Krishan Kumar (formerly UK, now University of
Virginia) spoke on ‘Europe, the Nation-State and
the Question of Identity in an Era of Multicultur-
alism’, comparing different settings in Europe.
Kumar spoke about the dilemma of maintaining
one’s cultural origin in the UK, and of a future of
hyphenization, hybridity, syncretization and
creolization, but he also eloquently defended
assimilation for those who choose that path. 
Bassam Tibi (University of Göttingen, Ger-
many) focused on themes of cultural and politi-
cal integration of Muslim groups. The notion of
‘cultural co-existence’, based on principles of
diversity and plurality, was central to his
address. Tibi suggested that a ‘Euro-Islam’, or
European form of Islam, is emerging, but he
cautioned against turning a blind eye to the
more fundamentalist elements which also exist
within the spectrum of European Muslim opin-
ion. 
Hala Mustafa (Center for Political and Strategic
Studies, Al Ahram Foundation, Cairo) addressed
political concerns on a more global level, also
emphasizing co-existence. Mustafa called for the
transformation of existing unequal power rela-
tions between Europe and the Islamic states in
the developing world, and noted that current
processes of globalization would significantly
affect this imbalance. 
Paul Lubeck (UC Santa Cruz) discussed the
economic and sociological issues facing
Europe, particularly those issues pertaining to
Islamic networks and the challenges they pre-
sent to citizenship claims. Lubeck noted that
the contributions of future Muslim migrants to
Europe’s economy, and hence to its global
competitiveness, will not reside primarily in
menial labour. Rather, migration trends from
Muslim majority countries contribute to the
area of technological skills. 
Several issues emerged from
the presentations and debates: 
Regarding the nation-state, some argued
that, with the rise of European institutions, the
nation-state is being replaced by wider politi-
cal entities in terms of both sovereignty and
identity. Others argued that such notions are
premature, noting also the persistence of sub-
national identities, both ethnic and regional. 
A second issue is assessing the relative
power of assimilationism versus multicultural-
ism in different national settings. Assimilation-
ists argue that Muslims in Europe will and
should gradually become more like other Euro-
peans. Multi-culturalists, on the other hand,
argue both the inevitability and the desirabili-
ty of retaining non-European heritages and
promoting cultural diversity. 
Finally, how powerful a force is Islam in
determining identity? Some suggest that other
factors – such as ethnic, national, regional, trib-
al, class or economic identities – can often be
stronger than religion. The identities of
Europe’s Muslim populations are not fixed but
vary in both the short term and historically. 
Several speakers cautioned against reifying
and attributing causality to Islam, noting that
there are important differences amongst Mus-
lims in Europe – especially between Islamic
activists and secularists. While many Muslims
resist Euro-American post-industrial culture on
moral grounds, they often thrive in the infra-
structure of globalization, which is the product
of capitalism. In any case, there was general
agreement that both Muslims and non-Mus-
lims in Europe are articulating new citizenships
and new ethnicities through a continuing
d i a l e c t i c .
Participants in the conference are revising
their papers for a collective volume which is
projected for publication in 1999. ♦
Dr Laurence Michalak is Vice Chair of the Center for
Middle Eastern Studies and Lecturer in International
and Area Studies at the University of
California/Berkeley, USA.
E-mail: otis@uclink4.berkeley.edu
Dr Renate Holub is Chair of the Italian Research and
Study Group and Adjunct Associate Professor in
International and Area Studies, also at the University
of California/Berkeley, USA.
E-mail: rholub@socrates.berkeley.edu
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B R I T I S H  C OU N C I L
From February to July 1999, Visiting arts, a joint ven-
ture comprised of arts councils from around the UK, will
focus on the cultural and arts activities of Muslim com-
munities from all over the world, the UK included. Arts
events taking place in the UK originating from, or influ-
enced by, Muslim cultures will be publicized in the form
of a six-month Cultural and Arts Programme. The aim of
the Programme is to build on existing initiatives and to
encourage new ones, and also to increase awareness of
the immensely rich and passionate artistic response to
the world’s fastest growing religion. The Programme
will coincide with The British Council’s international
conference, ‘Mutualities: Britain and Islam’ (28-30 April
1 9 9 9 ) .
M u t u a l i t i e s :
Britain and Islam
Cultural  and Arts
P r o g r a m m e
To conclude the Programme, and as part of its ongoing con-
tribution to this field, in July 1999, Visiting Arts will hold a sem-
inar on Promoting Muslim Arts in the UK.
In August 1999, Visiting Arts will produce a resource publica-
tion for those involved in planning Islam-related arts events.
The publication will include: a directory of relevant UK organi-
zations; reports on The British Council’s conferences and a full
listing of the events included in the Mutualities: Britain and
Islam Cultural and Arts Programme, with colour photographs.
Calligraphy from the Muslim
W o r l d (visual, international)
Venue: Cartwright Hall Art Gallery, Bradford.
January 1999 – December 2000
Promoter: Nilesh Mistry, Cultural Diversity
Outreach Officer, Cartwright Hall Art Gallery,
Lister Park, Bradford BD9 4NS
Tel: +44 1274 493 313,
Fax: +44 1274 481 045.
The exhibition focuses on calligraphy
primarily from the Indo-Pakistan sub-
continent, but includes items from Syria,
Iran, Turkey and Egypt. To reflect
t h e versatile nature of this art form,
t h e collection covers a range of media,
s u c h as textiles, gemstones, silver, bronze,
brass, wood and paper. Also on display are
contemporary calligraphic works by
Tehmina Shah, Shirazeh Houshirary,
L a i l a Rahman and Shahzia Sikander. 
Painted Poetry: illustrations
from the Khamseh of Nizami and
Haft Aurang of Jami ( e x h i b i t i o n ,
India and Iran)
Venue: British Museum, London
15 February to 5 July 1999
Promoter: Rachel Ward, Assistant Keeper,
British Museum Tel: +44 171 323 8457.
This exhibition will include illustrations
o f the well-known Persian poetical
manuscripts: the K h a m s e h, or Five Tales,
o f Nizame and the Haft Aurang, or S e v e n
T h r o n e s, of Jami. The paintings range in date
from the fifteenth to the eighteenth
centuries and come from Timurid and
Safavid Iran, and Sultanate and Mughal
I n d i a .
Mosaiques 99 ( f i l m / l i t e r a t u r e ,
France/North Africa)
Venue: Institut Français, London
17-22 March 1999.
Promoter: Jean Jacques Scaerou,
S e c r e t a r y General, French Cultural
Department, Embassy of France,
2 3 Cromwell Road, London SW7 2EL
Tel: +44 171 838 2078,
F a x : +44 171 838 2088
E-mail: jeanjacques.scaerou@mail.
a m b a f r a n c e . o r g . u k
This is a programme of cultural and arts
events to celebrate the Maghreb’s
contribution to French culture today.
T h e programme will include fourteen films
from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia; two
exhibitions: M a g h r e b and Portraits of Arabic
W o m e n; conferences with guests from the
Maghreb; calligraphy; storytelling; musical
accompaniment. The French Brasserie will
offer Tunisian specialities in a traditional
North African atmosphere.
Giving Voice: A Divinity of
t h e V o i c e (music, international)
1-10 April 1999
V e n u e : Centre for Performance Research (CPR),
8 Science Park, Aberystwyth, Wales.
Promoter: Claire Swatheridge, Administrator,
Centre for Performance Research, 8 Science
Park, Aberystwyth SY23 3AH, Wales
Tel: +44 1970 622 133
Fax: +44 1970 622 132
E-mail: cgs@aber.ac.uk
URL: http://www.aber.ac.uk/~cprwww 
A ten-day international festival of the voice
comprising workshops, informative and
entertaining lecture-demonstrations, an
opportunity for discussions and a wide
range of exciting and unusual performances
from around the world, such as Croatia,
Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria, South Africa, India
and Pakistan. To book, please contact Fiona
Smith at CPR.
Linked to the festival will be the fifth
Performance Studies Conference ‘99, ‘Here
Be Dragons’, which will take place 9-12 April
1999. To book, please contact Ileike Roms
a t CPR. CPR would like to contact leading
female international vocalists who are
interested in participating in the festival.
Hossein Omoumi:
The Voice of L o v e (music, Iran)
5-6 April 1999
Venue: Centre for Performance Research,
8 Science Park, Aberystwyth, Wales.
Promoter: Claire Swatheridge, Administrator,
Centre for Performance Research, 8 Science
Park, Aberystwyth SY23 3AH, Wales
Tel: +44 1970 622 133
Fax: +44 1970 622 132
Email: cgs@aber.ac.uk URL:
h t t p : / / w w w . a b e r . a c . u k / ~ c p r w w w
A two-day workshop led by the Iranian
Hossein Omoumi, followed by an evening
performance. Omoumi will teach Iranian
music, based on Sufi poetry, introducing
parts of the Radif in the traditional style:
orally and by repetition. There will also be
an evening performance for the public on
April 6 in Aberystwyth.
Muslims in China
(lecture/exhibition, China)
April – May 1999
V e n u e : t b c
Promoter: Susie Wong, Chinese Cultural
Centre, 27 Old Gloucester Street,
London WC1N 3XX
Tel/Fax: +44 171-633 9878.
This programme, funded by Visiting Arts,
will be the first of its kind in the UK to focus
on the arts and culture of China’s Muslim
populations. The programme will include
two lectures: an overview of Muslims in
China, and the contribution of Muslim
culture in China; and an exhibition on the
subject of Chinese mosques.
Bakshi Javaid Salamat Qawwal:
Sounds of the Qawwal
(music/dance, Pakistan)
July 1999
Venue: APNA Arts, Nottingham Community
Arts Centre, 39 Gregory Boulevard,
N o t t i n g h a m .
Promoter (UK): APNA Arts, Nottingham
Community Arts Centre, 39 Gregory
Boulevard, Nottingham NG7 6BE
Tel: +44 115 942 2479
Fax: +44 115 942 2478.
Promoter (Pakistan): Uxi Mufti, Executive
Director, Lok Virsa, Garden Avenue,
Shakarpurian, Islamabad, Pakistan
Tel: 00 92 51 9203983
Fax: 00 92 51 9202042
E-mail: mufti@heritage.sdnpk.undp.org
Sounds of the Qawwal is a twelve-week
dance music workshop programme run by
APNA Arts for young people. The Bakshi
Javaid Salamat Qawwali music group from
Pakistan will collaborate with an established
musician from the UK, Aki Nawaz (Nation
Records, Fundamental), fusing centuries-old
qawwali tradition with contemporary
British-based youth culture dance music.
The collaborative work will be recorded and
released on CD.
The project also provides the opportunity
for live performances, lectures and talks on
Sufi concepts and music.
Sounds of the Qawwal is part of NCIusion, a
three year programme of high quality arts in
the city of Nottingham initiated by
Nottingham City Council and funded by the
Arts Council. It uses arts as a vehicle to
change and challenge attitudes, and
provides a rich and varied climate for the
interchange of ideas and creativity.
Available to tour. ♦
C o n f e r e n c e
on Britain
and Islam
The British Council in London is
organizing a conference on the
relationship between Britain and Islam.
The aim of the congress is threefold:
– to emphasize the interdependence
a n d mutual benefit of the relationship
through education and trade between
Britain and Islam 
– to link the cultural pluralism of Britain
with the cultural pluralism of the
emerging global village
– to strengthen partnerships that
transcend the normal institutional
c o n t r a i n t s .
Conference organizers include Dr Peter
Clark OBE, Special Advisor, Middle East
and North Africa, British Council; Prof.
Jorgen S Nielsen, Director of the Centre of
the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim
Relations; and Imam Dr Abduljalil Sajid JP,
Director of the Brighton Islamic Mission.
The conference will take place at the
Royal Commonwealth Society in London,
on 28-30 April 1999.
Further information and application forms can be
obtained from:
Peter Clark
MENA, The British Council




Anne van de Graaf
British Council The Netherlands  
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T H E  N E T H E R L A N D S
Exhibitions 
Municipal Museum The H a g u e
Stadhouderslaan 41
2517 HV The Hague
tel: 31 70 3381111
C o n t i n u i n g
• exhibition  Islamic crafts.  Renewed
exhibition from its own collection, in





tel: 31 10 4112201
fax: 31 10 4118331
• Due to renovations, the museum will be
closed until October 2000. It will reopen
with a permanent exhibition of Islamic




tel: 31 45 5604581
3 October 1998 – January 2000





tel: 31 20 626 44 32
fax: 31 20 626 44 33
e-mail: g a l e r i e @ f i b e i t i . d e m o n . n l
30 January – 6 March 1999
• Persheng Warzandegan. Paintings and
C e r a m i c s
Witte de With, Center for
Contemporary Art
Witte de Withstraat 50,
3012 BR Rotterdam
tel: 31 10 4110144
fax: 31 10 4117924
e-mail: w d w @ w x s . n l
open:  Tuesday through Sunday,
1 1 a m - 6 p m
28 January – 21 March 1999 
• From/To is an exhibit in which Palestine







tel/fax: 31 20 6182164
20 – 30 March 1999
• Turkish Sufi music and Spanish
f l a m e n c o
22 April – 2 May 1999
• Istanbul Oriental Ensemble with Burhan
Ö ç a l
20 – 30 October 1999
• Turkish popstar Sezen Aksu & the Dutch
Willem Breuker Kollektief




tel: 31 30 2319676
fax: 31 30 2315507
e-mail:   M a r i e k e v a n t e l l i n g e n @ r a s a . n l
14 May 1999-23 May 1999
• Rabita Andalousa (Arabo-andalusian
music), various locations. For details
please contact Rasa, attn: Marieke van 
T e l l i n g e n
F R A N C E
Institut du Monde Arabe
1, Rue des Fosses St-Bernard,
75236 Paris
tel: 33 1 40 51 39 60/ 33 1 0 
open:  Daily 10am – 6pm, Saturday
until 8pm. Closed on Monday. 
22 October 1998 – 30 April 1999
• Liban, l’autre rive. Exhibition on
Lebanon, with 400 objects, icluding
pieces as the sarcophagus of King
Ahiram. During the exhibition, a ‘saison
Libanaise’ is organized featuring music,
dance, theatre, film and lectures.
Hassan Massoudy Atelier
18 Quai de la Marne
75019 Paris
tel/fax: 33 1 42 03 15 51
open:  Every last Saturday of t h e
month 2pm – 7pm. Other days by
telephone appointment.
January – June 1999
• Original Calligraphies, Lithographies
G E R M A N Y
Black International Cinema
B e r l i n ,
in association with the Humboldt-
University and the Hochschule der Künste
Seminar für Theaterwissen-
schaften/Kulturelle Kommunikation
Sophien Str. 22a., Berlin
tel.: 030 751 84 38/782 16 21
url: h t t p : / / m e m b e r s . a o l . c o m / b i c d a n c e
30. April – 8. May 1999
• XIV. Black International Cinema
Interdisciplinary, Intercultural
• Film-/Video-Festival Berlin, Germany
& U.S.A., focuses on the African
process of liberation; its search for its
own identity; its path towards
political healing methods, and the
results gained by these approaches.
It explores these themes through the
media of
• film, video, music, lectures, seminars,
dance and theatre performances.
U N I T E D  K I N G D O M
British Museum
Great Russell Street
L o n d o n
tel: +44 171 6361555
open:  Monday 11-16:50; Tuesday,
Friday, Saturday 10-16:50; Sunday
1 4 : 3 0 - 1 7 : 5 0
22 October – 21 February 1999
• Art and Artists: The Tunisian culture
Egee Art Consultancy
9 Chelsea Manor Studios
Flood Street
London SW3 5SR
tel: 44 171 351 6818
fax: 44 171 376 3510
url: www.egeeart.com 
open:  Monday – Saturday 2-6pm 
C o n t i n u i n g
• Contemporary and antique Middle
Eastern Art
Sony Gallery
25 Connaught Street Marble Arch
London W2
tel/fax: +44 171 262 9101
url: w w w . s o n i g a l l e r y . c o m
C o n t i n u i n g
• International contemporary art
especially from the Indo-Pak
subcontinent and the Arab World
L e c t u r e s / s o c i e t i e s
The British Council
L o n d o n
April 1999
• Mutualities: Britain and Islam.
Conference to explore the mutualies. A
programme of visiting arts featuring
cultural arts and arts events related to
Islam and Islamic countries runs from
February – July 1999.





• Calligraphy from the Tareq Rajab
Museum Kuwait. The Qur'an was central
to the development of the art of
beautiful writing. Explored in this
exhibition are the various scripts that
developed over the centuries and also
calligraphy as a decorative motif on
various media like ceramics and
m e t a l w o r k .




0 8 5 4 4 - 1 0 1 8
tel: +1 609 258-3787/3788
Autumn 1999 or Spring 2000
• Islamic Art
County Museum of Art 
5905 Wilshire Blvd.,
L o s Angeles, CA 90036 
tel: +1 323 857-6000.
25 February 1999 – 17 May 1999
• Letters in Gold: Ottoman Calligraphy
from the Sakip Sabanci Collection,
I s t a n b u l .
• Draws upon one of Turkey’s leading
private collections to display 70
exceptional examples of Ottoman-era
calligraphy. 
Freer Gallery of Art 
The Arthur M. Sackler and Freer
Galleries of Asian Art, 
Smithsonian Institution,
W a s h i n g t o n DC 20560
May 3, 1998 – Indefinitely 
• Arts of the Islamic World. Some 60 works
– Koran pages, metalwork, ceramics,
glass, paintings, and calligraphy from
the 9th to 17th centuries are used to
explore Islamic artistic traditions.
Themes include the forms and functions
of the works of art, the role of
calligraphy, the use of figurative
decoration, and the meaning of
abstract designs.
January 23, 1999 – August 8, 1999
• Masterworks of Indian Painting III. On
view is a changing selection of 16th-
19th-century Indian paintings from the
Mughal Dynasty (1526-1858) and the
Rajput courts, who controled northern
and western India between the
1 7 t h-19th centuries. 
Sackler Gallery
Through 4 April 1999
• The Jesuits and the Grand Mogul:
Renaissance Art at the Imperial Court of
India (1580-1630). It looks at the
influence of Western style on Mughal
artists in the 16th century.
K U W A I T




K u w a i t
tel: 965 565 3006
October 1998 – May 1999
• A weekly series of public
presentations on Islamic art and art
history by Kuwaiti and international
s p e a k e r s .
The Agenda is produced by the Centre of
Islamic Culture in Rotterdam, The
Netherlands. Please send all information
with regard to activities related to culture
and art in the Islamic World to: 
The Centre of Islamic Culture
P.O. Box 361
3000 AJ Rotterdam The N e t h e r l a n d s
fax: 31 10 4118331
Art & Culture Agenda
In order for the ISIM Info Pages
t o prosper, we kindly ask for your
participation by filling out the
forms for Vacancy Announce-
ments and for Special Events.
These forms can be found online
on the ISIM website:
h t t p : / / i s i m . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
If you wish to have a formula sent
by e-mail, fax, or post, please
contact the ISIM Secretariat: 
Telephone: +31-71-527 7905  /
Fax: +31-71-527 7906  /
E-m a i l : I S I M @ r u l l e t . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
A l -cusur al-wusta Bulletin of
Middle East Medievalists
The Oriental Institute
1155 East 58 Street
Chicago, IL 60637 USA
Annual Newsletter of
t h e Edinburgh Institute for
t h e Advanced Study of Islam
a n d the Middle East
The University of Edinburgh
7 Buccleuch Place
Edinburgh EH8 9LW, UK
Tel.: +44 131 650 4181/2 or
+44 131 650 6615
Fax: +44 131 650 6804
E-mail: I s l a m i c . S t u d i e s @ e d . a c . u k
B I T I G
SOTA, Research Centre for Turkestan
a n dA z e r b a i j a n
P.O. Box 9642
2003 LP Haarlem, The Netherlands
Tel.: + 31 23 529 28 83 
Fax: + 31 23 529 28 83 
E-mail: s o t a @ t u r k i y e . n e t
B r i s m e s
British Society for Middle Eastern Studies
Centre for Middle Eastern & Islamic
Studies, University of Durham
South End House, South Road,
Durham DH1 2TG, UK
Tel.: +44 191 374 2821
Fax: +44 191 374 2830
E-mail: A . L . H a y s a y @ d u r h a m . a c . u k
Bulletin The Moshe Dayan
Center for Middle Eastern
a n d African Studies
Tel Aviv University
Ramat Aviv 69978, Israel
Tel.: +972 3 640 9646
Fax: +972 3 641 5802
E-mail: d a y a n c e n @ c c s g . t a u . a c . i l
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . d a y a n . o r g
Caraka ‘The Messenger’.
A Newsletter for Javanists
Dept. of Languages and Cultures
o f Southeast Asia and Oceania,
U n i v e r s i t y of Leiden
P.O. Box 9515, 2300 RA Leiden,
t h eN e t h e r l a n d s
Fax: +31 71 5272615
E-mail: C a r a k a @ r u l l e t . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
CCAS News
Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies
Georgetown University, ICC 241,
Washington, DC 20057-1020, USA
Tel.: +1 202 687 5793
Fax: +1 202 687 7001
E-mail: c c a s i n f o @ g u n e t . g e o r g e t o w n . e d u
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . g e o r g e t o w n . e d u /
s f s / p r o g r a m s / c c a s / n e w s l e t t e r s . h t m
CERES Newsletter
Centre for Resource Studies of
D e v e l o p m e n t
P.O. Box 80140, 3508 TC Utrecht,
T h e N e t h e r l a n d s
Tel.: +31 30 253 4815
Fax: +31 30 253 7482
E-mail: c e r e s @ f s w . r u u . n l
CMENAS Newsletter
Center for Middle Eastern and
N o r t h African Studies
University of Michigan
1080 South University, Suite 4640,
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1106, USA
Tel.: +1 734 764 0350
Fax: +1 734 764 8523
CMES Newsletter
Center of Middle Eastern Studies
Harvard University
1737 Cambridge Street, Rm. 517,
Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Tel.: +1 617 495 4055
E-mail: m i d e a s t @ f a s . h a r v a r d . e d u K I T
CNWS Newsletter
Research School CNWS, School of Asian,
African, and Amerindian Studies
P.O. Box 9515, 2300 RA, Leiden,
T h e N e t h e r l a n d s
Tel.: +31 71 527 2171, Fax: … 939
E-mail: C N W S @ R U L L E T . L e i d e n U n i v . n l
URL: h t t p : / / o a s i s . l e i d e n u n i v . n l /
i n t e r f a c / c n w s /
Correspondances. Bulletin
d’Information Scientifique
Institut de Recherche sur le Maghreb
contemporain (IRMC)
20, Rue Mohamed Ali Tahar
Mutuelleville – 1002 Tunis, Tunisia
Tel.: +216 1 796722
Fax.: +216 797376
E-mail: i r m c @ c a r a m a i l . c o m
URL: h t t p : / / w 3 . c y b e r - e s p a c e . c o m / i r m c
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . a m b a f r a n c e - m a . o r g /
c e s h s
CSAS Newsletter
Center for South Asian Studies
University of Virginia
110 Minor Hall, University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, Virginia 22903, USA
Tel.: +1 804 24 8815
CSSEAS Newsletter
Center for South and Southeast Asian
S t u d i e s
Suite 3640, 1080 S. University
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1106, USA
Tel: +1 734 764-0352, F a x : … 9 3 6 - 0 9 9 6
E-mail: c s s e a s @ u m i c h . e d u
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . u m i c h . e d u /





Prof. Dr. Günter Meyer
Geographisches Institut Universität
Mainz, 55099 Mainz, Germany
Tel.: +49 6131 392701/393446
Fax: +49 6131 394736
E-mail: D A V O @ g e o . U n i - M a i n z . d e
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . g e o . u n i - m a i n z . d e / d a v o
ENSEAS Newsletter
European Newsletter of South-East Asian
Studies (ENSEAS)
KITLV (Royal Institute of Linguistics
and Anthropology)
EUROSEAS (European Association for
South-East Asian Studies)
C/o KITLV, P.O. Box 9515
2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands
Tel.: +31 71 527 2295 / Fax: … 2638
E-mail: k i t l v @ r u l l e t . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
ESCAS Newsletter
The European Society for Central Asian
S t u d i e s
Asst. Prof. Mag. Dr. Gabriele
R a s u l y-P a l e c z e k ,
Institute for Ethnology, Cultural and
Social Anthropology, University of
Vienna, A-1010 Vienna, Universitätsstr.
7/IV, Austria
Tel.: +43 1 4277 485 06, Fax: … 94 85
E-mail: g a b r i e l e . r a s u l y @ u n i v i e . a c . a t
European Network for
Bangladesh Studies
The European Network for Bangladesh
S t u d i e s
Centre for Development Studies
University of Bath, Claverton Down,
Bath BA2 7AY, UK
IIAS Newsletter
International Institute for Asian Studies
P.O. Box 9515, NL 2300 RA Leiden,
T h e N e t h e r l a n d s
Tel.: +31 71 527 2227
Fax: +31 71 527 4162
E-mail: I I A S N e w s @ R U L L E T . L e i d e n u n i v . n l
URL: h t t p : / / i i a s . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
ISESCO Newsletter
Newsletter published by the Islamic
Educational, Scientific and Cultural
O r g a n i z a t i o n
Ave. Attine, Hay Riad, P.O. Box 2275,
Zip Code 10104, Rabat, Morocco
Tel.: +212 7 772433/715294/715305/
7 1 5 2 9 0
Fax: +212 7 772058/777459
Islamic Area Studies Newsletter
Project Management Office of Islamic
Area Studies
The University of Tokyo, Bungakubu
Annexe, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku,
Tokyo, 113, Japan
Tel.: +81 3 5684 3285
Fax: +81 3 5684 3279
E-mail: I - o f f i c e @ l . u - t o k y o . a c . j p
Individual and Society in the
Muslim Mediterranean World
( I S M M )
European Science Foundation
1 quai Lezay-Marnésia, 67080
Strasbourg Cedex, France
Tel.: +33 388 767121, Fax: … 370532
E-mail: M y a b o u b i @ e s f . o r g
Middle East Women’s Studies
R e v i e w
Association for Middle East Women’s
S t u d i e s
3000 Lillard Drive # 203
Davis, CA 95616, USA
E-mail: l a t h o m p s o n @ u c d a v i s . e d u
N A R C E
Newsletter of the American Research
Center in Egypt
American Research Center in Egypt,
3 0 East 20th Street Suite 401,
N e w York, NY 10003, USA
Tel.: +1 212 529 6661
Fax: +1 212 529 6856
E-mail: a r c e . c e n t e r @ n y u . e d u
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . a r c e . o r g
Nouvelles du CERI
Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches
I n t e r n a t i o n a l e s
Rue de Chevreuse 4, 5006 Paris,
F r a n c e
Tel.: +33 1 4410 8484
Fax: +33 1 4410 8450
URL: h t t p :/w w w . c e r i - s c i e n c e s p o . c o m
The Newsletter of the Islamic
Legal Studies Program
at Harvard Law School
Pound Hall 501, Harvard Law School,
Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Tel.: +1 617 496 3941
Fax: +1 617 496 2707
E-mail: i l s p @ l a w . h a r v a r d . e d u
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . l a w . h a r v a r d . e d u /
P r o g r a m s / I L S P
KIT Newsletter
Royal Tropical Institute
P.O. Box 95001, 1090 HA Amsterdam,
The Netherlands
Tel.: +31 20 568 8711, Fax: … 668 4579
Telex: 15080 KIT NL
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . k i t . n l / i n f o /
N e w s l e t t e r / n e w s _ t o c . a s p
La Lettre d’Asie Centrale
L’Association de Recherche et d’
Information sur l’Asie Centrale (ARIAC)
Maison des Sciences de l’Homme,
Bureau 108, 54 Boulevard Raspail,
75006 Paris, France
Fax: +33 1 4548 8353
MEOC Newsletter 
Middle East Center
838 Williams Hall, University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,
PA 19104-6305, USA
Tel.: +1 215 898 4690
Fax: + 1 215 573 2003
E-mail: m a r y m @ m e c . s a s . u p e n n . e d u
Middle East Studies Association
(MESA) Newsletter
University of Arizona 
1643 East Helen Street, Tucson,
Arizona 85721, USA
Tel.: +1 520 621-5850, Fax:… 6 - 9 0 9 5
E-mail: m e s a n a @ u . a r i z o n a . e d u
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . m e s a . a r i z o n a . e d u
MEWS Review
Association for Middle East Women’s
Studies (AMEWS)
Editorial Office
64 Alumni Avenue, Providence,
R I0 2 9 0 6
Middle East Resources
the Newsletter of the Teaching Resource
C e n t e r
Center for Middle Eastern Studies,
Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge
Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . f a s . h a r v a r d . e d u /
~ m i d e a s t / l l o c a l r e s / t r c n e w s . h t m l
News from Nordiska
A f r i k a i n s t i t u t e t
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet
P.O. Box 1703, 
SE-751 47 UPPSALA, Sweden
Tel: +46 18-56 22 00, Fax: … 69 56 29
E-mail: n a i @ n a i . u u . s e
URL: h t t p : / / w w w - h o t e l . u u . s e / n a i / m i s c /
i n s t s w e . h t m l
News and Notes
The Oriental Institute of the University of
C h i c a g o
1155 East 58th Street, Chicago,
I L . 60637, USA
Tel.: +1 773 702 1677, Fax: … 9853
E-mail: o i - m e m b e r s h i p @ u c h i c a g o . e d u
URL: h t t p : / / w w w - o i . u c h i c a g o . e d u
Newsletter Centre for the Study
of Islam and Muslim-Christian
R e l a t i o n s
Centre for the Study of Islam and
Christian-Muslim Relations
Selly Oak Colleges,
Birmingham B29 6LQ, UK
Tel.: +44 121 472 4231
Fax: +44 121 472 8852
E-mail: i s l a m @ s e l l y o a k . a c . u k
N e w s l e t t e r :
Organisation of the Islamic Conference
Research Centre for Islamic History,
Art, and Culture
P.O. Box 24
80692 Besiktas, Istanbul, Turkey
Tel.: +90 212 259 1742
Fax: +90 212 258 4365
E-mail: i r c i c a @ s u p e r o n l i n e . c o m
URL: h t t p : / / i r c i c a . h y p e r m a r t . n e t /
i r c i c a . h t m l
NIAS nytt Nordic Newsletter
o f Asian Studies
Nordic Insititute of Asian Studies
Leifsgade 33
DK-2300 Copenhagen S
D e n m a r k
Tel: +45 3254 8844
Fax: +45 3296 2530
E-mail: j c s @ n i a s . k u . d k
URL: h t t p : / / n i a s . k u . d k / n y t t
Nordisk Midtaustenbulletin
( N M B )
Nordic Society for Middle Eastern Studies
SMI, University of Bergen, Parkvn. 22 A,
N-5007 Bergen, Norway
Tel.: +47 5558 2711
Fax: +47-5558 9891
E-mail: k n u t . v i k o r @ s m i . u i b . n o
NVIC Newsletter
Nederlands Vlaams Instituut in Cairo
P.O. Box 50, 11211 Zamalek Cairo,
E g y p t
Tel.: +20 2 340 0076
Fax: +20 2 340 4376
E-mail: n i a a s c @ r i t e . c o m
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . h f - f a k . u i b . n o / s m i / n s m /
O C I S
Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies
George St., Oxford OX1 2AR, UK
Tel.: +44 1865 278730
Fax: +44 1865 248942
E-mail: p u b l i c a t i o n s @ o x c i s . a c . u k
ShowCase Arts Newsletter
51 Edenbridge Road
Bush Hill Park, Enfield EN1 2LW, UK
Tel.: +44 181 373 7719
E-mail: s a b i n a . a 2 @ u k o n l i n e . c o . u k
SIS News
The Newsletter of the Society for Iranian
S t u d i e s
C/o Princeton University Library, One,
Washington Road, Princeton, NJ
08544-2098, USA
Tel.: +1 609 258 1308
Fax: +1 609 258 0441
E-mail: k e s l a m i @ p h o e n i x . p r i n c e t o n . e d u
The Middle East Institute
N e w s l e t t e r
The Middle East Institute
1761 N Street, NW, Washington,
D C 20036-2882, USA
Tel.: +1 202 785 1141
Fax: +1 202 331 8861
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . m i d e a s t i . o r g / m e i
N e w s l e t t e r s
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Newsletters are a vital means of disseminating
information on various aspects of Islamic Studies
activities and institutions. The ISIM asks that you
inform us on any relevant newsletters in the field.
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AAS meeting in Boston
Panel on South Asian Muslims
Date: 11-3-99 to 14-3-99
Venue: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Boston
Omar Khalidi. Aga Khan Program
f o r Islamic Architecture
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 77 Massachusetts Ave.,
Room 7-238, Cambridge, MA 02139-
4307 USA
Tel: +1 617 258 5597
Fax: +1 617 253 9331
o k h a l i d i ! @ m i t . e d u
The First Arab Gulf Conference
On Folklore and Oral History
Date: 23-3-99 to 25-3-99
Venue: Al-Ain Intercontinental
United Arab Emirates
Zayed Center for Heritage and History
Tel: 97150 6422492/9713 615166
Fax: 9712 657757
N a b o o d a h @ u a e u . a c . a e
N a b o o d a h @ q m a r . u a e u . a c . a e
The Sixth Annual Central
Eurasian Studies Conference
a t Indiana University





Tel: +1 812 855 9510
Fax: +1 812 855 7500
a c e s @ i n d i a n a . e d u
British Association of South
Asian Studies (BASAS) Annual
Conference 1999: Norm and
D i v e r g e n c e
Date: 7-4-99 to 9-4-99
Venue: University of Derby, UK
Professor Jamal Malik, Department of
Religious Studies
University of Derby, Mickleover, Derby
DE3 5GX,UK
J . M a l i k @ d e r b y . a c . u k
Ahmed Andrews, Religious Resource
and Research Centre, University of
Derby, Mickleover, Derby DE3 5GX, UK
A.Andrews@derby.ac.uk 
h t t p : / / w w w . b r a d . a c . u k / a c a d / s e s / b a s a s
c 9 9 . h t m l
14th Annual Middle East History
and Theory Conference
Date: 10-4-99 to 11-4-99
Venue: University of Chicago, Center for
Middle Eastern Studies
Scott Lucas & Rochdi Younsi
MEHTW Coordinators
Center for Middle Eastern Studies, The
University of Chicago
5828 South University Avenue,
Chicago, IL 60637, USA
s c l u c a s @ m i d w a y . u c h i c a g o . e d u
International Congress on
Learning and Education in the
Ottoman World
Date: 12-4-99 to 15-4-99
Venue: Besiktas, Turkey
IRCICA, P.O. Box 24
80692 Besiktas, Istanbul, Turkey
Fax: +90 212 258 4365
I R C I C A @ i h l a s . n e t . t r
Iran at the Threshold of the New
Millennium. The 17th Annual
CIRA Conference 
Date: 23-4-99 to 24-4-99




Boston, MA 02115 USA
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . d a c . n e u . e d u / c i r a
Social Justice, Social Welfare
and Praxis in Islamic Societies in
A f r i c a
Date: 23-4-99 to 24-4-99
Venue: Department of Asian and African
Studies, University of Helsinki
P.O. Box 59 (Unioninkatu 38 B)
00014 University of Helsinki
Tel: + 358 9 708 4770
h o l g e r . w e i s s @ h e l s i n k i . f i
American Research Center in
Egypt Annual Meeting
Date: 23-4-99 to 25-4-99
Venue: Oriental Institute, University of
Chicago, USA
Tel: +1 212 529 6661
Fax: +1 212 529 6856
h t t p : / / w w w . a r c e . o r g
A r c e . c e n t e r @ n y u . e d u
Mutualities: Britain and Islam
Date: 28-4-99 to 30-4-99
Venue: Royal Commonwealth Society
18 Northumberland Avenue, London
SW1, UK
Promoter: Dr Peter Clark OBE, Special
Adviser, Middle East and North Africa
The British Council, 10 Spring Gardens
London SW1A 2BN, UK
Tel.: +44 171-389 4029
Fax: +44 171-389 4758
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . b r i t c o u n . o r g /
v i s i t i n g a r t s / i s l a m /
Uzbekistan in the 21st Century
Date: 12-5-99 to 13-5-99
Venue: Samarkand State Institute of
Foreign Languages (SSIFL)
Information: Dr Reuel Hanks
Dept. of Geography, Oklahoma State
University, Stillwater, OK 74078, USA
Fax: +1 405 744 5620
R h a n k s @ o k w a y . o k s t a t e . e d u
The Fourth Annual Midwest
Conference on Asian History and
C u l t u r e
Date: 14-5-99 to 16-5-99
Venue: The Ohio State University,
Columbus, Ohio
Matthew E. Keith or Erica Swarts
The Midwest Conference on Asian
History and Culture
106 Dulles Hall
230 West 17th Avenue
Columbus, Ohio 43210 USA 
Fax: +1 614 292 2282
k e i t h . 5 8 @ o s u . e d u
s w a r t s . 6 @ o s u . e d u
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . h i s t o r y . o h i o -
s t a t e . e d u / p e o p l e / k e i t h . 5 8 / m c a h c
The Resurgence of Islam in
Theory and Practice: The
Prospect of Islam in the Third
M i l l e n n i u m
Date: 21-5-99 to 23-5-99
Venue: Montreal, Canada Indonesian
Academic Society XXI
y w a h y u @ p o - b o x . m c g i l l . c a ,
amakin@po-box.mcgill.ca for English
b7e@musicb.mcgill.ca for French
International Congress of Mulla
Sadra (Iran)
Date: 23-5-99 to 27-5-99
Congress Site: h t t p : / / w w w . i r a n p a c . n e t . i r /
s a d r a / i n d e x . h t m
M u l l a s a d r a @ w w w . d c i . c o . i r
Sudan: Dilemmas and Prospects.
Sudan Studies Association
Annual Conference
Date: 4-6-99 to 6-6-99
Venue: Medford, MA
Ann. M. Lesch
Villanova University, Political Science
Department, 800 Lancaster Ave.,
Villanova PA 19085, USA
Fax: +1 610 519 7487
A l e s c h @ e m a i l . v i l l . e d u
The Druzes: 1000 Years of
History, Reform, and Tradition
Date: 4-6-99 to 5-6-99
Venue: The Institute of Druze Studies
( I D S )
P.O. Box 641025
Los Angeles, CA 90064, USA
Fax: +1 310 474 5900
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . i d s p u b l i c a t i o n s . c o m
i d s @ i d s p u b l i c a t i o n s . c o m
Mutualities: Britain and Islam
Promoting Muslim arts in the UK
July 1999
Venue: ICA, London (tbc)
Promoter: Rachel Abedi, Visiting Arts,
1 1 Portland Place, London W1N 4EJ,
U K
Tel.: +44 171 389 3019
Fax: +44 171 389 3016
i n d e p e n d e n c e @ e a s y n e t . c o . u k
Asean Inter-University Seminar
on Social Development
Southeast Asia into the 21st Century:
Critical Transitions, Continuity and
C h a n g e
Date: 16-6-99 to 18-6-99
Venue: CS Thani Hotel, Pattani, Thailand
Asian Seminar Secretariat
Dept. of Sociology
National University of Singapore
19 Kent Ridge Crescent
Singapore 119260
Tel: +73 335093/331620/336096
Iran under Reza Pahlavi 1921-
1941. New Perspectives on State
and Society
Date: 2 5 - 6 - 9 9
Venue: Brunei Gallery, SOAS
Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square
London WC1H 0XG, UK
Tel: +44 171 323 6164
Fax: +44 171 323 6064
S C 4 5 @ s o a s . a c . u k
Foreign Policies of Middle East
S t u d i e s
Date: 12-7-99 to 15-7-99
Venue: St. Andrews, Scotland
Prof. Raymond Hinnebusch
Dept. of International Relations
University of St. Andrews
St. Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL, Scotland,
U K
R h 1 0 @ s t - a n d r e w s . a c . u k
Middle East Encounters with
European Enlightenment
Date: 26-7-99 to 31-7-99
Dublin, Republic of Ireland
Shelly Ekhtiar. Dept. of English
SUNY Oswego, Oswego NY 13126
e k h t i a r @ o s w e g o . e d u
Second International Malaysian
Studies Conference
Date: 2-8-99 to 4-8-99
Venue: Institute of Postgraduate Studies
and Research, University of Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Foo Ah Hiang
Institute of Postgraduate Studies
a n dR e s e a r c h
University of Malaya
50603 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Tel: +60 603 7593606
Fax: +60 603 7567252
M a s s a 2 2 @ m a i l c i t y . c o m
H l f o o @ u m c s d . u m . e d u . m y
URL: h t t p : / / i p s p . u m . e d u . m y
U R L :
h t t p : / / m e m b e r s . x o o m . c o m / P S S M M A S
S A
The 11th International Congress
of Turkish Art (ICTA-XI)
Date: 30-8-99 to 4-9-99
Venue: Chair of Islamic Languages and
Cultures, Utrecht University
Drift 15, 3512 BR Utrecht
The Netherlands
I C T A - X I @ l e t . u u . n l
U R L :
h t t p : / / w w w . l e t . u u . n l / o o s t e r s / i c t a 0 . h t
The Qajar Epoch: Culture, Art &
Architecture in Qajar Persia
Date: 2-9-99 to 4-9-99
Venue: School of Oriental and African
Studies, London, UK
C/o PO Box 2256, London W1A 1YS
Fax: +44 171 431 7923
i n f o @ i r a n h e r i t a g e . c o m
International Association for the
History of Religions (IAHR)
XVIII Quinquennial Congress
Date: 5-8-2000 to 12-8-2000
Venue: International Convention Centre,
Durban, South Africa
Prof. Pratap Kumar
Department of Science of Religion,
University of Durban-Westville, Private
Bag X54001, Durban, 4000 South
A f r i c a
kumar@pixie. udw.ac.za
General Secretary of the IAHR, Prof.
Armin W. Geertz
Department of the Study of Religion,
University of Aarhus, Main Building,
DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
g e e r t z @ t e o l o g i . a a u . d k
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . u d w . a c . z a / i a h r /
European Conference of Iranian
S t u d i e s
Paris, Sept. 1999
Monde Iranien
CNRS – 27, rue Paul Bert 94, 204 IVRY-
sur-Seine, France
Tel: +33 0 1 49 60 40 05
Fax: +33 0 1 45 21 94 19
i r a n @ d r l . c n r s . f r
The thirteenth Turkish Congress
of History
Date: 4-10-99 to 8-10-99
Loction: Ancara (or Bursa), Turkey
Prof. Dr. Yusuf Halacoglu




Tel: +90 312 310 23 68
Fax: +90 312 310 16 98
Beyond the Border:
a N e w Framework for
Understanding the Dynamism
o f Muslim Societies
Date: 8-10-99 to 10-10-99




C o m m i t t e e
The University of Tokyo, Bungakubu
Annexe, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku,
Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan
Tel: + 81 3 5684 3285
Fax: + 81 3 5684 3285
i - i n r @ l . u - t o k y o . a c . j p
International Interdisciplinary
Conference on Language,
Thought and Reality: Science,
Religion and Philosophy
Date: 1-8-2000 to 4-8-2000
Venue: Calcutta, India
Contact: Dr Chandana Chakrabarti
Elon College Campus Box 2336
Elon College, N.C. 27244, USA
C h a k r a b a @ n u m e n . e l o n . e d u
h t t p : / / w w w . e l o n . e d u / c h a k r a b a
Deadline for proposals: 1 - 4 - 9 9
MESA Annual
M e e t i n g s :
1 9 9 9
Date: 19-11-99 to 22-11-99
Venue: Marriott Wardman Park Hotel,
Washington DC, USA
2 0 0 0
Date: 16-11-2000 to 19-11-2000
Venue: Disney’s Coronado Springs
Resort, Orlando, FL, USA
AAR/SBL Annual
M e e t i n g s :
1 9 9 9
Date: 20-11-99 to 23-11-99
Boston, Massachusetts
2 0 0 0
Date: 18-11-2000 to 21-11-2000
Nashville, Tennessee
Academic Meetings
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Peter Mandaville
Digital Islam: Changing the Boundaries
o f Religious Knowledge ?
1
I S I M
Dick Douwes
E d i t o r i a l
2









ISIM Advanced Degree Programme
4
P O L I C Y  D E B A T E
Nico Landman
Imams in the Netherlands:
H o m e-m a d e Better than Import ?
5
G E N E R A L  I S S UE S
Abdou Filali-Ansary




The Radicalization of Sunni Conservative
F u n d a m e n t a l i s m
7
Joe Stork
Human Rights Watch and the Muslim World
8
R E G I O N A L  I S S U E S
Juan R.I. Cole
The Genesis of the Baha'i Faith and






Armed Separatism and Muslim Autonomy
i n the Southern Philippines
1 1
Margaret Kartomi
Seudati Inong: the Female Form of
M a r t i a l Art Genre in Aceh
1 2
Chandra Muzaffar
Power Struggle in Malaysia: the Anwar Crisis
1 3
Jay Willoughby
The Cham Muslims of Vietnam
1 4
Theodore Gabriel
The Sufi Tariqas of the Lakshadweep Islands,
I n d i a
1 5
Adeeb Khalid
Jadidism in Central Asia: Islam and
Modernity in the Russian Empire
1 6
Ziba Mir-Hosseini
The Making of Divorce Iranian Style
1 7
Evert Schreur
National Heritage: Cairo Style
1 8
Valerie J. Hoffman
Saints and Sheikhs in Modern Egypt
1 9
Rahal Boubrik
Traditional ‘Men of Religion’ and
P o l i t i c a l Power in Mauritania
2 0
Katherine E. Hoffman
Singing the Distance: Gendered Experiences
of Migration in Anti-Atlas Community Song
2 1
Abdulkader Tayob
Transitional Islamic Identities in Southern
A f r i c a
2 2
Elizabeth Frierson
The Debatability of Islam in Late-Ottoman
Serials and Censorship
2 3
M i loš Mendel








Elections in the Muslim Community
o f B e l g i u m
2 6
Halima Kassim
Muslims and Missionaries of Trinidad
2 7
R E S E A R C H
Aysha Parla interviews








in the Arab World
3 0
Richard C. Martin
Getting Beyond Fundamentalism in Islamic
S t u d i e s
3 1
R E S E A R C H  P R O J E C T S
Samina Yasmeen










The Study of Islam: American Academy of
R e l i g i o n
3 5
Georges Khalil
The Working Group Modernity and Islam
3 6
Richard C. Martin
Consortium for Islamic Religious Studies
3 7
Peter van der Veer
Research Centre Religion and Society
3 8
A P P O I N T M E N T S
Marcel Kurpershoek 
Chair of Arabic Literature and Politics,
Leiden University
3 9
Johan G.J. Ter Haar
Chair of Persian Language and Literature
and the Cultural History of Iran,
L e i d e n U n i v e r s i t y
3 9
P U B L I C A T I O N S
The Encyclopaedia of Islam 
of the Turkish Religious Foundation
4 0
Corien W. Hoek
Shifting Sands. Social-economic Develop-
ment in the al-Sharqiyah Region, Oman
4 0
Charles Kurzman




Basic Tools of Research
4 2
C O NF E R E N C E  R E P O R TS
Laurence Michalak & Renate Holub
UC Berkeley Symposium 'Islam and the
Changing Identity of Europe'
4 3
IN F O  P A G E S
Mutualities: Britain and Islam
Cultural and Arts Programme
4 4
Art and Culture Agenda
4 5




C o n t e n t s
The International Institute for
t h e Study of Islam in the Modern
World (ISIM) promotes and
conducts interdisciplinary
research on contemporary social
and intellectual trends and
movements in Muslim societies
and communities. It emerged from
the need to further research on
developments of great intellectual,
social, and political importance in
t h e Muslim world. The ISIM’s
research approaches are thus
expressly interdisciplinary and
comparative, covering a large
geographic range which includes
North Africa and the Middle East,
Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia,
South and Southeast Asia, and
(Muslim communities in) the West.
Broad in its scope, the ISIM brings
together all areas of expertise.
